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Abstract 
Traditionally, activism by investors in Germany has not played a central part either in 
its corporate governance regime, or in Company Law doctrine. However, in the last 
years the role of shareholder engagement in Germany has changed considerably. As a 
response to developments in financial markets, society, technology and globalisation 
the legislator introduced a number of legal reforms in order to improve corporate 
governance. In this new concept the shareholders play a key role. However, currently 
shareholder rights in Germany are only exercised to a limited extent. This concerns 
private, corporate as well as institutional investors. To rely on a sound corporate 
governance system it is not only essential to have an appropriate legislation and a 
functional supervisory board, but also to have a healthy shareholder engagement'. 
Arguing that shareholder engagement has and will have an increasingly positive 
impact on corporate governance in Germany, this thesis aims to do three things. Firstly, 
it seeks to argue, normatively, that shareholder engagement does indeed matter, and 
can be beneficial for shareholders. Secondly it describes the current situation of 
shareholder engagement in Germany, while thirdly it provides proposals on how the 
current system could be reformed. Of course, "shareholder engagement" is a somewhat 
open ended term. To increase comprehension of the potential benefits of such 
engagement, as well as its current limits, this concept needs to be 'unpacked' and 
precise meaning given to it. In this thesis, I try to do that by developing, in chapter 1, 
what I call a "hierarchy of forms of shareholder engagement". The hierarchy arranges 
the forms of shareholder engagement according to their level of "aggression". This 
hierarchy is then used throughout the thesis to maintain a consistent analysis of the 
benefits of different forms of shareholder engagement, the extent of different forms, and 
the legal and practical changes I argue remain necessary to increase the effectiveness of 
these different forms of engagement. 
1 By shareholder engagement I mean the safeguarding of all justifiable interests, which are given to the shareholder by law or by the articles of association of the 
company. 
In most of the literature the concept of "shareholder activism" is used instead of "shareholder engagement". I prefer to rely on the second wording. The reason 
being the fact that shareholder activism often has a negative connotation. Activists in connection with an annual general meeting are sometimes seen as 
troublemakers not only among the boards but also among investment managers. Moreover, activists also strive for popularity and attention. This is not the 
intention of shareholder engagement, which aims at positive results for the investors. The impression that legally protected activities by the shareholder are 
assessed as being negative should be avoided in this thesis. Additionally the concept of shareholder engagement in contrast to shareholder activism is more and 
more accepted in literature and market. 
As the emphasis of this thesis is on the investment in securities of stock corporations, other forms of investment are only mentioned when appropriate 
(Partnerships, private limited companies, closed funds). 
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After the introduction (Chapter 1), the thesis is divided into three parts. Part A is the 
normative part; Part B the descriptive part; Part C provides suggestions to reform the 
system, including my own recommendation. 
Chapter 2 of PART A provides the normative foundation of the thesis. In particular it 
shows that not only is shareholder engagement able to create shareholder value and 
other "intangible values" for investors, but also has an important function for a sound 
corporate governance system. A number of different surveys, which support this 
argument, are presented as well as some other surveys, which seem to go against my 
argument. In this respect the measurable and positive effect of the different forms of 
shareholder engagement is shown. 
The descriptive PART B starts with Chapter 3. Here I introduce those instruments 
which support shareholder engagement. Explaining the role of the supervisory board in 
particular, but also the possibilities of proxy solicitation, helps to develop a good 
understanding of the environment of shareholder engagement. 
Chapter 4 provides empirical evidence on the current practices and extent of 
shareholder engagement, whilst chapter 5 examines the non-legal environment for the 
exercise of shareholder engagement. 
Chapter 6 turns to the legal environment for shareholder engagement, again applying 
the hierarchy of shareholder engagement developed in chapter 1. 
Within this chapter I seek to demonstrate that the new liberties provided by Company 
Law are not yet applied appropriately, and that there is sufficient room for 
improvement. 
In Chapter 7I present the limits of engagement by investors, by explaining the 
shareholders' duty of loyalty towards fellow investors and the stock corporation. 
PART C turns to the reform of the German corporate governance regime. It is divided 
into three chapters. To get a clear idea of what remains to be done in the future, it 
needs to be pointed out what has been achieved so far. More specifically, Chapter 8 
focuses on the most recent activities of the legislator in the environment of shareholder 
engagement. Four important Acts and Bills are explained and assessed. Finally, an 
outlook into future legal initiatives is also provided. 
In Chapter 9, I introduce a number of different authors who developed theories on how 
the legal environment could be reformed. The aim of those hypothesises is that 
shareholder engagement has to be pursued easily and has to benefit all stakeholders. 
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In Chapter 10 l provide my own suggestions and findings on the role of shareholder 
engagement. In particular I see three outstanding issues as central to improving 
shareholder engagement, namely: a) the financing of shareholder engagement; b) 
investors' reluctance and lack of awareness; and c) shortcomings in Company Law. 
The suggestion on financing shareholder engagement requires pointing out, as it plays 
an important role in the overall concept. As a result I make a proposal on how the 
system existing so far could be reformed by using a working model called "agency 
without authority. " According to this model the institutional investor could pass on the 
costs, which arise out of his engagement, to the issuer. 
In this chapter I conclude that a mixed reform between an extension of the areas where 
investors could take influence, and a cut back of other rights is necessary so that 
shareholder engagement will act as a guarantor for sound corporate governance in 
Germany. 
8 
1. Chapter: Introduction 
1.1. Defining the Position of Shareholder Engagement in the Corporate 
Governance System 
1.1.1. The Pillars of German Corporate Governance 
"One share - one vote"2 is nowadays probably one of the most discussed principles 
within the Company Law in Germany. It provides a basic right in the concept of 
corporate governance, namely the influence shareholders could execute on corporate 
policy and decision making via the general meeting. According to the German Stock 
Corporation Act, shareholder rights include in particular the safeguarding of the assets; 
the right to be informed on company matters; participation in the general meeting; and 
protection- and control mechanisms through share- and voting quorums. Moreover, 
they also include the right of action against the issuer or a third party and more. 3 
Along with the supervisory board and the legislation, the general meeting is supposed 
to build a three pillar base for the regime of corporate governance. 
Some jurisdictions preferred to install one board with executive and non-executive 
directors in it. In contrast to this, the two-tier control mechanism describes another way 
of corporate governance: The separation into a management and a supervisory board, 
which consists of shareholder and employee representatives. 
A number of recent crises, such as those of Telekom, EM-TV, Mannesmann, 
DaimlerChrysler, Holzmann, Volkswagen4 and others, have raised doubts as to 
whether this governance system is still suitable for a leading financial market place. 
To strengthen the second and central pillar, the German legislator has increased efforts 
to reform the Stock Corporation Act of 1965 in the last years, with the aim of improving 
existing governance mechanisms and introducing new remedies. 
One cornerstone of the new legal framework within Company Law was the work of the 
government panel on corporate governance5 (May 2000 - July 2001). The task of this 
2 Regulated in § 134 AktG; albeit with a number of exceptions. 
3 Obermüller, Werner, Winden Die Hauptversammlung 
der Aktiengesellschaft" revised by Butzke, Volker 4th Edition Stuttgart 2001 at p. 214 
4 There are numerous articles in the web considering this topic. See, 
for example, 
Hoffritz, Jutta Rüstige 
Rentner dringend gesucht" in die Zeit 12/2000 at www. zeit. de/2000/12/200012_ar_kontrolle. html; Hamann, Götz/Hauch-Fleck, Marie- 
Luise/Uebel, Conny Legitim, 
legal, illegal" in die Zeit 13/2001 at www. zeit. de/2001/13/wirtschaft/200113_bewertung. html; Kramarsch, Michael H. Fur 
die 
Vergütung von Managern werden Maßstäbe gesucht" in Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung 08/09/01 Wirtschaft 
5 Report of the Government Panel on Corporate Governance 
July 2001 "Unternehmensführung - Unternehmenskontrolle - Modernisierung des Aktienrechts" to 
download at http: //dip. bundestag. de/btd/14/075/1407515. pdf or press report 
304/01 
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panel was to scrutinise the German Stock Corporation Act and to find ways through 
which it could be improved by national and international corporate governance 
standards. In particular they described the legislator's task as follows: 
"Due to the institutionalisation and internationalisation of shareholdings, the globalisation of the 
capital markets, and the rapid development of information technologies, the German corporate law 
system was placed under increasing pressure to adapt to the ever changing requirements of the 
market6". 
The central proposal of the panel was that the Federal Government is to appoint a 
group of experts to draft and continuously improve a Code of Corporate Governance7. 
Although the Code is not legally binding for stock corporations, they are advised to 
document it in their articles of association. The reason for this is that they have to 
comply with it or explain their opting out (§ 161 AktG) in the Bundesanzeiger (Federal 
Gazette). Moreover, the panel also proposed the creation of a legal framework for this 
new, flexible instrument. Consequently, a number of findings by the panel resulted in 
the TransPuG of 2002. Surprisingly, the rights of investors in Germany can be seen as 
the most advanced within Euroland8. Although it would be wrong to overrate this 
view, it does at least indicate that German legislation is competitive compared to that of 
other financial markets. 
Technical and social developments were also taken into account by the legislator. 
Examples include the possibility to vote the stocks electronically, the (unfortunately) 
short-lived fashion to change bearer share equities into registered shares, and the 
increased importance of the stock market not only for the pension scheme but also as an 
attractive investment for individuals. 
Historically, the general meeting as the third pillar of corporate governance has not 
played a decisive part in the German corporate governance system, although the capital 
presence might indicate the opposite. This derived from the still dominant position of 
the custodian banks and their reluctance to interfere with corporate policy and decision 
making. However, over the last years the financial, social and political environment has 
changed and with it the role of the shareholder meeting. By acknowledging that it 
needs to become a load-bearing pillar in the concept of corporate governance, the 
shareholder meeting experienced an increase in value. It is slowly becoming a body 
which, within its limits, exercises control over the company. Therefore shareholder 
engagement is decisive for influencing the general meeting. 
While the two-tier board and the new Code, respectively Company Law, have become 
accepted load-bearing pillars in the German corporate governance system, the general 
6 Report of the Government Panel on Corporate Governance July 2001 to download on "Untemehmensfuhrung - Unternehmenskontrolle - Modernisierung des 
Aktienrechts" to download at http: //dip. bundestag. de/btd/14/075/1407515. pdf or press report 304/01 
7 German Corporate Governance Code to download at www. corporate-govemance-code. de/eng/download/DCG_K_E200305. pdf (Last alteration: 2.6.2005) 
8 Kramarsch, Michael H. Für die Vergütung von 
Managern werden Maßstäbe gesucht" in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 08/09/01 Wirtschaft 
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meeting still falls back because of underdeveloped shareholder engagement. The big 
issue here remains the widespread lack of awareness of shareholder rights and its 
accompanying responsibility, or more directly, investors' ignorance. This becomes 
obvious when looking at the capital presence at general meetings in Germany9, and the 
uncritical approach towards governance issues1o. 
However, due to the debate on the performance of certain corporations' board 
members; recent legislator's reforms on the Stock Corporation Act; and enhanced 
investor relations management, shareholder engagement is gaining in importance to 
market participants. 
1.1.2. The Position of Shareholder Engagement in Corporate Germany 
In a study carried out by the fund corporation, DWS, on corporate governance" 
German companies do not meet the standards of international investors12. While the 
legislation has been found shareholder friendly, the quality of the supervisory boards 
was assessed as being poor13. Moreover, the commitment to shareholder-value, 
achieved by the teamwork of the executive board, the supervisory board and the 
shareholders, is largely viewed as inadequate14. This statement is reinforced when 
considering the failure of corporate governance in certain German stock corporations 
like EMTV, Comroad, Kabel New Media and others. 
Although these reforms have not yet made the German system comparable with the 
Anglo-American scheme15, the introduction of the German Corporate Governance 
Code16 implied considerable progress in this area. Even if the code is a recommendation 
rather than a statute, it indicates the fact that governance is up-valued in Corporate 
Germany. This positive development will most probably improve the value of German 
corporations to a significant extent17 as the capital markets will acknowledge enhanced 
transparency and publicity. 
Due to Corporate Germany's ignorance on such matters, foreign institutional investors 
as well as the legislator have led the push for German companies to adopt corporate 
9 See Figure 6: Presence at DAX 30 AGMs (1998-2005) 
10 Although critique could get quite loud, the majorities in a number of general meetings do not reflect this. Good example: Especially institutional investors and 
shareholder associations criticised severely the management of DaimlerChrysler before the 2004 AGM. Nevertheless, the activities of the board were approved by 
88% of the votes. 
11 Hetzer, Jonas/Papendick, Ulrich Unter 
Freunden" in Manager Magazin 8/01,31. Jahrgang at p. 92-98 
12 Hetzer, Jonas/Papendick, Ulrich Unter Freunden" 
in Manager Magazin 8/01,31. Jahrgang at p. 94 
13 Hetzer, Jonas/Papendick, Ulrich Unter 
Freunden" in Manager Magazin 8/01,31. Jahrgang at p. 97 
14 Hetzer, Jonas/Papendick, Ulrich Unter 
Freunden" in Manager Magazin 8/01,31. Jahrgang at p. 97 
15 Hanloser, Stefan Proxy-Voting, 
Remote-Voting und Online-HV: § 134 s. 3 AktG nach dem NaStraG" in Neue Zeitschrift für Gesellschaftsrecht (NZG), Volume 
8,27.04.2001 p. 355-358 at p. 356 
16 German Corporate Governance Code to download at www. corporate-governance-code. de/eng/download/DCG_K_E200305. pdf (Last alteration: 2.6.2005) 
17 California Public Employees' Retirement System "Why Corporate Governance Today? " A Policy Statement - to download at http: //www. calpers- 
governance. org/principles/domestic/why/pageOl. asp 
August 14,1995, Especially the pension funds and shareholder associations represent this opinion 
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governance standards. Some companies' resistance to these changes can still be 
observed in, for example, the lack of transparency of the managements' remuneration. 
1.1.3. The Position of Shareholder Engagement in a Global Context 
Shareholder engagement has also become more important as a result of increased 
internationalisation of the investors. Companies tend to acquire capital from around the 
globe, while investors hold more and more cross-border shares. Considering the 
merging of capital markets, it can be predicted that the trend to international 
investments will increase, because the introduction of the Euro is harmonising the 
European stock market18. Also the increasing popularity of shares as a means of 
payment with takeovers and mergers of corporations will speed up the globalisation of 
capital markets. 
In contrast to globalisation effects, it appears that shareholder rights do not cross the 
border. Although the legislation protects the rights of any investor, they are currently 
rarely exercised by foreign shareholders. For institutional investors, as opposed to 
private shareholders, this is about to change due to new technical developments, 
increased legal requirements, and possibly the realisation that corporate governance 
matters. 
Now it is more important than ever to exercise the possibilities, which are given by 
Company Law. Still the question remains if the conditions, which are set by the 
legislator and corporations, are sufficient to revalue the global shareholder as a 
supporter of the corporate governance system. 
The European Union has taken on the challenge of harmonising the different systems of 
corporate governance by putting this topic into its programme of action19. In a first step 
they had formed a panel on a Modern Framework for Company Law in Europe, the so- 
called "Winter-Committee"20. The findings of this panel lead to the recognition within 
the EU-Commission that improving the rights of shareholders of companies across the 
Member States was a priority21. The result is an Action Plan on modernising Company 
Law and enhancing corporate governance in the European Union. Especially, within 
18 Baums, Theodor/Schmitz, Rainer Shareholder 
Voting in Germany" Paper No. 76,1998 to download at www. jura. uni- 
osnabrueck. de/ institut/ hwr/ papers. htm 
19 Hommelhoff, Peter Die OECD-Principles on 
Corporate Governance - ihre Chancen und Risiken aus dem Blickwinkel der deutschen corporate governance- 
Bewegung" in Zeitschrift für Unternehmens- und Gesellschaftsrecht (ZGR), Vol. 30, No. 2, March 2001 at p. 238-267 at p. 262 
20 "Report of the High Level Group of Company Law Experts on a Modem Regulatory Framework for Company Law in Europe" 2002 to download at 
http: / / europa. eu. int/comm/ internal_market/ en/company/ company/ modern/ consult/ report_en. pdf 
21 European Commission - Directorate General Internal Market Company Law 
& Corporate Governance" 2006, to download at 
http: / / europa. eu. int/ comm/ internal_market/company/ shareholders/ index_en. htm 
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this context, an up-valuation of shareholder rights with a global alignment could be 
expected within 200622. 
To avoid the so-called "Delaware Syndrome" or "race to the bottom"23, the 
harmonisation of each member state's Company Law is essential24. This means that a 
member state should not refrain from important Company Law standards in order to 
win incorporation against another member state. Important considerations are tax 
issues, corporate control and labour market requirements. 
The European Union is seen to have less developed shareholder rights than the US25. 
The willingness of the EU-Commission to improve the legal framework in this area is 
consequently necessary to keep the European financial services market competitive. 
In summary, corporate governance in Germany and in the European Union still varies 
between the member states to an unsatisfactory extent. Hence, the role of the individual 
or institutional investor and the funds has to be upgraded. While the legislator has 
recognised, to a degree, that good shareholder engagement indicates additional support 
in the corporate governance system, German companies only slowly accept that an 
active shareholder is not only a guarantor for stability, but is also a marketing tool in 
gaining new investors. 
1.2. The Hierarchy of Forms of Shareholder Engagement 
Before explaining the environment of shareholder engagement, an escalating hierarchy 
should be drawn. This will support a better understanding, help to clarify an 
assessment and make the consideration of the environment for shareholder engagement 
easier not only with regard to its benefits but also to its costs. 
The hierarchy of shareholder engagement helps to define an easy and promising 
approach for the shareholder to request information or address his concerns towards 
the management in a reasonable manner. The hierarchy of shareholder engagement can 
also help the management of listed companies to better understand and react to the 
requests and concerns of the investor. Consequently the suggested hierarchy serves 
both parties. 
22 European Commission - Directorate General Internal Market 
" Corporate governance: Commission proposals to make it easier for shareholders to exercise 
their rights within the EU" 2006, Reference: IP/06/10, to download at 
http: / /europa. eu. int/rapid/pressReleasesAction. do? reference=IP/06/10&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en 
23 Tuerks, Robin A. "Depotstimmrechtspraxis versus U. S. -proxy-system: der Beitrag von Finanzintermediären zur 
Optimierung der Unternehmenskontrolle" 
Munich 2000 at p. 74 - In the beginning of the 
20th century a competition was held between the different US-States for the taxest Company Law. Winner was the 
state of Delaware, which was in 1915 considered the most 
liberal state to incorporate. 
24 Lo, Benjamin T. Improving 
Corporate Governance: Lessons from the European Community" Indiana University School of Law 1994 to download at 
http: //www. law. indiana. edu/glsj/voll/lo. htmi; more detailed: Stith, Clark D, 
"A "race to the bottom" in the European Community" in Federalism and 
Company Law 1991from p. 1549 at p. 1581 
25 Report to the European Commission by Delphi International 
LTD in Association with Ecologic GmbH "The Role Of Financial Institutions in Achieving 
Sustainable Development" 1997 to download at www. europa. eu. 
int//comrn/environment/finserv/fitotal. pdf 
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The following possibilities, ordered according to the level of "aggression" against the 
company that they entail, can be identified and distinguished: 
1. Requests for Information 
Requesting information from the issuer helps the shareholder improve his assessment 
abilities of the company's situation and thus of his investments. 
This information might be provided by the company in form of the annual report or the 
general meeting agenda or more general via their webpage. Alternatively, the 
shareholder also has the right to request more specific information directly from the 
company. 
As he receives the information directly from the company there is no fractional loss and 
100% accuracy can be expected. The information request is a practical and easy tool for 
the investor and should serve to build the basis for further shareholder engagement. 
The costs for pursuing this right are insignificant. 
2. Shareholder Negotiations 
Shareholder negotiations are not regulated and should therefore be considered as the 
least "aggressive" form of shareholder engagement. The company is not obliged to 
enter negotiations with its investors. 
Seeking dialogue with management is an elegant way to tell those that are responsible 
that they need to do better or make certain changes to corporate practice. If these 
measures fail the shareholder could still consider taking his issues to a higher level. 
Negotiations should be used by the larger shareholding investors in the company. 
The costs of talks are high as they need to be well prepared and should be carried out 
by members of senior management (when pursued by an institutional investor). In any 
case the chances of success need to be scrutinised prior to entering into discussions with 
the company. 
3. Speaking at the General Meeting 
Speaking at the general meeting is closely related to the request of information. This 
right provides the shareholder with the possibility to address and formulate critical 
issues towards a large group of shareholders and the management. Being asked a 
question, management needs to react and provide either a sufficient answer or the 
requested information. The costs for this right are insignificant. However, a positive or 
negative impact on the reputation needs to be considered. 
4. Shareholder Proposal or Calling in a General Meeting 
The next step the shareholder could consider is making a proposal to the general 
meeting. Although proposals by shareholders are very rarely successful, not only are 
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they an effective tool to force management to take a stand, but also to bring the raised 
issues closer to other shareholders. 
A shareholder proposal is emphasised when it is accompanied by a proxy fight. 
Additionally, providing the shareholder fulfils the legal requirements set out in 
Company Law he is also entitled to call a general meeting to discuss urgent issues. 
This option requires careful consideration as it is likely to have an impact on the 
company's reputation. The costs for a shareholder proposal or calling a general meeting 
are low. 
5. Using the Voting Right 
This tool primarily serves the purpose to show management either that it is doing a 
good job by voting for its recommendations; or to indicate that it requires improvement 
by voting against. This latter option is a vote of no-confidence, which, providing the 
opposition casts sufficient votes, puts a considerable strain on the board. 
The vote should be withheld when the shareholder believes that he is not sufficiently 
informed over an item on the agenda, but believes that there is an issue. Unfortunately, 
because of the low attendance at German general meetings, withholding the vote rather 
indicates passivity than an active analysis of the issues within the company. 
The shareholders' approval becomes necessary for a number of corporate decisions 
being brought about. This is particularly important with regard to resolutions on 
dividend payments; mergers and acquisitions; composition of the supervisory board, or 
altering the statutes. Even when the investor uses a proxy the costs for using this form 
of engagement are low to medium. 
6. Legal Actions 
Legal actions are often seen as a "last resort" for the shareholder, sometimes correctly. 
Not only because they carry a financial risk for the plaintiff, but also because they might 
hinder the economic or social development of the company. Typically, they serve either 
to recover financial losses (which could be attributed to at least negligent behaviour of 
the management) or to maintain the status of the investor. Due to the impact a legal 
action might have, management is well advised to take this form of engagement 
seriously and to take appropriate measures. Taking a certain action will probably have 
a negative impact on the reputation of the investor. In addition to that the costs in 
relation to the risk could be assessed as high. 
7. Exit as a Form of Shareholder Engagement? 
Simply selling the shares is still a very powerful and popular tool to express 
dissatisfaction with corporate performance. Although it constitutes a form of 
shareholder activity, I shall argue that it 
does not constitute a form of shareholder 
engagement as defined for this Thesis. 
More particularly, "exit" is designed for the 
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expressed purpose of breaking with the company, not to engage with it. Certainly the 
effect of selling shares may well reduce the share price and force management to 
change their policies. However, this is not the motive of those who sell their shares. 
Therefore I shall treat a sale, or "exit", as a last resort of shareholder engagement. Also 
known as "voting with the feet", this measure does not harmonise with the notion of 
corporate governance. With the exception of custodian fees and possible Capital Gain 
Tax, exit costs are insignificant. 
16 
Part A- Normative Part 
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2. Chapter: Why Shareholder Engagement in Germany Is Beneficial 
Shareholder engagement does matter and is becoming more and more relevant for 
corporate Germany and investors themselves26. The Deutsche Börse bid for the London 
Stock Exchange in early 2005 revealed the increased influence of shareholders on 
corporate decision making in quite a dramatic way. In this case the shareholders of the 
Deutsche Börse (77% Anglo-American investors) evaluated the takeover offer for the 
London Stock Exchange as far too expensive. Management of the Deutsche Börse did 
not consult its own shareholders prior to the bid, yet a number of shareholders 
succeeded in demanding an end to the takeover battle. The CEO and the chairman of 
the supervisory board wore the consequence and resigned. 
The question answered in this chapter is whether shareholder engagement is beneficial 
both for shareholders and for stakeholders under certain conditions. I shall begin by 
examining whether engagement is advantageous for corporate performance and hence, 
shareholder value. To recognise a potential positive impact of shareholder engagement 
on the stock price (material), a number of different tests will be applied below. These 
tests are also important to determine which forms of activity (hierarchy of shareholder 
engagement) deliver most value. Additionally, it will also be investigated whether 
shareholder engagement has an impact beyond the financial performance of the 
company (intangible). Therefore, the effect on the company's social responsibility will 
also be illuminated. 
Having addressed shareholder value we then turn to the stakeholders' interest. Here 
the question will be asked whether there is a cause of friction between shareholder 
engagement and the stakeholders' interest. 
Finally, it is also necessary to evaluate negative impacts of shareholder engagement on 
corporate Germany. 
2.1. The Nexus of Interests 
Jensen and Meckling27 see the nexus of interests and relations among the stakeholders 
of a company as follows: They state that, 
"if (a) the firm is viewed as a nexus of complete contracts with creditors, employees, clients, 
suppliers, third and other relevant parties, (b) only contracts with shareholders are open-ended; 
that is, only shareholders have a claim on residual returns after all other contractual obligations 
26 In contrast to Germany shareholder engagement 
in Anglo-American countries is considerably further developed. Due to legal requirements and client pressure 
institutional shareholders in the UK or the US are more likely to engage themselves 
in the company they are invested in than their continental European 
counterparts. 
27 JensenMichael/Meckling, William "Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure" in Journal of Financial Economics 3 1976 
p. 305-360 at p. 312 
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have been met, and (c) there are no agency problems, then maximisation of (residual) shareholder 
value is tantamount to economic efficiency. " 
Under this scenario, corporate governance rules should be designed to protect and 
promote the interests of shareholders exclusively. 
As it has just been argued, in order to understand the complexity of shareholder 
engagement it is important to get an overview of the different interests of investors and 
the interests of different investors. Although this latter group will be scrutinised in detail 
in Chapter 4.1., at this point it needs to be pointed out that shareholders could be 
categorized as institutional, corporate, private, state, foundational or associational. 
Hence, an accumulation of different interests is a logic consequence. 
For instance, looking at the role of pension funds requires a unique approach. Pension 
funds pursue a long-term profit maximisation, as any other policy would be 
contradicting their investors' interests. In contrast, other shareholders have different 
expectations from shareholder engagement. The manager of a Hedge Fund is certainly 
more interested in the short-term influence of shareholder activism on the equity price, 
while the manager of a Social Responsibility Fund28 requires that certain intangible 
standards be fulfilled. 
2.2. Shareholder Engagement and its Influence on the Equity Price 
At this point, the crucial question shall be illuminated whether action taken by the 
investor could improve the financial well-being of shareholders. As it can be seen in 
Figure 28 (appendices), the instruments to measure this effect are not as manifold as the 
detected results. A number of different authors tried to measure the influence of 
activism with the help of different characteristic features. Unfortunately, the costs of 
engagement were rarely part of the studies. However, the results varied considerably, 
depending on the scope of the investigation. The same is valid for other approaches like 
making an inquiry among fund managers, or looking at the difference between the 
prices of ordinary shares compared with those of preference shares. Due to these heavy 
deviations of the empirical data, a critical approach is appropriate and the conclusions 
need to be reflected in the whole context. 
Deriving from the thesis that shareholder engagement serves good corporate 
governance and thus has a positive effect on the performance of the company, it needs 
to be investigated whether this impact results in a higher equity price. By using the 
hierarchical approach, it will be explained that different forms of engagement have 
different effects on the share price. 
28 E. g. Companies like Ethos, SAM - Sustainable Asset 
Management in Switzerland or Funds like Sarasin Sustainable Eco, DWS Invest Sustainabilit Leaders or 
BHF Sustain Select 
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Here it is important to point out that there is no direct or indirect empirical evidence to 
prove any value-enhancing effects of information requests and speaking at the general 
meeting. Furthermore, it is vital to keep in mind that the focus of this thesis is primarily 
on Germany. 
2.2.1. Corporate Governance Rating 
Measuring the impact of shareholder engagement is difficult. Therefore, it is beneficial 
to support the argument that shareholder engagement matters by taking into account 
the value of good governance in general as well. One good tool in this respect is 
considering ratings. They are informative - and they give us a hint of what value might 
attach to shareholder engagement - but no more than that. Ratings primarily serve to 
avoid risks when picking stock, and therefore only have an indirect connection with the 
claimed hierarchy. However, corporate governance ratings also scrutinize some aspects 
of shareholder engagement. For instance the option to call a special meeting; the 
response to shareholder proposals; and vote requirements or shareholder approval of 
option plans29 are among the tested variables. 
In 2002, Institutional Shareholder Services introduced their Corporate Governance 
Quotient (CGQ) for the US stock market. This product is a rating system that rates stock 
corporations according to their corporate governance performance. The source data, 
which contains up to 61 variables, is derived from public disclosure documents, press 
releases and corporate websites, and is then verified by analysts and stored in a 
database. Issuers can access a webpage, giving them the ability to make changes to their 
corporate governance rating if they believe that something has been stated wrongly or if 
improvements to the company's corporate governance system have been made. This 
tool enabled fund managers to choose stocks considering the corporate governance 
performance of a company and consequently, to avoid the sorts of scandals that beset 
Enron, Worldcom, Ahold and Parmalat. 
In September 2003, ISS extended this corporate governance rating to 3.000 stock 
corporations in the MSCI EAFE index (Europe, Asia, Far East, Australia) and the MSCI 
World index. 
Figure 1: Corporate Governance Rating by Countries30 
Country Average CGQ Country Average CGQ 
United Kingdom 90,3 Japan 42,5 
Ireland 86,1 Netherlands 41,4 
Australia 73,2 Hong Kong 39,5 
New Zealand 66,3 Italy 38,7 
29GIobal corporate governance rating criteria of Institutional 
Shareholder Services 2006 to download at 
http: / / www. issproxy. com/ institutional/ analytics/ globalcggcriteria. 
isp 
30 Average Corporate Governance Quotient - Source: Institutional 
Shareholder Services Oct 2004 
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Switzerland 61,2 Denmark 34,2 
Singapore 59,4 Spain 33,6 
France 57,4 Sweden 22,8 
Finland 57,3 Belgium 19,7 
Austria 56,2 Greece 19,0 
Canada 51,6 Norway 14,7 
Germany 45,4 Portugal 10,9 
In a study carried out by Lawrence Brown on "The Correlation between Corporate 
Governance and Company Performance"31, which was based on the Corporate 
Governance Rating by ISS, Brown found that companies in the bottom decile of 
industry-adjusted CGQ by ISS have five-year returns that are 3.95% below the industry 
average, while firms in the top decile of industry-adjusted CGQ have five-year returns 
that are 7.91 % above the industry-adjusted average32. Hence, the difference in 
performance between the over- and underperformers is 11.86%. 
For the advocates of good corporate governance this is certainly proof that governance 
matters. However, this result only provides a positive result to the extent that fostering 
shareholder engagement rules has a positive impact on the stock price. 
2.2.2. The Willingness of the Shareholder to Spend more for a Company with an 
Active Corporate Governance 
The willingness of investors to spend more on shares of a company with good corporate 
governance is of limited meaning with regard to the value of shareholder engagement. 
Assessing shareholder engagement with this instrument does not deliver very sound 
conclusions, as this approach does not give evidence of the engagement itself and hence 
lacks reliability. However, it is at least an indicator that corporate policy is of some 
importance to the shareholder. 
According to an international study carried out by McKinsey & Company in 200033, 
investors were prepared to pay 18% to 27%34 more for shares providing they adopt a 
functioning corporate governance system. Interestingly, in this study three-quarters of 
the investors say that board practices are at least as important to them as financial 
performance when evaluating companies for investment. In Latin America, almost half 
the respondents consider board practices more important than financial performance35. 
31 Brown, Lawrence "The Correlation between Corporate Governance and Company Performance" Georgia State University, 2004 to download at 
http: / / www. issproxy. com/ pdf / Corporate%20Governance %2OStudy %201.04. pdf 
32 Brown, Lawrence "The Correlation between Corporate Governance and Company Performance" Georgia State University, 2004 to download at 
http: / / www. issproxy. com/ pdf/ Corporate %20Governance%2OStudy 
%201.04. pdf 
33 McKinsey & Company "Investor Opinion Survey on Corporate Governance" Research Paper June 2000 
34 Interestingly investors in Europe and Northern America were less prepared to spend more on well-governed companies compared to their 
Asian or Latin 
American counterparts. Stated in McKinsey & Company "Investor Opinion Survey on 
Corporate Governance" Research Paper June 2000 at p. 16 
35 McKinsey & Company "Investor Opinion Survey on Corporate 
Governance" Research Paper June 2000 at p. 1 
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This indicates that shareholders considerably rely on other corporate governance pillars 
that are not engagement related and even prefer stability before shareholder value. 
Certainly, this statement also relies on the fact that a corporation, which is active in 
practising corporate governance, does not have anything to hide. Providing that a 
company offers maximum transparency, it can easily be concluded that it is healthy. 
Therefore, the willingness to accept a higher price for the share is concomitant with the 
perfect flow of information between the company and the investor36. Although the 
assumption that investors intend to spend more on shares of a company with good 
corporate governance, is a useful indicator, it should not be overestimated, as probably 
other considerations influence it and moreover, it is only based on a subjective view. 
2.2.3. Shareholder Negotiations 
Shareholder negotiations are a fundamental part of the engagement hierarchy. Their 
positive impact compared to shareholder proposals (which will be explained in detail in 
the following chapter) is remarkable37. One reason for this might be the fact that some 
shareholders perceive proposals more as door openers, forcing management into 
negotiations. On the surface, it is difficult to see a difference between the two 
approaches, as both intend to achieve a goal defined by the shareholder. Hence, it could 
be assumed that shareholders believe that a negotiated agreement, aiming at a 
reciprocal approach, results in performance improvement; compared to a proposal, 
which emphasises a deplorable state of affairs within the company and reveals a 
disagreement between investor and management. Monks points out that real 
shareholder victory lies not in toppling ineffective CEOs, but in creating an 
environment of revitalisation making these upheavals unnecessary38. The argument 
might be valid that shareholder proposals can distract managers and harm their 
abilities to manage effectively, while a negotiated agreement considers the 
managements' points of view. 
The great difference between proposal and negotiation is the chosen approach. While 
the first is drastic and attracts attention, the latter is considerably smoother and 
inconspicuous (in the end it might even be difficult to determine which party prevailed 
over the other). 
Considering all this, one may conclude that investors prefer cooperation instead of 
confrontation. To use the words of Monks again: 
36 Compare with: Pellens, Bernhard/ Hillebrandt, Franca/Ulmer, 
Björn "Umsetzung von Corporate-Governance-Richtlinien in der Praxis" in Der Betriebs-Berater 
(BB) Volume 56 No. 2414.06.01 p. 1243-1250 at p. 1243 
37 See Figure 28: Studies Showing the Correlation between Equity 
Performance and Corporate Governance Activity 
38 Monk--, Robert A. G. "Relationship Investing" Columbia 
University, 1993 to download at www. ragm. com/archpub/ragm/relationship_investing. html at p. 11 
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"This is certainly a step forward as shareholders are not there to tell corporations how to run their 
business; they should be there to tell corporations that they need to do better"39. 
Understandably, the accomplishment of shareholder negotiations is closely related to 
the targeted issue. It could be assumed that in those consultations stakeholder issues are 
playing a more important role than proposals. Successful initiatives by employee 
shareholders for example to raise the share of disabled employees; to accept new 
environmental standards or to alter takeover defences, can have different effects on the 
development of the stock price if they are negotiated with the influence of stakeholder 
issues rather than pure shareholder proposals. 
However, one great weakness of studies showing a positive effect of shareholder 
negotiations on the stock price is that they concentrate on the Anglo-American judicial 
system. There the management decides the degree to which it will comply, while in 
Germany (g 119f AktG) and a number of other European countries (e. g. France), the 
successful shareholder resolution is binding. Just as it is the case with shareholder 
proposals, these studies should be considered carefully when coming from a 
Continental-European angle. Not only the differing judicial systems but also other 
influences need to be taken into account, such as stakeholders or whether the objections 
by management are qualified. This means that most of the empirical data cannot simply 
be applied to another environment. 
2.2.4. Shareholder Proposals 
As it will be described later in this thesis, shareholder proposals are a fundamental part 
of the shareholder engagement concept. 
Conclusions and results of studies investigating shareholder proposals are as numerous 
as the studies4° themselves. While a majority of studies show a positive effect, some 
even show a negative (respectively neutral) correlation between shareholder proposals 
and stock price performance. At first this seems to be astonishing. However, it should 
be kept in mind that shareholder engagement sets in when the company's performance 
39 Monks, Robert A. G. "Relationship Investing" Columbia University, 1993 to download at www. ragm. com/archpub/ragm/relationship_investing. html at p. 12 
40 See Figure 27: Studies Showing the Correlation between Equity Performance and Corporate Governance Activity; Karpoff, Jonathan M. /Malatesta, Paul H. / 
Walkling, Ralph A. "Corporate Governance and Shareholder Initiatives: Empirical Evidence" in Journal of Financial Economics 42,1996 at p. 365-395; Gillian, 
Stuart L. / Starks, Laura T. "Corporate Governance Proposals and Shareholder Activism: the Role of Institutional Investors" in Journal of Financial Economics 57, 
2000 at p. 275-305; Smith, Michael P. "Shareholder Activism by Institutional Investors: Evidence from Ca1PERS" in The journal of Finance Vol. 51 No. 1 March 1996 
at p. 227-252; Nesbitt, Stephen L. "Long-Term Rewards from Shareholder Activism: A Study of the "CaIPERS Effect"" in Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 
Winter 1994 at p. 75-80 and "The "CaIPERS Effect" on Targeted Company Share Prices" January 26,2001 to download at http: //w-ww. calpers- 
governance. org/alert/selection/WilshireRpt. pdf, Strickland, Deon/ Wiles, Kenneth W. 
/Zenner, Marc "A Requiem for the USA - Is Small Shareholder Monitoring 
Effective? " Journal of Financial Economics 40,1996 at p. 319-338; Bizjak, John M. /Marquette, Christopher J. "Are Shareholder Proposals All Bark and No Bite? 
Evidence from Shareholder Resolutions to Rescind Poison Pills" in Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis Vol. 33, No. 4 December 1998 at p 499-521, 
Gompers, Paul A. /Ishii, Joy L. /Metrick, Andrew "Corporate Governance and Equity Prices" July 2001 to download at http: //icf. som. yale. edu/Conference- 
Papers/ Fa112001/gov. pdf 
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is perceptibly below average. How is it possible that a proposal aiming at an 
improvement has no, or even negative, effect? One reason is seen in misdirected 
activism41. It was found that the types of board and compensation reforms advocated 
by proposal sponsors have not been found to be value-enhancing corporate governance 
devices42. 
Interestingly, the list of applicants shows that the initiator of the proposals could be 
ascribed to any camp of shareholders43. As the conclusions of the studies are closely 
dependent on the way shareholder engagement was exercised, it is advisable to make a 
distinction between the studies showing a positive, negative or insignificant effect. 
Certainly, a number of proposals (e. g. confidential voting) do not target a better 
performance at all. Others are primarily aiming at certain provisions within the articles 
of association (takeover defence, board reform) and might display its purpose only in 
certain cases (takeover, crisis of the board). Therefore, a better distinction of the 
proposals is necessary to recognise a possible positive effect. Moreover, it seems to be 
suitable to include individual company characteristics such as structure of ownership or 
size. For example, a poison pill44 is unattractive for smaller investors, but considerably 
attractive to majority shareholders. 
Moreover, the vast majority of results are based on studies carried out in the US. This 
makes it difficult to transfer them to other financial markets like the German market. A 
different legislation, pension scheme or development of the market will probably falsify 
the findings to a certain extent. For instance in Germany takeover preventing provisions 
are relatively unknown (and unnecessary) due to the shareholder structure of most 
German companies, which hinders any hostile approach. Here it is the remuneration of 
the board that is the target of active investors, rather than the statutes or provisions of 
the company. Therefore, the target of shareholder proposals is not applicable for a 
number of regimes. The expressiveness of most studies remains limited, but it certainly 
explains the incredible high interest in new case related investigations. 
41 Romano, Roberta "Less is More: Making Institutional Investor Activism a Valuable Mechanism of Corporate Governance" in Yale journal on Regulation 
Volume 18,2001 p. 1-78 at p. 7 
42 Romano, Roberta "Less is More: Making Institutional Investor Activism a Valuable Mechanism of Corporate Governance" in Yale journal on Regulation 
Volume 18,2001 p. 1-78 at p. 18; Hetzer, Jonas/Papendick, Ulrich Unter Freunden" 
in Manager Magazin 8/01,31. Jahrgang at p. 94 
43 Romano, Roberta "Less is More: Making Institutional Investor Activism a Valuable Mechanism of Corporate Governance" in Yale journal on Regulation 
Volume 18,2001 p. 1-78 at p. 15; also compare with Pozen, Robert " Institutional Investors: The 
Reluctant Activists" in Harvard Business Review Jan 1994 p. 140-149 
from p. 140ff 
44 Definition taken from Gompers, Paul A. /Ishii, Joy L. /Metrick, Andrew "Corporate Governance and Equity Prices" July 2001 at 
http: //icf. som. yale. edu/Conference-Papers/Fa112001/gov. pdf p. 37-42: 
Poison pills - These securities provide their 
holders with special rights in the case of a triggering event such as a hostile takeover bid. If a deal is approved 
by the 
board of directors, the poison pill can be revoked, but if the 
deal is not approved and the bidder proceeds, the pill is triggered. In this case, typical poison pills give 
the holders of the target's stock other than the bidder the right to purchase stock 
in the target or the bidder's company at a steep discount, making the target 
unattractive or diluting the acquirer's voting power. 
The early adopters of poison pills also called them "shareholder rights" plans, ostensibly since they give 
current shareholders the "rights" to buy additional shares, 
but more likely as an attempt to influence public perceptions. A raider-shareholder might disagree with 
this nomenclature. 
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2.2.4.1. Studies Showing a Positive Relation between Corporate Governance and Stock Price 
Performance 
The studies taken into account for this thesis were all investigating the effect of activism 
(almost exclusively shareholder proposals) of a certain group of investors in a certain 
area, over a certain period of time. (An overview and summary of the studies is 
provided in Figure 28). 
A highly celebrated study was that of Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick in which the authors 
calculated that an 8.9 percentage point difference between 1990 and 1998 in firm value 
was partially "caused" by each additional governance provision45. They created a 
Governance Index for a certain number of companies based on 24 governance 
provisions (ranging from golden and silver parachutes, to poison pills and special 
meeting requirements46) and studied the relationship between this index and several 
forward-looking performance measures. The result of this study was a comprehensible 
relation between corporate governance and the share price. Taking into account the 
higher agency costs with companies, which have more governance provisions, this 
finding is even more upvalued47. 
Although this study does prove the connection between governance provisions and a 
higher equity price, it relies too much on aspects that should protect the company from 
takeover, and ignores other features of corporate governance. Hence, an idea is given 
about a number of cost intensive provisions upheld by the company to maintain 
control, but necessary factors of corporate governance are omitted. Especially 
shareholder engagement features like enhanced investor relations or improved proxy 
voting, which are important for an informed and reasonable shareholder; deserve 
mentioning in connection with this matter. The reference to the expositions on the price 
difference between the ordinary share (with voting right) and the preference share (no 
voting right) - (Chapter 2.2.7. ) already indicate that an analysis of certain shareholder 
engagement factors in this study would have been desirable. It also needs to be 
emphasised that shareholder engagement is mostly a higher cost factor for the company 
than agency costs related with certain governance provisions in the law or the statutes. 
45 Gompers, Paul A. /Ishii, Joy L. /Metrick, Andrew "Corporate Governance and Equity Prices" July 2001 at http: //icf. som. yale. edu/Conference- 
Papers/Fa112001/gov. pdf p. 36 
46 Definitions taken from Gompers, Paul A. /Ishii, Joy L. /Metrick, Andrew "Corporate Governance and 
Equity Prices" July 2001 at 
http: //icf. som. yale. edu/Conference-Papers/Fa112001/gov. pdf p. 
37-42: 
Golden parachutes - These are severance agreements which provide cash and 
non-cash compensation to senior executives upon a triggering event such as 
termination, demotion, or resignation following a change in control. They 
do not require shareholder approval. 
Silver parachutes - These are similar to golden parachutes 
in that they provide severance payments upon a change in corporate control, but unlike golden 
parachutes, a large number of a firm's employees are eligible 
for these benefits. 
Special meeting requirements - These provisions either 
increase the level of shareholder support required to call a special meeting beyond that specified 
by state 
law or eliminate the ability to call one entirely. 
47Gompers, Paul A. /Ishii, Joy L. /Metrick, Andrew "Corporate 
Governance and Equity Prices" July 2001 at http: //icf. som. yale. edu/Conference- 
Papers/Fa112001/gov. pdf p. 34 
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Moreover, other corporate governance factors like special disclosure requirements or 
continued education of supervisory board members were also not taken into account. 
Consequently, it needs to be questioned whether the 8.9% are a realistic surcharge for 
companies with good corporate governance. Probably this figure needs to be put into 
perspective and thus only represents an approximate value. 
Other studies which were carried out by Bizjak, Marquette48 on the rescission of poison 
pills; by Strickland, Wiles, Zenner49 on the effect of proposals, which were sponsored by 
the United Shareholders Association (USA); or by Nesbitt50 who investigated the 
performance of proposals by California Public Employees' Retirement System 
(Ca1PERS)51; all showed a measurable positive effect of shareholder engagement on the 
stock price. 
2.2.4.2. Studies Showing a Negative or Neutral Relation between Corporate Governance and 
Stock Price Performance 
In contrast to the studies mentioned above, there are a number of authors who 
discovered a neutral or even negative effect on the stock price. For example, Gillan and 
Starks52 detected a slight positive impact of proposals sponsored by active individual 
investors, but they also found a small but measurable negative impact of proposals of 
institutional investors. Unfortunately, they only focused on voting outcomes and short- 
term market reactions, which put the findings into perspective. Other studies like that 
of Karpoff, Malatesta, Walkling, 53 who conclude that the probability of receiving a 
shareholder corporate governance proposal is negatively related to a firm's market-to- 
book ratio, operating return on sales, and recent sales growth54; or Forjan55 on the effect 
of shareholder proposals, found a neutral respectively negative return in connection 
with shareholder proposals. Again, the results of these studies have to be considered 
carefully. Both studies were carried out mainly in the Eighties and ended in the 
beginning of the Nineties. Assuming that the realisation that shareholder engagement 
48 Bizjak, John M. /Marquette, Christopher J. "Are Shareholder Proposals All Bark and No Bite? Evidence from Shareholder Resolutions to Rescind Poison Pills" 
in Journal of Financial and Quantative Analysis Vol. 33, No. 4 December 1998 at p. 499-521 
49 Strickland, Deon/ Wiles, Kenneth W. /Zenner, Marc "A Requiem for the USA - Is Small Shareholder Monitoring Effective? 
" Journal of Financial Economics 40, 
1996 at p. 319-338 
50 Nesbitt, Stephen L. "Long-Term Rewards from Shareholder Activism: A Study of the "Ca1PERS Effect"" in journal of Applied Corporate 
Finance, Winter 1994 
at p. 75-80 and Nesbitt, Stephen L. "The "CalPERS Effect" on Targeted Company 
Share Prices" January 26,2001 to download at www. calpers- 
governance. org/alert/selection/WilshireRpt. pdf 
51 California Public Employees' Retirement System: http: //www. calpers. com 
52 Gillian, Stuart L. / Starks, Laura T. "Corporate Governance Proposals and Shareholder Activism: the Role of 
Institutional Investors" in Journal of Financial 
Economics 57,2000 at p. 275-305 
53 Karpoff, Jonathan M. /Malatesta, Paul H. / Walkling, Ralph A. "Corporate Governance and 
Shareholder Initatives: Empirical Evidence" in Journal of Financial 
Economics 42,1996 at p. 365-395 
54 Karpoff, Jonathan M. /Malatesta, Paul H. / Walkling, Ralph A. 
"Corporate Governance and Shareholder Initatives: Empirical Evidence" in Journal of Financial 
Economics 42,1996 at p. 392 
55 Forjan, James "The Wealth Effects of Shareholder-Sponsored 
Proposal" in Review of Financial Economics 8,1999 p. 61-72 
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was necessary to support corporate governance was developed in the second half of the 
1980's56, it is not surprising that the first proposals were not destined to succeed 
economically. 
2.2.4.3. Conclusions 
As there is considerable variation in the results of these US-focused studies, it is crucial 
to determine the quality of the data and its interpretation when making an assessment. 
Taking this and all studies into account, an objective observer could cautiously 
conclude that shareholder proposals could indeed show a positive effect. 
Although it has to be acknowledged that it is almost impossible to specify a value of 
shareholder proposals, the statements of Smith and Strickland/ Wiles/Zenner could be 
kept in mind, saying that in general shareholder engagement is worthwhile as the 
returns are far higher than the costs57. 
In Germany Drobetz, Schillhofer und Zimmermann58 show a positive effect of 
differences for firm-specific corporate governance. Despite this finding it must be 
alleged that shareholder proposals in this country do not have the same effect 
compared to those in the US. This derives from the fact that proposals by other 
investors rarely succeed. To blame is the omnipotence of the banks, whose custodian 
voting rights almost certainly determine the results of the poll before it is carried out. 
Therefore, Germany might serve as a good example for the assumption that 
shareholder negotiations are the more successful way of shareholder engagement than 
shareholder proposals. 
2.2.5. The Value of the Voting Right 
It is also possible to ascribe a value to the voting right, although it is not necessarily 
positive. 
2.2.5.1. The Counterproductive Side of the Voting Right 
A good example that the voting right could be counterproductive and destroy value is 
the Girmes case59. Here Girmes AG encountered financial troubles, which endangered 
the stakes the shareholders put in the company. The revitalisation plan by management, 
56 Romano, Roberta "Less is More: Making Institutional Investor Activism a Valuable Mechanism of Corporate Governance" Yale Law School and National 
Bureau of Economic Research; Draft: October 26,2000 p. 1-78 at p. 3 
57 Michael P. Smith "Shareholder Activism by Institutional Investors: Evidence from CaIPERS" in The Journal of Finance Vol. 51 No. 1 March 1996 at p. 251 (return: 
$ 19 million - costs: $ 3.5 million); Deon Strickland, 
Kenneth W. Wiles, Marc Zenner "A Requiem for the USA - Is Small Shareholder Monitoring Effective? " 
Journal of Financial Economics 40,1996 at p. 335 (return: $ 1.3 billion - costs: 22.75 million) 
58 Drobetz, Wolfgang/Schillhofer, Andreas/Zimmermann, Heinz Corporate 
Governance and Expected Stock Returns: Evidence from Germany" Arbeitspapier 
No. 110,2003 to download at http: //www. jura. uni-frankfurt. de/ifawzl/baums/Arbeitspapiere. html 
59 Girmes Ruling: Amtliche Sammlung der Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofs - BGHZ Volume 129 at p. 136 
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major shareholders and major creditors intended to waive outstanding claims and to set 
down the capital in a ratio of five to two. An active shareholder representative 
promoted that a reduction of the capital in the ratio of five to three would be sufficient. 
He succeeded with his plan in the general meeting, but failed to convince the creditors. 
The consequence was that the company became insolvent and was liquidated. 
The Girmes case illustrates a negative example for shareholder engagement and shows, 
just like the following exposition, that the voting right needs to be exercised carefully 
and on an informed basis. 
2.2.5.2. Takeover and Merger 
As § 13 s. 1 s. 1 UmwG requires shareholder approval when the management decides to 
merge with or takeover another company; and investors could engage in corporate 
decision making by using their vote. This means that in a general meeting their voting 
decision is crucial for the coming about of a takeover or merger. Consequently, their 
vote will have a positive or negative impact on the material value of the company. 
In 2002, the legislator introduced the WpÜG - "Wertpapiererwerbs- und 
Übernahmegesetz" (Security Acquisition and Takeover Act). Its aim is to provide 
guidelines for a fair and systematic bidding procedure, without fostering or preventing 
takeovers. Moreover, it should improve the flow of information to the affected 
shareholders (in order to make an informed voting decision) and employees in the case 
of a takeover, as well as safeguarding the legal position of minority shareholders60. This 
objective already indicates that the emphasis of this Act was more or less laid on a 
capital market approach. Valid reasons include that the attraction for shareholders in a 
takeover is the accompanying expectation that the stock price increases, as the "bid 
price" is usually considerably higher than the market price immediately before the bid. 
This anticipation derives primarily from synergy and efficiency effects of a takeover or 
a merger. Moreover, often the mismanagement of a company is also made out as a 
reason for a takeover bid. The replacement of management might be an indicator for an 
increase in the stock price. 
These reasons form the basis for the predominantly positive acceptance among the 
investors. Surprisingly often enough this positive assessment is not based on facts. 
According to studies by Jansen/ Körner61 and Schneider/ Burghard62 this is not justified 
as only a minority of the hostile and friendly takeovers lead to a market value increase 
60 Gesetzentwurf der Bundesregierung Entwurf eines 
Gesetzes zur Regelung von öffentlichen Angeboten zum Erwerb von Wertpapieren und von 
Unternehmensübernahmen" 2001 (BT-Drucksache 14/7034) to download at http: //dip. bundestag. de/btd/14/070/1407034. pdf at p. 28 
61 Jansen, Stefan/Körner, Klaus "Fusionsmanagement in Deutschland" Witten 2000 to download at http: //notesweb. uni- 
wh. de/wg/wiwi/wgwiwi. nsf/vwFiles/StudieFM/$FILE/Jansen+Fusionsmanagement+Abstract. pdf 
at p. 28 
62 Schneider, Uwe/Burgard, Ulrich "Übernahmeangebote und 
Konzerngründung" in Der Betrieb (DB) 2001 p. 963-969 at p. 964f 
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and thus to a better equity price. Consequently, as takeovers and mergers are often 
"value reducing" shareholder engagement becomes crucial for the plans of the 
management, as informed voting decisions need to be made. 
2.2.5.3. The Price of Ordinary Shares minus the Price of Preference Shares: Is it the Value of the 
Voting Right? 
Maybe the easiest way to determine the value of the voting right is simply to compare 
the quotation of ordinary shares and preference shares (Figure 2). 
As preference shares do not have a voting right, it could be assumed that the surcharge 
for ordinary shares in the same stock corporation is the value of the voting right. 
However, due to the great difference between the spread in the stock price between 
those two types of shares63 it is not possible to give a universally applicable statement 
for German companies. 
Figure 2: Average Price Difference of Ordinary Shares compared to Preference Shares 
in Listed German Stock Corporations 1956-199$64 
25 
m 
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It is worthwhile to look at the average of 17% between 1956 and 199865. As the price of 
ordinary shares is often considerably higher than that of preference shares despite the 
paid dividend being lower, it could be argued that the increase in value is dependent on 
the vote66. Generally speaking, this assumption is correct, but some explanations are 
required. The capital requirements of the different companies are certainly reflected in 
63 see chapter 5.3.3. Preference Shares 
64 Daske, Stefan/ Ehrhardt, Olaf Der 
Kurs- und Renditeunterschied von Stamm- und 
Vorzugsaktien - eine Untersuchung am 
deutschen Kapitalmarkt" 2000 to download at www. fmpm. ch/files/4th/DaskeEhrhardt. pdf p. 24 
65 Daske, Stefan/ Ehrhardt, Olaf Der 
Kurs- und Renditeunterschied von Stamm- und 
Vorzugsaktien - eine Untersuchung am 
deutschen Kapitalmarkt" 2000 to download at www. fmpm. ch/files/4th/DaskeEhrhardt. pdf p. 1 
66 Grabert, Frank Stimmrechtsvertretung 
im Aktienrecht - ökonomische Bedeutung und rechtliche Problematik" Dissertation with the University of Hohenheim 
to download at at http: //ourworld. compuserve. com/homepages/mox/diplom. 
htm at 2.1.2 
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the spread. Surprisingly, it has been found that higher tax, which has a negative 
influence on the equity price of preference shares and its attractiveness for 
shareholders, could easily be ignored67. 
However, a measurable but not linear impact on the value of the voting right stems 
from the shareholder structure. Daske and Ehrhardt state that a high and low share of 
widely held stock (Streubesitzanteil), as well as a dominant position of a major investor 
prevent considerable changes within the shareholder structure and are, therefore, 
reducing the value of the votes68. Furthermore, Daske and Ehrhardt add that in contrast 
to this, the value of votes will be enhanced if the separation of cash-flow and vote 
enables a major shareholder to obtain the majority of the shares, with a relatively low 
capital share compared to the controlled asset69. These conclusions for the German stock 
market appear strange. This derives from the fact that ownership of German stock 
corporations is mostly concentrated and control-oriented70 (e. g. interweaving, which 
results from crossholdings of blue-chip companies or large private shareholders, who 
control the majority of the votes). Consequently, the existing shareholder structure often 
prevents greater influence of minor investors in general meetings. However, this does 
not appear to explain the spread in the equity price between ordinary and preference 
shares. This fact is underlined by the relatively low capital presence in the general 
meetings71. 
Although the voting right is rarely used in general meetings in Germany, it is crucial for 
the coming about of a takeover. Consequently, the predator company is only interested 
in acquiring shares that carry a voting right. This results in a higher price at the stock 
exchange and could explain the pricing spread between preference shares and ordinary 
shares. However, regarding the attempts of hostile takeovers in which the number of 
votes was crucial, none in German corporate history was successful. Even the 
Mannesmann AG - Vodafone takeover battle in 2000 ended as a friendly takeover. 
In context with shareholder engagement and equity price it is also necessary to state 
that alterations to the articles of association affecting the voting right result in 
markdowns72. Hence, individual corporate policy is also able to have an effect on the 
equity price. 
67 Daske, Stefan/ Ehrhardt, Olaf Der 
Kurs- und Renditeunterschied von Stamm- und Vorzugsaktien - eine Untersuchung am deutschen Kapitalmarkt" 2000, to 
download at www. fmpm. ch/files/4th/DaskeEhrhardt. pdf at p. 29: This research found that higher taxation does influence the capital costs by only 0,21% 
annually 
68 Daske, Stefan/Ehrhardt, Olaf Der 
Kurs- und Renditeunterschied von Stamm- und Vorzugsaktien - eine Untersuchung am deutschen Kapitalmarkt" 2000, to 
download at www. fmpm. ch/files/4th/DaskeEhrhardt. pdf at p. 33 
69 Daske, Stefan/ Ehrhardt, Olaf Der 
Kurs- und Renditeunterschied von Stamm- und Vorzugsaktien - eine Untersuchung am deutschen Kapitalmarkt" 2000, to 
download at www. ftnpm. ch/files/4th/DaskeEhrhardt. pdfat p. 33 
70 See Figure 29: Shareholder Structure of Selected Stock Corporations 2004 
71 See Figure 6: Presence at DAX 30 AGMs (1998-2005) 
72 Hahn, Dieter Die 
feindliche Übernahme von Aktiengesellschaften: Eine juristisch- ökonomische Analyse" Munich 1992 at p. 18 
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Nevertheless, the research so far backs up the careful assumption that the larger share 
of the spread between the preference and the ordinary share derives from the higher 
assessment of the vote instead of financial implications. This notion is also supported by 
an inquiry carried out by Ernst/Gassen/Pellens73. Here a number of shareholders 
stated that a preference share without voting right should have a share price that is on 
average 20% cheaper than that of an ordinary share (Figure 3)74. 
Figure 3: Inquiry result on the question: How much has a Preference Share without 
Voting Right to be cheaper compared to an Ordinary Share? 
more than 50% 
40 to 50% 
30 to 40% 
20 to 30% 
10 to 20% 
up to 10% 
In conclusion, the voting right has a measurable value. This supports the fact that 
shareholder engagement, beyond corporate governance, has (providing it is carefully 
used) a positive impact on the equity price. The constant stronger price for shares with 
a voting right provides a sound argument in favour of shareholder engagement 
positively influencing stock prices. A useful example in this respect is the MLP AG. In 
2001, they decided to change ordinary shares into preference shares in a ratio of 1: 1. In 
the following year the AGM quorum (Figure 6) dropped by 24%, while the stock price 
suffered considerably. 
73 Ernst, Edgar/Gassen, Joachim/Pellens, Bernhard Verhalten und 
Präferenzen deutscher Aktionäre - Eine Befragung privater und institutioneller Anleger zu 
Informationsverhalten, Dividendenpräferenz und Wahrnehmung von Stimmrechten" Studies of the Deutsche Aktieninstitut (German Institute to Promote 
Shareholding), Frankfurt January 2005, Issue 29 to download at http: //www. dai. de/internet/dai/dai-2-0. nsf/dai_publikationen. 
htm 
74 Ernst, Edgar/Gassen, Joachim/Pellens, Bernhard Verhalten und 
Präferenzen deutscher Aktionäre - Eine Befragung privater und institutioneller Anleger zu 
Informationsverhalten, Dividendenpräferenz und Wahrnehmung von Stimmrechten" 
Studies of the Deutsche Aktieninstitut (German Institute to Promote 
Shareholding), Frankfurt January 2005, Issue 29 to download at http: //www. 
dai. de/intemet/dai/dai-2-0. nsf/dai_publikationen. htm at p. 29 and 37 
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2.2.6. The Impact of Legal Actions 
No direct empirical evidence exists showing an impact on the stock price caused by 
legal actions a shareholder pursues in a German court (e. g. appeal against a resolution 
or nullity action). Here it could only be assumed that an action brought forward by a 
shareholder has a negligible negative effect on the stock price (in contrast to class action 
in the US) as the value in dispute mostly remains within reasonable limits (providing 
the company is not charged with fraud). However, if the action by the individual 
investor or group of investors is permissible and justified, then a settlement payment or 
a ruling by the court could have a considerable positive effect for them. 
As no empirical evidence exists for the German financial market the mentioned impacts 
are only of theoretical nature. 
2.3. Shareholder Engagement and Intangible Purposes of Action Taken by 
Investors 
Having given some indications that shareholder engagement could have a measurable 
positive effect on the equity price; intangible purposes of action taken by investors need 
to be taken into consideration. As it has been stated above and will be explained in 
detail below, social responsible investment (SRI) or sustainable asset management, 
which describes the same investment policy, is becoming increasingly important to 
investors. While in the US this type of shareholding already achieves about 13%75, the 
share in Germany is considerably lower with 0.4%76. The reason for this huge 
discrepancy is the difference in approach. In the US, a fund is categorised as an SRI 
when investments into companies linked with weapons of mass destruction, child 
labour, tobacco or environmental pollution are excluded. In Germany the definition of 
sustainable asset management is far narrower. According to the definition of the 
"Forum Nachhaltige Geldanlagen"77, sustainable investments are investments which 
beyond economical factors also consider social and ecological criteria78. 
The nature of this investment philosophy usually implies that socially responsible 
investment will in turn produce greater shareholder engagement. The clients of SRI 
funds often do not only have a strict investment policy, but are also active shareholders, 
sometimes even with an own voting policy. 
75 Loew, Thomas Internationale 
Entwicklung der Regulierungen zur Förderung ökologisch-ethischer Finanzdienstleistungen" Discussion Paper of the Institut 
für ökologische Wirtschaftsforschung 56/02, Berlin 2002 to download at www. ioew. de/home/downloaddateien/DP5602. pdf at p. 48 
76 Loew, Thomas Internationale 
Entwicklung der Regulierungen zur Förderung ökologisch-ethischer Finanzdienstleistungen" Discussion Paper of the Institut 
für ökologische Wirtschaftsforschung 56/02, Berlin 2002 to download at www. ioew. de/home/downloaddateien/DP5602. pdf at p. 31 
77 Forum Nachhaltige Geldanlagen is the largest German association promoting sustainable investments - www. forum-ng. de 
78 Forum Nachhaltige Geldanlagen "Nachhaltige Investments" to download at http: //www. forum-ng. de/upload/Mitglieder-log-in/Definitionenfina105-10- 
28. pdf 
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It is incomprehensible that some SRI funds see voting their stocks not as a SRI 
engagement as it only plays a minor role79. More importance is seen in dialogues with 
the issuers. This attitude is inconsequent and dangerous. An asset manager of a 
sustainable fund, who promotes an advanced form of investment and therefore applies 
strict standards to the issuers, appears implausible when ignoring the fiduciary 
responsibility he has towards the beneficiary owners. 
The fact that not only institutional SRI investors but also private investors show an 
engagement in some political issues is certainly worth mentioning. With respect to this 
kind of activity, it is problematic that the suggestions private investors offer in the 
general meeting are badly prepared and poorly presented. Hence, even though they 
might have excellent points they do not have a chance to succeed or at least being 
considered by the management. 
Unfortunately, it has not yet been investigated if shareholder proposals with a socially 
responsible background are more successful and if management is more receptive of 
these compared to other economic topics. 
2.4. Shareholder Engagement versus Stakeholder Interest 
The corporate interests of shareholders on one side and stakeholders on the other are 
mostly diverging. This finding is not new and led to a "shareholder versus stakeholder" 
debate80. A good catchphrase in this respect is "shareholder value". It is still associated 
with corporate policy aiming at short-term profit maximisation, and thus should have a 
negative impact on the interests of stakeholders. They are concerned about the 
company's social responsibility, which is only achievable through long-term profit 
maximisation. According to the International Center for Corporate Social Responsibility 
(ICCSR)81, corporate social responsibility refers to the attention of business to 
community involvement, socially responsible products and processes and socially 
responsible employee relations. 
However, the discussion on shareholder value versus corporate social responsibility is 
not a central part of this thesis. The question if codetermination rights of stakeholders 
should be expanded is not discussed in this thesis, either. Both issues are wide-ranging 
and thus provide ample material for a thesis in itself. 
79 Eurosif: Socially Responsible Investment among European Institutional Investors - 2003 Report to download at 
http: //www. eurosif. org/pub2/lib/2003/10/srirept/eurosif-srireprt-2003-all. pdf at p. 50 
80 Sources: Schmidt, Reinhard H. /Weiß, Marco Shareholder vs. 
Stakeholder: Ökonomische Fragestellungen" Working Paper Series Finance and Accounting No. 
104, January 2003 to download at www. wiwi. uni-frankfurt. de/schwerpunkte/finance/wp/770. pdf; Aabo, Tom "Ownership and Risk Management: Shareholder 
versus Stakeholder Satisfaction" Competitive Paper, Aarhus/Denmark 2002 to download at www. aueb. gr/deos/EfBA2002. files/Papers/C73. pdf; Cornelius, 
Peter/Kogut Bruce "Creating the Responsible Firm: In Search for a New Corporate Governance Paradigm" in German Law Journal No. 1 (1st of January 2003) to 
download at www. germanlawjournal. com/article. php? id=224 
81 International Center for Corporate Social Responsibility (ICCSR) at http: //www. nottingham. ac. uk/business/ICCSR 
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The question to be solved with regard to this thesis is whether shareholder engagement 
collides with the stakeholders' interest. Having indicated the underlying conflict, it 
appears that activities by investors will also have a negative impact on corporate social 
responsibility. 
Undisputedly, shareholders are interested in a good stock price development. They try 
to achieve this by engaging and targeting good corporate performance. Although the 
shareholders' sphere of activity is limited, as they are only able to articulate their 
interests by negotiating, asking, voting, suing or most important by selling their shares, 
their influence on corporate decision making could still be considerable. The examples 
of capital increase, altering the statutes, or approving takeovers alone indicate the 
significance of shareholder engagement. For these reasons, it becomes obvious that 
shareholder engagement could in some areas collide with the interests of stakeholders. 
This cannot be ignored. 
However, there are also some indications showing that shareholder engagement does 
not necessarily conflict with stakeholders' interest. 
In approaching this issue, it is first of all important to recognise that an active 
shareholder is interested in a healthy company and shareholder value, which could be 
assumed as he accepts expenses (e. g. costs for proxy voting) in order to raise his voice82. 
Although this realisation might more be the result of legal requirements (e. g. in 
Germany § 32 s. 1 s. 3 InvG - Kapitalanlagegesellschaften should vote) than of 
conviction, it has to be noted positively that the shareholder lets management know 
that it needs to do better. 
Additionally, a differentiation needs to be made between an active investor and a 
speculator. Usually the latter does not get involved in corporate policy. His aim is to 
make profits in a short period of time. Therefore, he tries to keep expenses as low as 
possible and will typically sell his shares instead of getting involved in company 
business. 
Another indicator that shareholder engagement is not automatically interfering with the 
interests of the stakeholders is the scope of their engagement. As it can be seen in the 
Figure 4 and 5, the stakeholder is not primarily focused on profit maximisation. A 
number of issues like corporate governance, remuneration or takeover defences are not 
or only partially value related. 
82 Hirschman defines the concept of voice as "any attempt at all to change, rather than to escape from, an objectionable state of affairs", in Hirschman, Albert 
Exit, 
Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organisations and States " Harvard University Press, Cambridge 1970 at p. 30 
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Figure 4: Question for Issuers: Which issues have investors asked to discuss or most 
often voted on? 83 
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Figure 5: Question to Investors: Which type of issues are you most likely to want to 
discuss or vote on? 84 
Appointment of auditors 
Corporate/ social responsibilty 
Company performance 
Management/ board appointments 
Corporate governance 
Executive remuneration 
Changes of voting rights/ takeover defences 
Taking this into account, a conflict of interests between active investors and 
stakeholders is not as obvious as it seemed to be in the first place. There are some 
indicators showing that shareholder engagement targets issues, which could also be 
attributed to the stakeholders` interest. To mention in this respect are excessive 
remuneration of management; corporate/ social responsibility; corporate governance or 
the common interest to reduce the likelihood of destabilising financial meltdowns. 
The existence of some common interests should not obscure the fact that engaged 
shareholders and stakeholders have conflicting concerns. In these cases it is important 
that the board could function as an arbitrator, as it is management which is mostly 
better positioned to assess facts, circumstances and developments. It is only natural that 
shareholders as well as stakeholders primarily focus on their own benefit rather than 
that of the company. Therefore equilibrium of the different interests needs to be 
maintained. For instance, a tip over could result in a reduced equity price or in a strike. 
83 Grubaugh, Richard H. Survey of 
Global Voting Trends" 2004 at p. 20 to download at wv%ww. iirf. org (International Investors Relation Federation) 
84 Grubaugh, Richard H. Survey of Global Voting 
Trends" 2004 at p. 19 to download at www. iirf. org (International Investors Relation Federation) 
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Such a development needs to be avoided as it contradicts the interest of the corporation. 
Taking this into account the question should not be whether to favour shareholder 
engagement or stakeholder interests but how to establish an equilibrium benefiting all 
parties. It should be considerably easy to achieve this goal. Engagement usually 
becomes an issue with shareholders seeking long-term profit maximisation. This is 
exemplified by the costs and efforts in order to pursue the engagement. The 
perseverance that is necessary until the engagement begins to take effect also supports 
this hypothesis. 
In conclusion, the conflict between shareholder engagement and stakeholder interests 
should not be overestimated as it has been done in the "shareholder versus 
stakeholder" debate. There are sufficiently common interests, which give allowance to 
the opinion that under certain circumstances shareholder engagement is beneficial for 
stakeholders. 
2.5. Critical Evaluation of Shareholder Engagement 
While arguing that engagement by investors is beneficial for the company and fosters 
shareholder value, it must be accepted that engagement can be abused. Indeed this has 
often been the case in Germany, inflicting varying degrees of damage on the company 
and its price. An inaccurate picture of the company can be drawn because of thoroughly 
reasonable criticism on the profit maximising, sustainable, and ethical or other 
development of the company voiced in an aggressive, inadequate or sensationalistic 
way. 
Far-reaching shareholder engagement also has the potential to harm other shareholders 
or the issuer. Having laid the focus on Germany, reference should be made to issues 
like the abuse of the right to file a suit (Chapter 6.2.6.1.7. ), the danger of accidental 
majority outcomes, misdirected majorities (Girmes AG - Chapter 2.2.2. ), driving a 
campaign against the CEO (e. g. Wyser-Pratt versus IWKA AG in 2005) or other 
negative effects. Due to the lack of self-regulation of the capital market and due to 
structural overregulation by the legislator, loopholes for the abuse of shareholder rights 
have been created in Germany, as I will elaborate later in this thesis. This does not 
necessarily need to be the abuse of an action taken in order to achieve a tidy settlement; 
it could also involve insider trading and other activities, which are capable of harming 
the interests of shareholders or substitutable stakeholders. The essentially positive 
impact of shareholder engagement can quickly become a lasting negative state of 
affairs, or even destructive. 
The necessity of sound regulation for shareholder engagement is as crucial as self- 
control pursued by the investors. Additionally, the management and supervisory board 
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need to react when recognising an abusive behaviour. Accidental majorities, 
uncontrolled squeeze-outs, unjustified blocking, etc. must be avoided. 
2.6. Concluding Assessment 
We have seen that a number of different approaches offer varying results on the impact 
of shareholder engagement. It has been shown that an investment strategy focused on 
good corporate governance, could not only reduce risk, but also deliver returns that 
could be two-digit percentages higher compared to investments renouncing this 
strategy. 
However, in reviewing these approaches with respect to the impact of shareholder 
engagement three issues become obvious. 
The emphasis is placed squarely on negotiations, proposals and voting. This derives 
from the beneficial effect these forms of engagement could provide to the company and 
its investors. Results on the impact of shareholder engagement regarding information 
request, speaking at the general meeting and litigation could not be provided. This is 
not very surprising with regard to information inquiry or speaking at a general 
meeting. Yet it is necessary to mention that, in contrast to the US, actions a shareholder 
pursues in a German court (e. g. appeal against a resolution or nullity action) rarely 
show effects, as the paid settlement does not put a real strain on the stock price. 
Second, the price difference between shares with and without voting right is not, or 
only to a limited extent, influenced by the shareholder. Hence, this effect is more of an 
investment tool than the result of shareholder engagement. 
Third, the great difference of the tools and studies on the stock price derives from the 
varying approaches in time, scope, region, shareholder groups, and other parameters. 
However, the vast majority of methods allow the statement that shareholder 
engagement has a more or less positive effect on the stock price. 
To draw a conclusion shareholder engagement, in Germany as well as globally, has a 
positive effect on the stock price development. Due to the great diversity in the results 
of the different approaches, it is not possible to provide a universally applicable 
formula. Shareholder engagement can also positively affect non-financial issues, like 
social responsibility. Moreover, shareholder engagement is not necessarily in conflict 
with the interest of the stakeholders. Overall, it is certainly valid to state that the success 
for the shareholders is to a great extent dependent on excellent negotiation skills, good 
tactics and functional shareholder communication. 
37 
Finally, it needs to be pointed out that shareholder engagement generates its value by 
exhausting the given legal tools and the usage of complementary steps. Consequently it 
is able to enrich the existing corporate model in Germany. 
Having shown the benefit of shareholder engagement, I will now turn to examine its 
realisation in corporate Germany. In doing so, the "hierarchy" of forms of engagement 
set out in Chapter 1 will be employed. Chapter 3 begins this process by providing an 
overview of the current situation in Germany. 
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3. Chapter: Support for Shareholder Engagement 
An examination of the instruments supporting shareholder engagement is necessary to 
understand its still existing deficits and to develop a healthy activity according to the 
introduced hierarchy (Chapter 1.2. ). The means to support shareholder engagement 
could help to direct their activity into the correct and efficient channels, or could 
anticipate necessary actions. 
Therefore this chapter will explain the support investors could expect from third parties 
in pursuing sound shareholder engagement. I will provide an insight into the role of the 
supervisory board as the shareholder representatives' body on the board and the 
possibilities proxy solicitation could offer; therefore looking beyond the general 
meeting and the provided hierarchy of shareholder engagement. 
3.1. The Supervisory Board as the Extended Arm of the Investors 
In the German corporate governance system the board is divided into the management 
and the supervisory board. This "German Solution" often is criticised in particular for 
its codetermination (50% of the supervisory board members are shareholder 
representatives, 50% are employee representatives). Some examples, like that of 
Volkswagen in 200585 certainly justify a careful approach to this system. 
The principles of this model are still seen as an alternative for other judicial systems, 
which view their shareholder representation to be in need of reform. In particular the 
European Union, in its efforts to create the Societas Europea, took into account the 
division of the supervisory board and the management board86. This assessment is 
underlined by the Report of the High Level Group of Company Law Experts on a 
Modern Regulatory Framework for Company Law in Europe - the "Winter- 
Committee", which came to the conclusion that neither one-tier nor two-tier board 
structures are intrinsically superior: each may be the most efficient in particular 
circumstances87. 
To gain an understanding of this concept it is essential to assess the value of the 
supervisory board for shareholder engagement. In general the duty of the supervisory 
board is to oversee the activity of the management board (§ 111 s. 1 AktG). According to 
85 Volkswagen invited some employee representatives to pleasure trips". 
The latter are also suspected to have taken bribe money - Source e. g. Ritter, Johannes 
"VW-Affäre - Sexbelege und Lügengeschichten" 
in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 16.11.2005, No. 267 at p. 2 
86 Blanquet, Francoise "Das Statut der Europäischen Aktiengesellschaft (Societas Europea "SE")" in Zeitschrift für Unternehmens- und Gesellschaftsrecht ((ZGR)) 
January 2002 31. Volume number 1 p. 20-65 from p. 21ff 
87 "Report of the High Level Group of Company Law Experts on a Modem Regulatory 
Framework for Company Law in Europe" 2002 to download at 
http: //europa. eu. int/comm/internal_market/en/company/company/modem/consult/report_en. pdf at p. 
8 
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Huffer, this supervision consists of a control of management. It needs to be applied to 
the past, must include participation in management tasks through consultation 
(preventative governance) and must be legal, proper and suitable88. This responsibility 
is supplemented by the possibility to influence the business of the corporation to a 
certain extent89. This influence is exerted through appointment and employment of the 
management board members; engaging the auditors in charge; coordination with the 
management board as to how annual accounts and the profits are utilised; writing 
reports; and developing resolution proposals for the general meeting. 
In contrast to other judicial systems (e. g. U. K. - Section 1 A. 4 of the Combined Code 
200390) where non-executive directors are appointed by a nomination committee, 
shareholders of German Aktiengesellschaften could get engaged in the election of the 
supervisory board members in the general meeting (§ 19 s. 1 s. 1 AktG). 
Their usual tenure is five years, but they may be re-elected. One of the tasks of the 
members of the supervisory board is to make suggestions for new board members to be 
appointed91. The sensitive work of finding a qualified substitute for the supervisory 
board should not be left to the general meeting for good reasons. It is necessary that the 
search for a member of the supervisory board is professionally organised. This is not 
guaranteed when the suggestion right is left completely to the AGM. The supervisory 
board member needs to be qualified and experienced in matters of corporate 
governance and should be elected because of these characteristics, not because he 
carries the sympathies of the shareholders. 
The investors, nevertheless, also have the right to make their own proposal to the 
general meeting92. Their recommendation has a very limited chance to succeed, 
because institutional investors especially prefer to follow the advice of the supervisory 
board rather than that of private shareholders. However, it would certainly be 
beneficial if more than one suitable candidate stood for a place in the supervisory 
board. Having a choice between three or four candidates will indisputably promote 
competence rather than reflect a good network or lobby. 
However, it will be interesting to see whether specialised consultants will slowly take 
over the nominations for supervisory board members. This may occur as the standards 
for a supervisory board member get increasingly complex and require professional 
experience. Additionally, international shareholders need to be represented on the 
board - the existing mechanisms can only implement this to a limited extent. 
88 Huffer, Uwe "Aktiengesetz" 6th Edition Munich 2004 at § 111 No. 4ff 
89 Obermüller, Werner, Winden Die 
Hauptversammlung der Aktiengesellschaft" revised by Butzke, Volker 4th Edition Stuttgart 2001 at p. 346 
90 "The Combined Code on Corporate Governance", 2003 to download at http: //www. fsa. gov. uk/pubs/ukla/lr_comcode2003. pdf 
91 Happ, Wilhelm, Aktienrecht Handbuch - Mustertexte - Kommentar" 2nd Edition Cologne, Berlin, Bonn, Munich 2004 at p. 812 
92 Happ, Wilhelm Aktienrecht 
Handbuch - Mustertexte - Kommentar" 2nd Edition Cologne, Berlin, Bonn, Munich 2004 at p. 813 
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According to § 110 s. 3 s. 1 AktG the supervisory board must at least meet twice a year. 
Although the German Corporate Governance Code dictates that a member of the 
supervisory board should not have more than five mandates, this rule is not widely 
obeyed to this point in time. Ten mandates are still not unusual, which is the maximum 
according to § 100 s. 2 s. 1 No. 1 AktG. 
The supervisory board consists of shareholder representatives, who are elected by the 
annual general meeting (§ 119 s. 1 s. 1 AktG) and employee representatives93. This right 
of codetermination in stock corporations means that in an enterprise with more than 
2.000 employees, the latter have the right to contribute half of the members to the 
supervisory board. Control remains with the shareholder representatives as their 
chairman's vote counts twice in case of a deadlock. However, it seems that the huge 
employee representation on the board results in a model that is geared towards 
harmony and the willingness to compromise, instead of one that pursues effective and 
qualified corporate governance. This does not necessarily mean a negative outcome as 
Breuer, former CEO of the Deutsche Bank, reports: 
"The codetermination has produced really good results in manifold ways, especially in difficult 
times. I have been a member of supervisory boards, where particularly the employee 
representatives distinguished themselves by showing constructive, professional, fast support for 
drastic rescue measures, when the existence of the enterprise was endangered. [... ] The model of 
codetermination has to be supported and presents an important achievement. 94" 
Nevertheless, he continues with criticism of the current state of employee 
representation: The fact that only German employee representatives are allowed on the 
boards even when the majority is employed abroad might lead to decisions not based 
on economical, but also on local and political issues95. 
Therefore, the role of the supervisory board as the shareholders' corporate governor in 
the German system is double-edged. This is based on the two-tier boards of the legal 
system, separating management and supervisory boards. 
Additionally, the corporate crossholding (see Chapter 4.1.3. ) structure plays an 
important role. Still, a number of companies own a considerable share in other 
companies (e. g. Münchner Rück owns 4,9% of Allianz, Allianz owns 9,8% of Münchner 
Rück, Deutsche Bank owns 4,4% of Daimler Chrysler, Daimler Chrysler owns 30,2 of 
EADS96). This is particularly the case with banks and insurance companies, but also 
with large private investors. Consequently, the nexus of members in the different 
supervisory boards is almost symbiotic to the crossholdings. With the corporate 
93 § 76 Betriebsverfassungsgesetz, §5 Mitbestimmungsgesetz 
94 Breuer, Rolf. E. "Corporate Governance börsennotierter Banken" Documentation of the Seminar "Corporate Governance - Nutzen und Umsetzung" organised 
by the Deutsche Aktieninstitut on the 12th of March 2001: to download at http: //www. dai. de/intemet/dai/dai-2- 
0. nsf/LookupDL/41256A99002BDD55C1256A5E002C4E1F/$File/Studie_15. pdf at p. 
24 
95 Baums, Theodor Corporate 
Governance - Aktuelle Entwicklungen" 2003 to download at http: //www. irp. uni-trier. de/12_Baums. pdf at p. 8 
96 Source: Insight - Corporate Governance Germany 
"Insight Shareholder ID" Issue 0/2006 at p. 24f 
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investor mostly being the largest single shareholder, his place on the supervisory board 
is almost reserved. This means that for other shareholders it is extremely difficult to 
bring forward alternative candidates, who are not connected with a bank, a corporate 
investor or the major private shareholder. This is certainly problematic as it means that 
mandates are "conferred" according to the proportional representation and not 
according to qualification97. What is even worse is that the supervisory board is a 
potential pool of conflicts of interest. Being provocative, the independence of the 
members of the supervisory board is questionable. The background of some members 
supports this assertion. For example associates, who are sent by banks, could be 
tempted to protect the position of their employer as a creditor by looking for new 
business opportunities, rather than acting in the interests of the shareholders98. The 
same can be applied to employee representatives. Members, who are associated with 
trade unions99, often have to choose between the interests of their union, the employees 
or the corporation100. 
Criticism is not only justified regarding the composition of the board, but also 
regarding its organisation and its status. Sherman points out that a seat in the 
supervisory board is often abused as a farewell retirement present for long-serving 
managers, union members or anyone else who might need to be rewarded with a 
lucrative position101. With regard to the workload of some supervisors, who have a seat 
on ten boards besides their job as a CEO and other honorary posts, the investment of 
time is certainly limited. Therefore it is not uncommon that the members meet only four 
times a year and then only for two hours. The reproach that the supervisory board is a 
type of Breakfast Club is not without foundation. 
The German Corporate Governance Commission (Cromme-Commission) reacted to 
some of these issues and consequently, tried to improve the independence of the 
supervisory board with the latest alteration of the German Corporate Governance 
Code102. Special attention should be drawn to the recommendation that the former CEO 
of a company should not automatically become chairman of its supervisory board. If 
the company insists on this changeover it needs to justify this intention explicitly in the 
97 Brost, Marc/Heuser, Uwe Jean Das sind absurde 
Zustände" Interview with Hilmar Kopper in Die 
Zeit" 18th Issue 2001to download at 
http: / / www. zeit. de/ 2001 / 18/Wirtschaft/ 200118_beistueck_corpor. html 
98 During the takover battle between Thyssen and Krupp in 1997 the Deutsche Bank was consulting Krupp, while they also had a member in the supervisory 
board of Thyssen. 
99 Schmidt, Karsten "Gesellschaftsrecht" 4th Edition Cologne, Berlin, Bonn Munich 2002 at § 28 III No. 4 a) 
100 A famous example is the role of Bsirske (Chairman of Verdi, the largest union worldwide): In 
2002 he initiated a tabour dispute about the compensation of 
Lufthansa workers on the ground, although he was a member of the supervisory 
board of the airline. The dispute lead to a loss of the Lufthansa stock price. 
Anyway, at the end the general meeting refused his discharge. A 
Financial Times Deutschland article on that Issue: Lufthansa-Aktionäre strafen 
Bsirske ab" 
www. ftd. de/ub/di/1055680383285. html? nv=sl 
101 Shearman, John Germany - 
Controlling Directors the German Way" in The Company Lawyer Vol. 18 No. 4 (1997) p. 123-125 at p. 123 
102 Third Alteration of the German Corporate Governance Code: 
02.06.2005 
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general meeting103. A similar provision is also stated in the Combined Code104 in the 
U. K. where Section A. 2.2 states that a CEO should not go on to become chairman. Just 
like in Germany an exception is also possible providing that major shareholders have 
been consulted and it has been explained in the annual report. 
Although the supervisory board acts as the extended arm of the shareholder, the legal 
engagement of the investor according to the claimed hierarchy is limited to its election 
(en bloc or single105); the ability to file a suit due to an improper election process; and 
the relief from office (§ 103 s. 1 AktG). 
From a shareholder engagement point of view it would be of interest if the board was 
able to take over an active role in "shareholder negotiations"106 on corporate 
governance issues. Currently investors are negotiating their issues directly with the 
management without consulting their board representatives. From an objective point of 
view the supervisory board is a redundant intermediate. The latter represents the 
shareholders, but as the controller of the management board it is also involved in the 
day to day business of the corporation. Therefore the supervisory board members are in 
a perfect situation to evaluate the issues from both sides. However, if being an 
intermediate in shareholder negotiations with management becomes one of their future 
tasks, the legislator does not necessarily need to reform the supervisory board system. 
The possibilities of the existing law need to be exhausted, while the compliance with the 
Corporate Governance Code should be supervised and supported, rather than enforced. 
In conclusion, the role of the supervisory board as the extended arm of the shareholders 
has improved over the last couple of years, because of an increased awareness of the 
investors and an active legislator. Although the supervisory board has not yet come up 
to a status which will guarantee the shareholders sound corporate governance, the 
current discussions about codetermination and the new requirements by the Corporate 
Governance Code are pointing in the right direction. 
3.2. Proxy Solicitation 
Increasingly, issuers hire proxy solicitors. Their role must not be confused with the 
completely different role of a "lawyer". The main business field of the proxy solicitor is 
the tracking of investors. Here it has to be acknowledged that not only do they serve the 
103 Kirschbaum, Tom Deutscher 
Corporate Governance Kodex überarbeitet" in Der Betrieb Heft 28 Vol. 58 (15.07.2005) p. 1473-1477 at p. 1473 
104 "The Combined Code on Corporate Governance", 2003 to download at http: //www. fsa. gov. uk/pubs/ukla/lr_comcode2003. pdf 
105 More on that issue: Segna, Ulrich Blockabstimmung und 
Bestellungshindernisse bei der Aufsichtsratswahl" in Der Betrieb No. 21; 21.05.2004 p. 1135-1137 
106 For Shareholder Negotiation see chapter 6.1. 
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issuer but also the shareholder. This is possible as they are free of conflicts of interest. 
Their task is to contact the shareholders and not to offer analysis or advice. 
Proxy solicitation is of greatest value when a company decides to change from bearer 
shares to registered shares. As in this case the beneficial owner of the shares is not 
known by the company, measures must be taken to secure that the transformation of 
the shares is successful. Another advantage is that the data, which are collected by the 
proxy solicitors, enable the issuer of bearer shares to improve his investor relations. In 
addition to that companies engage their services to bring shareholders to the ballot box. 
By doing this, the issuer ensures high capital presence at the general meeting and thus 
reduces the chances of accidental majorities as well as the danger that the investor will 
sell his shares rather than raising his voice when issues within the company put the 
stock price under pressure. Hence, by hiring a proxy solicitor, such as Georgeson 
Shareholders, the issuer is also encouraging and improving shareholder engagement. 
The proxy solicitor also plays an important role when an investor wants to carry out a 
proxy contest or proxy "fight"107. This is seen, for example, in connection with a hostile 
takeover. A proxy contest occurs when the acquiring "predator" company attempts to 
convince shareholders to use their proxy votes to install new management that is open 
to the takeover. The technique allows the predator to avoid paying a premium for the 
target. 
A famous example in this respect is the takeover battle between Hewlett Packard and 
Compaq. Both the objecting party as well as the supporting party hired proxy solicitors 
in order to win the decisive majority of shareholders for their side. 
On the assumption that shareholder engagement in Germany will increase and the use 
of registered shares will continue in the next years, the role of proxy solicitors will 
become more and more important in the future. 
To recap, we have examined the means of support for shareholder engagement 
focussing in particular on the role of the supervisory board and proxy solicitation. 
Examining this helped us to understand the supporting environment beyond the 
offered hierarchy of shareholder engagement. 
107 Definition of Proxy Contest: to 
download at www. investorwords. com/3921/proxy_contest. htmt 
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4. Chapter: Empirical Evidence on Shareholder Engagement in Germany 
To allow a better understanding of the extent to which shareholder engagement is 
practised in Germany, some empirical data will be provided108. The latter concentrates 
on the issues of voting and litigation. For all other measures numerical information 
hardly exists, if at all. This primarily derives from the "hidden" character of these 
activities and the difficulty to assess the background of the engagement. Consequently, 
the focus has been on the right to vote and the right to file a suit. 
Moreover, based on the empirical results it is the issue of voting that causes greatest 
concerns. 
The figure below shows that in the last seven proxy seasons the presence at AGMs held 
by DAX 30109 companies on average constantly decreased, from nearly 61 % in 1998 to 
less than 46% in 2005. Here Infineon Technologies AG achieved the lowest recorded 
capital presence of only 17.59%. 
Figure 6: Capital Presence at DAX 30 AGMs (1998-2005) in Percent of all 
Shareholders'" 
in the DAX Current 3-Year- 
since/until Index 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Average 
Adidas-Salomon since 
AG 19.06.98 DAX 35,10 43,90 45,44 30,00 31,52 23,17 28,25 26,94 26,12 
Allianz Holding 
AG DAX 70,92 69,06 60,60 53,70 46,71 39,97 37,15 34,82 37,31 
since Ca. 
Altana AG 23.09.02 DAX 76,00 71,71 65,21 64,00 63,00 67,22 64,78 65 
BASF AG DAX 53,03 49,48 46,02 43,59 36,82 31,31 34,99 34,39 33,56 
Bayer AG DAX 47,53 44,79 37,53 35,90 33,21 36,00 35,50 35,91 34,8 
Bayerische Hypo- 
Vereinsbank AG * DAX 64,10 59,10 51,99 53,48 57,39 55,56 49,88 53,4 52,95 
BMW AG DAX 73,00 73,00 64,40 64,04 66,57 65,84 63,70 55,04 61,53 
Commerzbank 
AG DAX 46,54 43,91 55,97 56,07 58,93 57,31 46,53 39,39 47,74 
since 
Continental AG 22.9.03 DAX - - - - 41,66 33,57 34,44 23,55 30,52 
DaimlerChrysler 
AG ** DAX 63,97 39,02 39,00 36,92 38,25 38,84 43,69 37,84 40,12 
until 
Degussa AG *** 23.09.02 MDAX 69,51 70,86 82,82 75,86 76,24 - - - - 
Deutsche Bank 
AG DAX 44,69 37,50 31,73 34,44 33,41 38,75 31,98 25,47 32,07 
Deutsche Börse 
AG since 2003 DAX - 44,53 31,55 59,76 45,28 
Deutsche 
Lufthansa AG DAX 31,90 34,60 35,25 34,90 41,14 46,37 41,09 41,4 42,95 
108 Figure 5,6,10,11,15,17,20,21,23,24,30 
109 Index of the 30 biggest public listed companies in 
Germany 
110 Source: Deutsche Schutzvereinigung 
für Wertpapierbesitz e. V. (German Association for Share ownership) to download at www. dsw- 
info. de/uploads/ media/ HV-Praesenz_2005. pdf 
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Deutsche Post 
World Net AG 
since 
19.03.01 DAX - - - 76,18 77,37 79,35 72,71 74,19 75,42 
Deutsche 
Telekom AG 
since 
18.11.96 DAX 85,61 82,67 75,86 69,52 56,45 59,47 63,53 54,47 59,16 
Dresdner Bank AG 
until 
23.07.01 70,33 61,72 59,75 
E. ON AG 
since 
19.06.00 DAX - - - 39,01 37,35 31,00 35,00 29,92 31,97 
Epcos AG until 2003 DAX - - 42,60 44,88 54,54 
Fresenius Medical 
Care AG 
since 
17.09.99 DAX 62,40 67,88 64,79 61,06 62,59 64,97 65,00 63,8 64,59 
Henkel AG (Vz. ) DAX 65,12 66,75 83,24 84,50 83,73 79,39 80,22 78,31 79,31 
Hoechst AG 
until 
17.09.99 65,86 62,68 
Infineon 
Technologies AG 
since 
19.06.00 DAX - - - 74,74 41,66 31,88 17,59 48,19 32,55 
Karstadt-Quelle 
AG 
until 
19.03.01 MDAX 64,90 65,65 68,46 
Linde AG DAX 59,00 56,46 54,4 53,67 54,19 50,08 50,72 49,75 50,18 
MAN AG DAX 61,00 59,81 55,80 50,62 52,80 48,41 45,51 34,31 42,72 
Metro AG **** DAX 78,49 77,72 87,53 66,93 66,38 65,86 65,27 67,4 66,18 
MLP AG until 2003 MDAX - 77,89 79,22 75,38 51,41 59,50 - - - 
Münchener Rück 
AG 
since 
20.09.96 DAX 75,80 72,33 69,80 65,60 53,45 57,49 44,89 42,49 48,29 
RWE AG DAX 75,01 67,15 63,90 65,09 66,08 39,06 59,03 56,52 51,54 
SAP AG (Vz. ) 
since 
15.09.95 DAX 59,77 53,36 56,70 50,85 55,37 58,04 59,53 54,04 57,2 
Schering AG DAX 43,16 47,01 43,33 37,40 37,00 34,84 33,29 32,62 33,58 
Siemens AG 
since 
18.03.99 DAX 46,66 44,97 24,93 22,00 36,40 47,51 32,67 32,15 37,44 
ThyssenKrupp 
AG ***** DAX 58,74 55,90 64,13 61,26 59,97 61,60 56,18 54,03 57,27 
TUI AG (former 
Preussag) 
since 
03.09.90 DAX 65,41 66,87 39,30 37,21 37,21 54,18 54,30 37,18 48,55 
Veba AG ****** 
until 
17.06.00 45,33 46,44 40,41 - - - - - - 
Viag AG ****** 
until 
17.06.00 66,39 54,99 65,47 - - - - - - 
Volkswagen AG DAX 43,70 37,62 34,39 36,99 32,98 29,01 37,21 33,9 33,37 
Average 60,95 56,36 54,85 53,03 51,23 49,14 47,29 45,87 47,4 
* from 1999, before Bay. Vereinsbank AG 
** from Dec. 1998, before Daimler Benz AG 
*** from Dez. 2000, after merger with SKW, before Degussa AG 
**'* from 1997, before Kaufhof AG 
***'* from Dec. 1998, before Thyssen AG 
****** After the merger of Veba and Viag, E. ON and Infineon have been included in the Dax 
The average ongoing decrease of the presence of capital in German AGMs and hence, 
the use of the voting right raises the danger for accidental majorities, increases the 
possibility that the investor sells his shares rather than becoming active and weakens 
the position of the management and supervisory boards. 
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The reasons for the low and still decreasing capital presence are manifold. First, the 
crossholding is slowly breaking up11'. In Germany crossholding (compare with Chapter 
4.1.3. ) has been widely spread. The large share some companies had in another (e. g. 
Deutsche Bank held 10% in DaimlerChrysler) guaranteed a higher presence at the 
general meeting. The sale of those shares resulted in a decrease of large engaged 
blockholders to the benefit of widely held share ownership, with a lower interest in 
shareholder engagement. 
Moreover, the custodian banks are slowly pulling out of the proxy voting business. The 
Volksbanken112 as well as the Sparkassen113 have already stopped offering 
representation at the general meetings. This considerably increased the effort for 
executing the voting right for private investors, who have their shares in custody at 
those banks. As the small private shareholder most probably will not change his 
custodian in order to have a proxy for a general meeting, the votes of small private 
investors having shares in custody with the Volksbanken or Sparkassen were lost 
almost completely. 
Finally, the percentage of foreign shareholders is already considerably high, and still 
increasing. Naturally these shareholders rarely exercise their voting rights. However, 
with the reform of the German Stock Corporation Act by the UMAG114 in 2005, a record 
date was introduced, which removed a system of share blocking that had existed until 
then. Now the 21st day before the AGM is decisive for the entitlement to vote 
(§ 128 s. 1 AktG) and shares will not be blocked for trading anymore. Therefore, 
institutional investors will certainly feel encouraged to exercise their voting rights for 
their national holdings completely and not only partially as it was the case in the past. 
The wish not to block all shares and to keep a number of shares tradable or unblocked 
resulted in disclaiming the voting power, especially by institutional investors. Also, the 
European Union has recognised this deficiency and commenced formulating a directive 
that could be passed by the end of 2006115. One of its objectives is to shed the 
reservations of international shareholders towards engagement in foreign markets and 
encouraging cross-border voting. 
111 compare with Figure 12 
112 §1 Genossenschaftsgesetz (Cooperative Act): The basic idea of Volksbanken (Cooperative 
Banks) is the promotion of the earnings or the trade and industry of 
the members by means of mutual business activity. 
113 Sparkassen (Savings Banks) are an institution of public law. As universal 
banks they usually pursue a regionally limited business activity. 
114 Bundesjustizministerium "Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Unternehmensintegrität und 
Modernisierung des Anfechtungsrechts (UMAG)" 2004 to download at 
http: //www. bmi. bund. de/media/archive/701. pdf 
115 European Commission - Directorate 
General Internal Market Corporate governance: 
Commission proposals to make it easier for shareholders to exercise 
their rights within the EU 
" 2006 
http: / /europa, eu. int/ rapid/ pressReleasesAction. 
do? reference=IP/ 06/ 10&format=HTML&aged=0&Ianguage=EN&guiLanguage=en 
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Having shown shareholders' decreasing vote execution at general meetings, it is 
interesting to have a closer examination of the voting behaviour of investors themselves 
(Figure 30). 
It rarely happens that an agenda item receives less than 95% approval. Such an 
overwhelming vote of confidence certainly could be an indication that there have not 
been crucial issues within the company in the past year and that the work of the 
management and supervisory board is undisputed, but this is not necessarily the case. 
Taking DaimlerChrysler as an example, the voting results of the 2004 AGM do not 
reflect a lack of satisfaction with the management. Prior to the AGM, especially 
institutional investors116 pointed out a number of issues to the CEO and the board. 
These issues were in relation to a constantly decreasing stock price; problems with 
Chrysler and Mitsubishi; the Toll Collect disaster and a suit in the US. However, despite 
these issues the board was discharged by the general meeting with a majority of 88%. 
The reason for this voting behaviour is still mostly rooted in crossholdings and in the 
system of the custodian banks' omnipotent influence. Due to their roles as investor, 
creditor and proxy not only for private but also for institutional shareholders, their 
voting power is more than considerable (as will be explained in more detail in Chapter 
4.1.4. ). Hence, a successful vote against the management is only formulated in 
accordance with the custodian banks. 
Furthermore, when looking at the voting results the impression emerges that the 
boards' proposals are already a given fact for the company. This is not quite right. If the 
agenda item faces too much criticism and the management fears that the general 
meeting will not pass it, the proposal could be removed from the agenda as it happened 
with the item of the revision of the management remuneration at the Daimler Chrysler 
AGM in 2004. Hence, the unanimous consent with the boards' proposals by the 
shareholders may not be as uncritical as the voting majorities indicate. 
The empirical data give a hint to the topical situation of shareholder engagement in 
Germany: The capital presence is decreasing; majority voting results do not necessarily 
indicate a critical dealing with certain issues at AGMs and crossholdings and 
concentrated ownership are still common. Although this indicates that shareholder 
engagement is currently on the retreat, an optimistic approach towards this topic is 
appropriate, especially in view of the activity of the legislator; the ongoing corporate 
governance discussion particularly among institutional investors; and the possibilities 
that shareholder engagement provide (marketing, higher stock price, SRI, etc. ) 
Appeals against the general meeting117 often have a poor outcome for the corporation. It 
regularly occurred that shareholders filed an appeal against a resolution, motivated not 
116 e. g. Interview with Juschus, Alexander Daimler-Chrysler-Aktionäre 
haben Vertrauen verloren" in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 05.04.2004, No. 81 at p. 15; 
Deutsche Schutzvereinigung für Wertpapierbesitz e. V. DSW will 
Vorstand und Aufsichtsrat von Daimler-Chrysler nicht entlasten" 05.03.2004 to download at 
www. dsw-info. de/DSW_will_Vorstand_und_Aufsichtsrat. 
342.0. html 
117 § 246 AktG 
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by a desire for legal rectitude, but by the thought that a settlement with the company 
could be of considerable financial benefit for themselves. As indicated by the table 
below, appeals against a resolution were constantly increasing over time. An improved 
awareness by the corporation, the closing of legal and organisational gaps, and 
initiatives by the legislator helped to lessen this abuse. With the changes in the UMAG 
2005118 (e. g. shareholders could transfer far more powers to the chairman of the general 
meeting to summarise and limit the time to speak and ask119), it can be expected that 
such shareholder appeals, made solely for financial gain, may cease. 
Figure 7: Appeals against General Meeting Resolutions120 
Year Stock Corporation/ 
Limited Partnership 
on Shares 
Of which are 
Listed 
Resolution 
Items per GM 
Appeals 
Against the 
Resolution/ 
Nullity Action 
1980 2147 459/- 4,20 6 
1981 2149 456/- 3,93 1 
1982 2132 450/- 3,90 2 
1983 2122 442/- 4,05 7 
1984 2141 449/- 3,99 3 
1985 2148 451/- 3,97 20 
1986 2193 467/- 4,04 9 
1987 2261 474/679 4,48 17 
1988 2366 465/ 706 4,24 30 
1989 2483 486/ 749 4,84 29 
1990 2685 501 / 776 4,43 26 
1991 2791 519/ 799 4,40 26 
1992 2943 521 / 790 4,98 20 
1993 3085 522/ 796 4,45 21 
1994 3527 523/ 810 4,69 45 
1995 3780 527/812 4,90 33 
1996 4043 -/802 4,93 47 
1997 
1998 
4548 
4756 
-/817 
-/883 
4,81 
5,45 
27 
39 
1999 n/ a n/ a 7,76 45 
118 see also Chapter 9.4. 
119 Seibert, Ulrich BB-Gesetzgebungsreport: 
Das Gesetz zur Unternehmensintegrität und Modernisierung des Anfechtungsrechts (UMAG) kommt zum 
1.11.2005" in Betriebs-Berater (BB) Vol. 60 Heft 27 (04.07.2005) p. 1457-1458 at p. 
1457 
120 Baums, Theodor Die 
Anfechtung von Hauptversammlungsbeschlüssen" Working Paper No. 85,2000 - to 
download at http: //www. jura. uni- 
frankfurt. de/ifawzl/baums/Arbeitspapiere. html at p. 12; Baums, 
Theodor/ Vogel, Hans-Gert/Tacheva, Maja Rechtstatsachen zur 
Beschlusskontrolle im 
Aktienrecht" 2000 to download at http: //ww-w. jura. uni-frankfurt. 
de/ifawzl/baums/Arbeitspapiere. html Paper No. 86 at p. 7ff 
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An interesting development is observed when looking at the resolution items per 
general meeting (from 4,2 in 1980 to 7,76 in 1999). The numbers indicate that the general 
meeting increasingly plays a decisive role in corporate decision making. 
To draw a conclusion, the empirical data on shareholder engagement is only expressive 
with regard to the voting right and the right to file a legal suit. The former indicates 
indifference, while the latter provides evidence of an intensive and even improper use 
of engagement. The developments in those two areas have been deteriorating over the 
last couple of years despite reforms being put in place. Other forms of shareholder 
activities are not numerically measurable, which does not imply that they might not be 
used excessively. 
Having examined this empirical context, our task now is to turn to the environment 
within which shareholder engagement must operate. The following chapter begins to 
tackle this task, examining the non-legal aspects of the environment of shareholder 
engagement. 
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5. Chapter: The Non-Legal Environment for Shareholder Engagement 
It has been shown that shareholder engagement could create value and that it is an 
essential part in Germany's corporate landscape. 
Now, to obtain a comprehensive picture of the non-legal environment of shareholder 
engagement in Germany, it is essential to recognise and categorise the different groups 
of shareholders, shares, issuers and other market influencing facts. Germany shows 
some specific features not only with regard to Company Law but also the capital 
market. Examples include the bearer share, which is still far more widespread than the 
registered share and the nexus of crossholdings in the market place. 
The definitions of corporate governance are manifold and depending on the approach, 
a number of views and interests can be included in this concept. Investors favour an 
approach which emphasises the shareholders' position, whereas an employee insists on 
an enhanced role of the stakeholder being included in the corporate governance 
definition. 
Although an assessment of different corporate governance concepts will not be a 
component of this thesis, at least the approach of the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development will be stated121, to gain an understanding of this idea. 
For the OECD 
"corporate governance is one key element in improving economic efficiency and growth as well as 
enhancing investor confidence. Corporate governance involves a set of relationships between a 
company's management, its board, its shareholders and other stakeholders. Corporate governance 
also provides the structure through which the objectives of the company are set, and the means of 
attaining those objectives and monitoring performance are determined. Good corporate governance 
should provide proper incentives for the board and management to pursue objectives that are in 
the interests of the company and its shareholders and should facilitate effective monitoring. The 
presence of an effective corporate governance system, within an individual company and across an 
economy as a whole, helps to provide a degree of confidence that is necessary for the proper 
functioning of a market economy. As a result, the cost of capital is lower and firms are encouraged 
to use resources more efficiently, thereby underpinning growth. Corporate governance is only part 
of the larger economic context in which firms operate that includes, for example, macroeconomic 
policies and the degree of competition in product and factor markets. The corporate governance 
framework also depends on the legal, regulatory, and institutional environment. In addition, 
factors such as business ethics and corporate awareness of the environmental and societal interests 
of the communities in which a company operates can also have an impact on its reputation and its 
long-term success. " 
121 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) "OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 
2004" to download at 
http: //www. oecd. org/dataoecd/32/18/31557724. pdf at p. 11 
(Preamble) 
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Although shareholder engagement seems to play only a limited part in the concept of 
corporate governance according to the understanding of the OECD, it should be 
assessed as its key feature. 
However, before turning to the purpose and duty of the general meeting as the 
shareholders' body, the different types of shareholders, the effects of globalisation, the 
types of issued shares as well as the impact of modern communication forms will be 
discussed. 
5.1. Social Environment: Types of Shareholders 
The current categorisation of shareholders aligns with their legal status: institutional, 
corporate, private, state, foundational or associational. This differentiation is as practical 
as it is easy to understand the different group of investors. Unfortunately, it does not 
reflect the different interests of each group nor does it allow for appropriate 
consideration of the various minorities. 
5.1.1. Shareholder Structure 
The structure of share ownership in Germany is often regarded suspiciously by foreign 
investors. In contrast to the systems in the UK or the US, in Germany a small number of 
shareholders often control blocks of more than 50 %, as it can be seen in figure 8 below. 
Figure 8: Shareholder Structure (In percent of all shares in circulation)122 
Country Year Private 
House- 
holds 
Com- 
panies 
State Banks Insuran- 
ce/ 
Pension 
Funds 
Invest- 
ment 
Funds 
Abroad 
France 1977 41% 20% 3% 24% n. a. n. a. 12% 
1992 34% 21% 2% 23% n. a. n. a. 20% 
1995 19,4% 58% 3,4% 4% 2% 2% 11,2% 
1999 10,6% 20,1% n. a. 24,9% institutional 
investors 
36,3 % 
Germany 1970 28% 41% 11% 11% n. a. n. a. 8% 
1993 17% 39% 3% 29% n. a. n. a. 12% 
1995 14,6% 42,1% 4,3% 10,3% 12,4% 7,6% 8,7% 
2001 15,2% 32,5% 0,7% 13% 9,7% 13,9% 15,0% 
122 Deutsches Aktieninstitut (DAI) DAI-Factbook 
2002" Frankfurt 2002 at 08.6-4.; also Steiger, Max in Institutionelle 
Investoren im Spannungsfeld zwischen 
Aktienmarktliquidität und Corporate 
Governance", Baden-Baden 1999 at p. 33 
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UK 1969 50% 5% 3% 36% n. a. n. a. 7% 
1993 19% 2% 1% 62% n. a. n. a. 16% 
1995 29,6% 4,1% 0,2% 2,3% 39,7% 10,4% 13,7% 
1998 18,1% 1,4% 0,1% 5,7% 43,3% 4,9% 27,6% 
Japan 1970 40% 23% 0% 42% n. a. n. a. 3% 
1993 20% 28% 1% 22,8% 17,4% 2,6% 8% 
1995 22.2% 31,2% 0,5% 13,3% 10,8% 11,7% 10,3% 
2000 17,9% 26,0% 0,1% 18,6% 15,7% 2,2% 18,6% 
USA 1981 0 51% 0 15% 0 0% 28% n. a. n. a. 6% 
1993 48% 9% 0% 37% n. a. n. a. 6% 
1995 36,4% 15% 0% 0,2% 31,3% 13% 4,2% 
2000 39,1% n. a. 0% 1,9% 29,7% 19,3% 0,0% 
Large investors in German stock corporations can be companies (e. g. Allianz, Deutsche 
Bank) as well as private persons (e. g. Hasso Plattner - SAP) or families (e. g. Fam. 
Quandt - BMW, Altana). 
Additionally, German enterprises still mostly finance themselves through loans rather 
than through the stock market. While in France, the UK and in the US the ratio between 
borrowed capital and owned capital resources is roughly 1: 1, in Germany the ratio is 
2: 1123. Regarding this issue German companies have acknowledged that liquidity, long- 
term availability of financial resources and alternatives to bank loans will become more 
important in the future124. Consequently, it is not surprising that 64% of German 
companies (compared to 22% in France, 29% in the UK and 22% in the US) intend to 
look at new ways of financing125. 
This culture of ownership concentration has developed historically and is to a certain 
extent a result of the peculiarities of the German pension scheme which was introduced 
by Reichskanzler Bismark in 1889. The German system is based on a retirement 
insurance scheme financed by allocation. This means that the monthly contribution of 
workers and employees into the pension scheme is paid out immediately to the 
pensioners of today. As the pension is guaranteed by the state, investing in stocks 
has 
never been widespread. In contrast to that in other countries (most notably the 
US and 
123 Siemens Financial Services Study carried out by Steiner, Manfred/ Germain, Laurent/Hilton, 
Denis/Schwarz Norbert 
Unternehmensfinanzierung 
im Fokus - Entscheider aus Deutschland, 
Frankreich, Großbritannien und den USA antworten", 2003 to download at 
http: //www. sfs. siemens. de/cros/Materialbestellung/pdf/Studie_2003_de. pdf at p. 
22 
124 Siemens Financial Services Study carried out by Steiner, Manfred/Germain, 
Laurent/Hilton, Denis/Schwarz Norbert 
Unternehmensfinanzierung 
im Fokus - Entscheider aus Deutschland, 
Frankreich, Großbritannien und den USA antworten", 2003 to download at 
http: //www. sfs. siemens. de/cros/Materialbestellung/pdf/Studie_2003_de. pdf at p. 
5 
125 Siemens Financial Services Study carried out 
by Steiner, Manfred/ Germain, Laurent/Hilton, Denis/Schwarz Norbert 
Unternehmensfinanzierung 
im Fokus - Entscheider aus Deutschland, 
Frankreich, Großbritannien und den USA antworten", 2003 to download at 
http: //Wv,; `ý, '., -; 
fs. siemens. de/cros/Materialbestellung/pdf/Studie_2003_de. pdf at p. 
12 
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the UK) the working population saves for the pension by investing in stocks either 
directly or, more likely, indirectly through a collective investment scheme. 
However, it has to be emphasised that slowly the ownership concentration is breaking 
up. Here the promotion of private stock saving plans (so called "Biester Rente"), 
employee pension schemes (supported with lower tax liability) and other incentives by 
the legislator in order to ease the burdens for the actual pension scheme are the main 
drivers for a greater dispersion of share ownership. A contribution to this development 
could also be ascribed to the increased popularity to invest in the stock market, which 
has taken up since the Initial Public Offering of Deutsche Telekom in 1996 (Figure 13). 
Additionally, to increasing extent foreign shareholders invested in the German stock 
market and by doing so also ensured a greater diversification of the ownership 
structure of German companies. 
The increased dispersion of share ownership was also seen necessary by a symposium 
organised by the Deutsche Bank and the European Corporate Governance Institute in 
2002126: A decreasing influence of creditors and large shareholders in the progress of the 
tax reform and other driving forces will have a positive effect on balance as the agency 
conflicts between large and small shareholders, as well as between givers of borrowed 
capital and capital resources, could be reduced. A topical deficit in the entrepreneurial 
efficiency was not seen: One or two important minority shareholders could achieve a 
positive governance of the corporation127. 
5.1.2. Characteristics of Institutional Shareholders 
Without doubt the institutional investor has become a determining factor on the stock 
market since the mid- to late- 1990s. As it can be seen in Figure 9 the total investments 
have become enormous. 
Figure 9: Investments of Institutional Shareholders 1990 -2001 (in Bio. US-$)1zß 
1990 1997 2001 
USA 6.875,7 15.867,5 19.257,7 
126 Deutsch, Klaus "Research Notes in Economic & Statistics / Corporate Governance in Deutschland - 
Perspektiven der Wissenschaft" Deutsche Bank Research, No. 02-3,2002 to download at http: //www. dbresearch. de/PROD/DBR_INTERNET_DE- 
PROD/ PROD0000000000042525. pdf 
127 Deutsch, Klaus "Research Notes in Economic & Statistics / Corporate Governance in 
Deutschland - 
Perspektiven der Wissenschaft"Deutsche Bank Research, No. 02-3,2002 to download at 
http: //www. dbresearch. de/PROD/DBR_INTERNET_DE- 
PROD/PROD0000000000042525. pdf at p. 4 
128 OECD Institutional 
Investors - Statistical Yearbook 2001" to download at 
http: //cs4hq. oecd. org/oecd/eng/TableViewer/wdsview/dispviewp. asp; also in 
Steiger, Max Institutionelle 
Investoren im Spannungsfeld zwischen Aktienmarktliquidität und Corporate Governance", Baden-Baden 1999 at p. 29 
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japan 2.427,9 3.154,7 3.644,8 
United 
Kingdom 
1.116,8 2.226,9 2.743,3 
France 655,7 1.263,2 1.701,3 
Germany 599,0 1.201,9 1.478,4 
Netherlands 378,3 667,8 722,3 
Total 12.053,4 24.382,0 29.547,8 
This is derived not only from an increase in the countries with a traditionally large 
liquid financial market like the US, Japan, the UK and Canada129 but also due to 
increased investment of this investor group in other strong economies like Germany, 
France and the Netherlands. 
Although there is no generally acknowledged definition of the concept of the 
institutional investor130, a number of useful characterisations are found in the 
literature131. Most authors define institutional investors according to three important 
features132. These include: that institutional investors are independent juristic persons; 
that they pursue a business purpose - investment and administration of outside assets 
by professional employees while ensuring satisfactory returns; and that their invested 
capital is above average and therefore has an essential influence on market trends. 
Hence, private insurances, pension funds and investment trusts can be included in this 
category. According to these traits, other organisations holding investments, such as 
statutory bodies, banks or trading companies, are not institutional investors133. 
With regard to Kapitalanlagegesellschaften (German investment funds) it should be 
stated that in Germany their interest is limited by the law (§ 60 s. 4 s. 1 InvG). The 
Kapitalanlagegesellschaft is allowed to invest only five percent of its special assets in 
securities of the same issuer. Consequently, a Kapitalanlagegesellschaft will always be a 
minority shareholder and cannot take over a company. 
Having stated these definitions, it should be highlighted that a difference in the 
investment interests within the group of institutional investors becomes obvious. This is 
129 Newman, Peter/Milgate, Murray/Eatwell, John The 
New Palgrave Dictionary of Money and Finance" London and New York, 1992 at Volume 2 
"Institutional Investors" 
130 Steiger, Max,, Institutionelle Investoren im Spannungsfeld zwischen Aktienmarktliquidität und Corporate Governance", Baden-Baden 1999 at p. 
27 
131 Tuerks, Robin A. "Depotstimmrechtspraxis versus U. S. -proxy-system: der Beitrag von Finanzintermediären zur 
Optimierung der Unternehmenskontrolle" 
Munich 2000 at p. 27; Baums, Theodor/Fraune, Christian "Institutionelle 
Anleger und Publikumsgesellschaft: Eine empirische Untersuchung", Die 
Aktiengesellschaft 1995 at p. 97 ff; Kyrer, Alfred "Wirtschaftslexikon" 4th Edition Munich 2001 at p. 
273 "Institutionelle Anleger" 
132 Steiger, Max Institutionelle 
Investoren im Spannungsfeld zwischen Aktienmarktliquidität und Corporate Governance", Baden-Baden 1999 at p. 27; Schiereck, 
Dirk Institutionelle 
Investoren: Überlegungen zur Begriffsbestimmung bzw. -abgrenzung" in Sparkasse Volume 109,8th Issue, 1992 p. 393-394 at p. 
393; Newman, 
Peter/Milgate, Murray/Eatwell, John The New 
Palgrave Dictionary of Money and Finance" London and New York, 1992 at Volume 2 "Institutional Investors" 
133 Newman, Peter/Milgate, Murray/Eatwell, John , 
The New Palgrave Dictionary of Money and Finance" London and New York, 1992 at Volume 2 
"institutional investors" 
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especially noticeable when comparing the pension funds with the investment trusts. On 
one side the investment trusts tend to pursue short-term rather than long-term profit 
maximisation134. Their objective is to strive for the best shareholder value, which allows 
them to sell their shares if problems lie ahead for the company, rather than to take 
initiatives via the company's management to correct the problems. As it can be seen in 
figures 10,11 and 16 the safeguarding of the Kapitalanlagegesellschaft's interest is 
primarily exercised by voting. The interest in other corporate governance issues is more 
distinguished. 
Figure 10: Role of German Institutional Investors as Shareholder135 
5% 
49% 
46 % 
Actively safeguarding 
the interests as a 
shareholder 
  Passive, but interested 
in playing a more 
active role 
Passive and not 
interested in playing 
an active role in the 
future 
Figure 11: German Institutional Investors on Safeguarding their Voting Rights136 
54% 
46% 
No, rarely 
  Yes, at least to a large 
extent 
Having said that, it should be emphasised that although an increased interest by 
institutional investors in corporate governance is recognisable, their engagement (as the 
capital presence in the AGMs indicates) might still be improvable. 
134 Steiger, Maxin Institutionelle 
Investoren im Spannungsfeld zwischen Aktienmarktliquidität und Corporate Governance", Baden-Baden 1999 at p. 53-37 
135 Survey of the DSW - Deutsche Schutzvereinigung 
für Wertpapierbesitz among German Kapitalanlagegesellschaften, 2004 to download at www. dsw- 
irLfo. de/DSW-Fondsumfrage. 442.0. html#698 
136 Survey of the DSW - Deutsche Schutzvereinigung 
für Wertpapierbesitz among German Kapitalanlagegesellschaften, 2004 to download at www. dsw- 
info. de/ DSW-Fondsumfrage. 442.0. htm1#698 
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On the opposite side there are the pension funds. They serve as organisations 
administering pensions of employees of one or several companies, employees of the 
public sector and other contributory members137. As they play a major part in the old- 
age pension scheme, they are facing a dilemma. While trying to maximise profits for the 
fund, they have to consider their investors, who are often stakeholders in the companies 
used for investment. Thus, striving for the best shareholder value cannot be the only 
interest of the pension fund. Their dilemma is that they need to look after the interests 
of their investors, while the long-term adjustment of contributions forces them to 
pursue medium- to long-term profit maximisation138. The number of proposals made 
during general meetings by the internationally operating pension funds supports this 
thesis139. 
It should be added that in Germany, pension funds mostly outsource asset management 
to investment companies140. Therefore they generally formulate guidelines and rules for 
the investment in order to safeguard their voting right and maintain compliance with 
the German Corporate Governance Code. 
To draw a conclusion with regard to the concept of institutional investors, although 
investment trusts and pension funds are both included in this group, each one pursues 
different ways and time frames to maximise its profits. Taking this into account, a 
cautious approach is necessary when discussing the concept of institutional investors. 
5.1.3. The Corporation as an Investor and the Issue of Crossholdings 
The issue of the corporation as an investor becomes quite complex. On the one hand it 
may well be that the company only invested in another company for strategic reasons. 
Such motives can include: 
- Creation and usage of synergies 
- Completion of the range of products 
- Building up presence in another market 
- Control the pricing of ancillary industries 
137 Newman, Peter/Milgate, Murray/Eatwell, John The New Palgrave Dictionary of 
Money and Finance" London and New York, 1992 at Volume 3 "Pension 
Funds" 
138 Newman, Peter/Milgate, Murray/Eatwell, John The New Palgrave 
Dictionary of Money and Finance" London and New York, 1992 at Volume 
2 
"Institutional Investors" 
139 Good overview at Council of Institutional 
Investors: http: //app. cii. org/mainpage. htm; California Public Employees' 
Retirement System: 
http: //www, calpers-govemance. org/alert/proxy/Iteml0i. asp; 
Florida State Board of Administration: 
http: / / www. fsba. state. flus/ Investment. asp? 
FormMode=Call&LinkType=Combo&ID=13&Section=5 
140 e. g. VBL -Versorgungsanstalt 
des Bundes und der Länder (Pensionfund of the Federal 
Government and the Laender) to Universal Investment, IBM 
Pensionfund also to Invesco, Metallrente (Belongs to the 
Trade Union) to dit/ADAM. An exception is Siemens Kapitalanlagegesellschaft who has the asset 
management in-house. 
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On the other hand, especially in Germany, crossholdings of stock corporations are still 
very popular (Compare with Figure 12 below). Only 27 of the 100 biggest German 
corporations are widely held141. 
The effect of these crossholdings on Corporate Governance and Shareholder 
Engagement in Germany has been subject to discussion and criticism. The intrinsic 
danger of this system is that corporate governance is almost exclusively based on the 
board-rooms and hardly on the general meeting. 
Höpner142 concludes that different interests for breaking up crossholdings exist: in the 
view of neoclassical thinkers, crossholdings are micro-economical inefficiencies. The 
Social Democrats criticise interweaving between corporations, because of the 
concentration of economical power. Höpner ads that interweaved corporations are not 
reactionary with regard to profitability and their behaviour towards the 
internationalisation of shareholders. When the company's ownership structure is 
opened towards corporate governing then these corporations will protect themselves 
from hostile takeovers by increased shareholder value strategies. 
Whether crossholdings prevent profitability and internationalisation still needs to be 
proved, but in any case they hinder corporate governance. The danger that the 
corporations only look for each others interest is immanent. This assumption is 
supported by the finding of Carleton, Nelson, Weisbach that insider-controlled firms 
are less concerned about their reputation with shareholders143. 
The "exchange" of supervisory board members is certainly one symptom of the 
Deutschland AG, within which everybody knows and supports each other. Outside 
investors are heavily underrepresented and thus the insight from this angle is limited. 
Constructive criticism from this side could quickly be ignored. For these investors this 
is almost comparable with an exclusion from corporate control. 
In addition to this the Deutschland AG represents an enormous lobby group, which 
could influence the development of German Company Law. Furthermore, 
crossholdings also have the effect that takeovers become extremely difficult, if not 
impossible144. Potential predators face a concentrated interest, which could easily block 
their efforts. The alternative is to aim for (an agreed) merger. Here again they have to 
141 Höpner, Martin,, Unternehmensverflechtung im Zwielicht: Hans Eichels Plan zur Auflösung 
der Deutschland AG" Max-Planck-Institut für 
Gesellschaftsforschung 2000 to download at www. mpi-fg-koeln. mpg. de/sysbez/downloads/martin-Eichel. pdf at p. 
18f 
142 Höpner, Martin,, Unternehmensverflechtung im Zwielicht: Hans Eichels Plan zur Auflösung 
der Deutschland AG"Max-Planck-Institut für 
Gesellschaftsforschung 2000 to download at www. mpi-fg-koeln. mpg. de/sysbez/downloads/martin-Eichel. pclf 
143 CARLETON, Willard T. / NELSON, James M. / WEISBACH, Michael 
S. , 
The Influence of Institutions on Corporate Governance through Private 
Negotiations: Evidence from TIAA-CREF" in The Journal of Finance, 
Vol. LIII, No. 4, August 1998 at p. 1335-1362 at p. 1349 
144 Höpner, Martin Unternehmensverflechtung 
im Zwielicht: Hans Eichels Plan zur Auflösung der Deutschland AG" Max-Planck-Institut für 
Gesellschaftsforschung 2000 to download at www. mpi-fg-koeln. mpg. 
de/sysbez/downloads/martin-Eichel. pdf at p. 3 
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convince the large blockholder, because the majority for a takeover is 75% 
(§ 65 s. 1 s. 1 UmwG). The result is that corporate governance suffers. 
When looking at the nexus of crossholdings it is considerably difficult to answer the 
question: Who owns whom? 
Figure 12: Crossholdings in Germany145 
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145 Höpner, Martin/Krempel, Lothar The 
Politics of the German Company Network" Max-Planck-Institut 
für Gesellschaftsforschung Working paper 03/9 
September 2003 to download at http: //www. mpi-fg-koeln. mpg. 
de/pu/workpap/wpO3-9/wpO3-9. htni1 
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Although the German legislator altered the taxation for the sale of corporate holdings 
by corporations in 2000 (§ 8b KStG - Körperschaftssteuergesetz (Corporation Tax Act)), 
in order to decartelise the governance-hindering crossholdings, not much has happened 
since. The reason for the stagnation is the still unconvincing performance of the stock 
market, the difficulty to find a suitable buyer and the remaining economic interest in 
the holding company. However, the hope remains that the sale of corporate holdings 
will commence soon so that corporate governance can also be based on the general 
meeting and not exclusively on board-rooms. 
For the sake of completeness corporate holding companies should also be mentioned. 
Although they are not supposed to acquire stocks of listed companies, they have 
considerable influence in all other legal forms of corporations. To characterise corporate 
holding companies, it could be stated that their only business purpose is the acquisition, 
administration and alienation of shares in other companies by the allocation of capital 
resources. The big difference to Kapitalanlagegesellschaften is the fact that they are not 
allowed to invest in listed stock corporations as previously mentioned. 
5,1.4. The Banks 
In contrast to some other legal systems, German banks are entitled to have a share in 
other companies (banks and other enterprises)146. As it can be seen in Figure 8, this 
possibility has a considerable impact on the ownership structure of German companies. 
Even though the banks see their interest as an investment and do not pursue 
entrepreneurial aims, their influence could result in conflicts of interest and even 
concrete obstructions (e. g. share in competing companies, establishing relations of 
economical dependency)147. 
This statement is emphasised by the additional influence the banks have through 
granted credits, share ownership through dependent Kapitalanlagegesellschaften and 
proxies as part of their custody services (Chapter 6.4.2.1.2. ). As it has been shown 
above, German stock corporations finance themselves largely by credits, which they 
receive from the banks. Additionally, most often one of their business entities is asset 
management, which means that they have an investment fund holding numerous 
voting rights in-house. Moreover, in their function as a custodian bank they also offer 
proxy voting services to their (private) clients. Here the latter usually provides the 
custodian bank with full discretionary power. Consequently, banks have a universal 
role in the German financial services sector and are therefore the central pillar of the 
German economy. 
146 Schmidt, Thomas Macht 
der Banken" Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Bonn 1995 at http: //library. fes. de/fulltext/fo-wirtschaft/00366toc. htm at p. 19 
147 Schmidt, Thomas Macht 
der Banken" Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Bonn 1995 at http: //library. fes. de/fulltext/fo-wirtschaft/00366toc. htm at p. 20 
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Nevertheless, it has to be emphasised that over the last years their influence shows a 
downward trend. One reason is the breaking up of the crossholdings, as already 
mentioned. Additionally, the heavy criticism of their influence on German companies 
and the fact that the proxy voting service148 is not at all profitable, also foster their 
retreat from board rooms. Increased legal requirements like separating working 
proposals for the general meeting from own business interests (§ 128 s. 2 s. 3 AktG), the 
disclosure of personnel, and business interests with the corporation 
(§ 128 s. 2 s. 6,7 AktG) also reduce the influence of banks further. 
5.1.5. The Private Shareholders 
In Germany the number of private shareholders has increased considerably, 
particularly with the introduction of the "T-Aktie149" and the Initial Public Offering of 
the Deutsche Telekom in 1996150. Although private shareholding suffered during the 
corporate crisis in the early 2000's, it should be noted that nevertheless, it has become 
widely spread and is no longer considered an exotic form of saving151. 
Figure 13: Share of the Population in Germany (over 14 years) Owning Shares152 
Number of 1. hy. 
shareholders 1988 1992 1994 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Shareholders with 2,3 % 2,5 % 2,4 % 2,2 % 2,3 % 2,6 % 2,5 % 2,5 % 2,3 % 2,3 % 2,1 % 2,1% 
employee shares 
Shareholders with 4,9 % 4,2 % 4,4 % 4,2 % 4,4 % 5,1 % 5,9 % 8,0 % 7,4 % 6,3 % 6,5% 5,8% 
other shares 
Among them with 0,4 % 0,4 % 0,5 % 0,4 % 0,5 % 0,6 % 0,6 % 0,8 % 0,8 % 0,8 % 0,8 % 0,8 % 
employee shares 
and other shares 
Only employee 1,9 % 2,1 % 1,9 % 1,8 % 1,8 % 2,0 % 1,9 % 1,7 % 1,5 % 1,5 % 1,3 % 1,3 % 
shares 
Only other shares 4,5 % 3,9 % 3,9 % 3,8 % 3,9 % 4,5 % 
" 
5,3 % 7,2 % 6,6 % 5,5 % 5,7 % 5,0 % 
Total shareholders 6,8 % 6,4 % 6,3 % 6,0 % 6,2 % 7,1 
7/7 ý 7,8 % 9,7 % 8,9 % 7,8 % 7,8% 7,1% 
Number of 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 1. hy. 
shareholders via 2004 
an investment fund 
(fundholders) 
Owner of equity 2,8 % 3,9 % 5,6 % 10,3% 11,1% 9,4 % 8,1% 8,2% 
funds 
Owner of mixed % 1,1 /a % 1, /0 5 2,4 /0 % 0 4,3% 0 5,8% 0 5,8/0 0 5,9% 5,4/o 5,4% 
funds 
148 Volksbanken (cooperative banks) and Sparkassen Group (savings banks) have given up their proxy voting service in 2002. Source: (among other) DSW - 
Deutsche Schutzvereinigung für Wertpapierbesitz e. V. - Press Conference Hauptversammlungsthemen 
2003" 26.03.2003 to download at http: //www. dsw- 
info. de/ Hauptversammlungsthemen_2003.238.0. html 
149 Name used to market the Telekom share 
150 Gordon, Jeffrey N. Working 
Paper No. 161" in Columbia Journal of European Law, Vol. 5, No. 219, Spring 1999 (Symposium issue) or 
http: //papers. ssm. com/paper. taf? abstract_id=208508, see appendix chart: Private Investors in 
Germany 
151 However, private shareholding in Germany is still not comparable with the 
UK or the US as figure 8 shows. 
152 Deutsches Aktieninstitut: DAI-Factbook, August 2004 at 08.3-Zahl-D 
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Among then 
owner of equity 
and mixed funds 
0,3 % 0,4 % 0,6 % 1,5% 1,7% 1,8 % 1,3 % 1,2 % 
Only equity funds 2,5 % 3,5 % 5,0 % 8,8% 9,4% 7,6 % 6,8 % 7,0 % 
Only mixed funds 0,8 % 1,1 % 1,8 % 2,8% 4,1% 4,0 % 4,6 % 4,2 
Total fundholders 3,6 % 5,0 % 7,4 % 13,1% 15,2% 13,4% 12,7% 12,4% 
Number of 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 1. hy. 
shareholders and 2004 
shareholders via 
an investment fund 
(fundholders) 
Shareholders 6,2% 7,1 % 7,8 % 9,7% 8,9% 7,8% 7,8% 7,1% 
Fundholders 3,6 % 5,0 % 7,4 % 13,1% 15,2% 13,4% 12,7% 12,4% 
Among them with 0,9 % 1,4 % 2,3 % 4,3% 4,1% 3,2% 3,2% 3,1 % 
shares and funds 
Only Shares 5,3 % 5,7 % 5,5 % 5,4% 4,8% 4,6% 4,6% 4,0 % 
Only Funds 2,7 % 3,6 % 5,1 % 8,8% 11,1% 10,2% 9,5% 9,3 % 
Total shareholder 8,9 % 10,7% 12,9% 18,5% 20,0% 18,0% 17,3% 16,4% 
and fundholders 
With the private shareholder it is recommended to distinguish between the small 
private shareholder and the large investor. The group of small private investors is 
characterised by a share of widely held stock, with an alleged emphasis on shareholder 
value. Meanwhile the large investor shows a considerably high interest in the company. 
In Germany he is quite often a majority shareholder, also called "Familien AG". 
Consequently, large investors have a regular influence in forming the will of the 
company153. In addition to that, their general target is medium- to long-term profit 
maximisation. This derives from the amount of the shares they hold. As it is almost 
impossible for them to sell them in a short time without risking a considerable decrease 
of the stock price, they are forced to take an active part in the company's corporate 
policy. 
Nevertheless, the small private shareholder deserves some more consideration. 
Generally, his motive to buy shares is the expectation of high returns. 
Unfortunately, the small private shareholder does not have the best reputation with 
regard to exercising his vote154. This is often the result of indifference to the company's 
information (including the general meeting) and to his low share of votes. However, 
quite often it is the small investor who points out deplorable states of affairs of the 
company. 
153 Krumnow, Jürgen/Gramlich, Ludwig Gabler 
Bank Lexikon" 12th Edition, Wiesbaden 1999 at p. 641 Großaktionär" 
154 Grabert, Frank Stimmrechtsvertretung 
im Aktienrecht - ökonomische Bedeutung und rechtliche 
Problematik" Dissertation with the University of 
Hohenheim 1995 to download at http: //ourworld. compuserve. com/homepages/mox/diplom. 
htm 1.1.1.2.1 
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In contrast to the large and small private shareholder stands the employee shareholder. 
His initiative to invest in shares derives from stock option plans of the corporation155. 
Although the statistics regarding this issue are not overly expressive at this time, it 
could be assumed that their influence in some companies is more than considerable156, 
especially when considering the employee representatives on the supervisory board. 
Considering the fact that they are employees of the company, they are not only a 
determining factor for social issues within the company, but also a reliable partner for 
the management in a take-over contest. Due to a contractual obligation to hold the 
shares for one to five years, she or he is forced to pursue long-term profit maximisation. 
5.1.6. Further Investors (State, Foundations, Associations) 
As a result of the privatisation offensive, the influence of the state as a shareholder has 
decreased, and this is likely to continue157. Nonetheless, in some German companies the 
federal government is still the largest shareholder158. The state certainly acts as a 
stabilising factor, but its own voting behaviour is often incomprehensible to others as 
they try to do the split between shareholder value and responsibility for the 
stakeholders. Hence, it is sometimes questionable whether the state is capable of taking 
an active role in the governance of a company159. The difficulty for the state is being 
able to distinguish between its role as a major shareholder and its role as a legislator. A 
state usually prefers to remain cautiously passive and err to avoid accusations of 
pursuing a company unfriendly economic policy. 
It is also important to mention the existence of foundations160 and associations161 as 
shareholders. In accordance with their nature, foundations are closely related to 
corporate shareholders. However, it should be kept in mind that, in contrast to stock 
corporations, their relatively large capital resources are not based on stocks. Therefore if 
they intend to takeover a stock corporation they have to do it by cash payment rather 
than offering own stocks. 
The group of associations could be defined as a union of small private shareholders 
who are pursuing common investment for common gain162. These associations of small 
155 Krumnow, Jürgen/Gramlich, Ludwig Gabler 
Bank Lexikon" 12th Edition, Wiesbaden 1999 at p. 1222 Stock Option 
Plan" 
156 see Figure 29: Shareholder Structure of Selected Stock Corporations 2004 
157 see Figure 29: Shareholder Structure of Selected Stock Corporations 2004 
158 e. g. Deutsche Telekom: 26% plus Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau 17%, Deutsche Post: 20% plus Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau 42,6%, Volkswagen: State of 
Lower Saxony owns 13,7% 
159 Handelsblatt 20.03.02 Eine 
Milliarde weniger für T-Aktionäre" - The German Ministry of Finance said that the decision to cutback the dividend by more than 
40 % is "autonomous entrepreneurial" and that, therefore, no interference is planned. In the meantime the remuneration for the management board rose by 90 % 
160 e. g. private foundations: Bertelsmann, Lidl or foundations under public 
law: savings banks, regional banks 
161 e. g. investment clubs 
162 Krumnow, Jürgen/Gran-dich, Ludwig Gabler 
Bank Lexikon" 12th Edition, Wiesbaden 1999 at p. 742 Investmentclub" 
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private shareholders, which could also be defined as investment clubs, should not be 
confused with shareholder associations like the Deutsche Schutzvereinigung für 
Wertpapierbesitz e. V. (DSW) or the Schutzvereinigung der Kapitalanleger e. V. (SDK). 
The objective of the latter is to protect the interests of small private investors. 
The last group of shareholders to consider are foreign investors. However, they must be 
seen in the context of "globalisation", which is discussed in the next paragraph. 
5.2. Globalisation and its Impact on Corporate Germany 
Former German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt described the concept of globalisation as 
the "whip word" of these years. He argues that there are hardly any sensible definitions 
of the concept of globalisation. Most definitions are interest-motivated or politica1163. 
Therefore it is almost impossible to choose a politically "correct" definition. According 
to the probably innocuous Brockhaus encyclopaedia164, globalisation is a term for the 
emergence of worldwide financial markets of securities, money and foreign exchange 
trading, as well as for loans, furthered by new information and communication 
technologies and innovations on the financial markets. Additionally, globalisation 
describes the increased competition of corporations on world markets. 
The processes of globalisation have drawn a completely new landscape of shareholders; 
they have become more and more international. Foreign capital plays an increasingly 
important role in the global financial markets. In 2001 the share of foreign investors in 
Germany was 19,9 %165 (DAX had a quote of 34%). Although this number is increasing 
it is compared to other countries (e. g. UK 32.4%, France 36.5%, Finland 73.6%166) still 
considerably low. 
Anyhow, some of the renowned German stock corporations, like Deutsche Bank or 
Siemens, already show about fifty percent or more in foreign capital. As already 
mentioned above, this increase of foreign capital most probably resulted in the decrease 
of capital present at German AGMs. Additionally the increased investment by foreign 
capital also helped to break up cross-holding in Germany. The realisation that a cutting 
off by listed German companies against foreign investors will not benefit their long- 
term development led to the shift in thinking. 
163 Schmidt, Helmut in Globalisierung - 
Politische, ökonomische und kulturelle Herausforderungen" DVA, Stuttgart 1998 at p. 7 
164 Brockhaus Enzyklopädie 19th edition, Volume 8, Mannheim 1989 Globalisierung" at p. 
597 
165 European Social Investment Forum Active 
Share ownership in Europe - 2006 European Handbook" to download at 
http: / / www. eurosif. org/content/download/355/2519/version/1/file/eurosif-ActiveShare0shipEurope2006. 
pdf at p. 18 
166 European Social Investment Forum Active 
Share ownership in Europe - 2006 European Handbook" to download at 
http: //www. eurosif. org/content/download/355/2519/version/1/file/eurosif-ActiveShare0shipEurope2006. 
pdf at p. 18 
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Another welcome consequence of this development will be an increasing 
internationalisation of the boards. Especially the supervisory boards as the 
shareholders' body will take on a different complexion. Nowadays it has become 
normal that foreign shareholders are also represented on the board. The representation 
of employees in the supervisory board will certainly become an issue. Due to the fact 
that most stock corporations are global players and have facilities abroad, a discussion 
about representation of these foreign employees on German supervisory boards is 
certainly justified. 
Besides supervisory boards, management boards also reflect the ongoing processes of 
globalisation, taking the Deutsche Bank (two out of six members including the CEO are 
not German) or the Deutsche Börse (again - two out of six members including the CEO 
are not German) as examples. Mergers and acquisitions also foster the 
internationalisation of stock corporations. 
However, it also needs to be pointed out that the globalisation of German companies 
could result in strange effects. A good example of such effects is the rumour of a 
relocation of the Deutsche Bank headquarters from Frankfurt to London. 
A concomitant of the ongoing globalisation of German corporations was an increasing 
intervention of politics into corporate decision making, which most often had a populist 
and protectionist background rather than an understandable economic one. Examples 
for this criticism are numerous: the interference in the bankruptcy of Philip Holzmann, 
the "locust debate", the Mannesmann case, almost permanently Deutsche Bank and 
more. 
As we shall see in due course167, in order to maintain the flow of foreign capital and to 
encourage foreign investors, the German legislator had to encounter this changing 
environment by providing solutions reflecting the ongoing globalisation of investors. 
The necessity to overcome deficits in the cross border information flow and in 
communication problems (e. g. language, shareholder identification) had the positive 
consequence that Germany tried to harmonise its Company Law system with 
international standards and also started to deregulate it. Good examples in this respect 
include the introduction of a record date, electronic proxy voting or the corporate 
governance code. 
5.3. Types of Shares 
Besides the identity of shareholders, understanding the different types of shares issued 
is also crucial here. 
According to § 10 s. 1 AktG stock corporations are generally free to choose whether they 
issue registered or bearer shares. This norm is complemented by §23 s. 3 No. 5 AktG. 
167 See Chapter 8. - The Legilator's 
Activity in Stock Corporation Law 
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According to this clause, the company has to specify in the articles of association the 
type of shares it will issue. It is also possible for the company to choose a split between 
bearer and registered shares168. 
5.3.1. Bearer Shares 
The issuing of bearer shares is a particular trait of German corporations. As the name 
indicates, the ownership is transferred simply through the change of possession. Thus, 
the bearer is entitled to carry out the rights accompanying the ownership of the share 
(e. g. share lending or transfer of ownership by way of security). The evidence for the 
shareholder is given by the proof of deposit169. Therefore the great advantage of the 
bearer share is that it allows free and easy purchase and sale. 
The great influence of the banks in Germany probably derives from the widely spread 
bearer share. On the one side, as corporations issuing bearer shares do not know their 
investors, contact is mediated via the custodian bank. On the other side shareholders 
often elect to leave their voting decision with the bank. This position as an almost 
unavoidable intermediate with the bearer share has allowed the custodian banks to 
become an important factor in forming an opinion of corporate decision making. 
Therefore the suggestion that any important decision by the company has to have the 
banks' blessing has much substance. 
An additional problem that occurs is the personal distance between the company and 
its shareholder. In contrast to registered shares, this makes the bearer share unsuitable 
for investor relations. The company is only able to address the issue of investor interests 
in quite a general way, which might not meet the information request of the 
shareholder. This could put the latter in a position where he is more prepared to sell his 
shares compared to a registered shareholder, where the information request is more 
likely to be met and more attention is provided to the investor. 
5.3.2. Registered Shares 
5.3.2.1. Rediscovering the Registered Share 
More remarkable than the bearer share is the registered share. To understand its recent 
movement within the German Stock Corporation Act, it is certainly necessary to gain an 
168 Hoffmann-Becking, Michael "Münchner Handbuch des Gesellschaftsrecht - Band 4 Aktiengesellschaft" 2nd Edition Munich 1999 § 13 No. 1 (Hoffmann- 
Becking) 
169 Noack, Ulrich Entwicklungen 
im Aktienrecht 1999/2000" at IV. 1. a), to download at http: //www. jura. uni- 
duesseldoU. de/ dozenten/ noack/ texte/ noack/ entwicklung. htm 
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overview of the implications of the registered share. The conveyance of property using 
registered shares is more complicated than is the case with bearer shares. 
The registered share is mainly regulated in § 67 AktG. According to this paragraph, the 
name, date of birth, and address of the holder shall be entered in the stock corporation's 
register as well as the number or serial number of the shares he is holding. Legal 
persons, companies and similar entities are registered with name, headquarters and 
address, including the address of a proxy agent or an e-mail address170. 
Only the registered person will be treated as a shareholder. So the presentation of the 
share, according to § 68 III S. 2 AktG, will become irrelevant. The simple proof of 
transition, e. g. in the case of share lending, will be sufficient (although at least non- 
listed companies may have the right to refuse to register a transfer). With regard to data 
processing this is a great relief. If a registered share is transferred to another person, the 
stock corporation has to update its register. For the stock corporation, the registered 
person is seen irrevocably as the shareholder. However, this is not valid with regard to 
a third party. The bank, which might be registered as a shareholder, cannot claim any 
rights from the registration towards its custody client171. Due to § 128 I AktG the 
registered custodian bank shall promptly forward any information (pertinent to 
§ 125 1 AktG) to such shareholders. 
When the first stock corporations were created 150 years ago registered shares were 
quite popular. However, it was not until the end of the 1990's when the registered share 
was rediscovered by a number of stock corporations, as von Rosen and Seifert have 
noted172. The reasons for this turning point in favour of registered shares are 
manifold173. The registered share is perfect as a currency for takeovers and therefore 
allows shares of a company to be exchanged; the circulation of registered shares is 
worldwide, especially in the United States where registered shares are required for 
listing on the New York Stock Exchange (bearer shares, in contrast, would require an 
American-Depositary-Receipts-Programme174); the stock register enables counter- 
170 Gesetzentwurf der Bundesregierung Entwurf eines 
Gesetzes zur Namensaktie und zur Erleichterung der Stimmrechtsausübung (Namensaktiengesetz - 
NaStraG)" (BT-Drucksache 14/4051) 2000 to download at http: //dip. bundestag. de/btd/14/040/1404051. pdf at § 67I AktG 
171 Spindler, Gerald,, Internet und Corporate Governance - ein neuer virtueller (T)Raum? " in Zeitschrift für Unternehmens- und Gesellschaftsrecht (ZGR) 3/2000 
p. 420-445 at p. 423 
172 Von Rosen, Rüdiger/Seifert, Werner G. "Die Namensaktie" Schriften zum Kapitalmarkt Band 3, Eschborn 2000 also to download at 
http: //www. dai. de/internet/dai/dai-2-0. nsf/dai_publikationen. htm at p. 7 
173 A number of authors share these reasons, although their emphasis differs: Merkt, Hanno "Die Geschichte der Namensaktie" in Von Rosen, Rüdiger/Seifert, 
Werner G. "Die Namensaktie" Schriften zum Kapitalmarkt Band 3, Eschborn 2000 also to download at http: //www. dai. de/intemet/dai/dai-2- 
0. nsf/dai_publikationen. htm p. 63-96 at p. 88ff; Seibert, Ulrich Die gesetzliche 
Neuregelung" in Rüdiger von Rosen/Werner G. Seifert "Die Namensaktie" 
Schriften zum Kapitalmarkt Band 3, Eschborn 2000 also to download at http: //www. dai. de/internet/dai/dai-2-0. nsf/dai_publikationen. htm p. 11-45 at p. 12 f; 
Zschocke, Christian , The German 
Stock Corporation Act - Introductory Act to the Stock Corporation Act" Frankfurt am Main 3rd Edition 2001 at p. 11 
174 Definition by the International Corporate Governance Network at www. icgn. org 
American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) are one of the most popular methods by which US investors gain exposure to foreign securities (For ADRs to be within the 
US pricing levels, they may represent more than one share of a 
foreign Issuer or a fraction of one share of a foreign Issuer). In comparison to owning foreign 
securities directly, ADRs provide 
benefits to US investors who wish to own foreign securities, including easy transfer of shares, payment of dividends in US 
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measures to hostile takeovers to work more successfully; a deciding factor was also 
that companies could enhance their investor relations using registered shares; and 
finally, the global pressure to harmonise company, stock market and capital market 
laws led to the proliferation of registered shares. 
However, the spreading of the registered share should not be overestimated. Although 
a number of the most important German issuers (Deutsche Bank, Allianz, Epcos, 
Deutsche Telekom, Deutsche Post and others; global share: Daimler Chrysler) have 
made a decision in favour of the registered share, the number of such issuers is still 
limited to only about 6% of the 829 (in Dec. 2003) listed and 10% of all stock 
corporations (8.622 in Dec. 2003)175. In addition to that, it seems that the early 
enthusiasm for the registered share has disappeared. This is to a certain extent 
understandable, as the expected rise in capital presence did not take place176. 
The switch to registered shares is unattractive for other reasons, particularly for small 
corporations. Most of all, companies fear the high assignment costs, and quite often for 
good reasons. Especially in companies with one or more large shareholders it is 
certainly questionable whether the benefits of registered shares will outweigh the costs 
of an assignment. However, if the corporation has chosen to introduce registered 
shares, it is possible to keep administration costs to a similar amount as when using 
bearer shares177, through the collective deposit of securities. 
5.3.2.2. Data Pool: Register 
It is important to mention that an external company can carry out the conduct of the 
stock corporations register. In contrast to the Anglo-American countries, where the 
transparency of registers is not very advanced, German registers hold far more 
information and hence make them quite attractive as a data pool for all kinds of 
purposes. This derives from the fact that compared to the German registered share the 
American is at a considerable disadvantage, as the broker has an almost universal 
position. In contrast to the German system, where the beneficial owner is stated in the 
registers (in most cases), the US shareholder is only registered within the accounts of his 
dollars, and facilitation of compliance with foreign investment restrictions and requirements. Similarly, ADRs and other forms of depositary receipts also are 
attractive vehicles for many non-US investors for investments in emerging markets. Non-US investors of ADRs appreciate the greater security and liquidity that 
these instruments offer over direct investment in certain markets. 
ýA more detailed definition could be found in the Appendix under Definitions 
175 Deutsche Börse Group Factbook 
2003" to download at http: //www3. deutsche- 
boerse. com/ INTERNET/ IP/ ip_stats. nsf/ (KIR+Factbook+Kassamarkt)/ BD587F972E5DF758C1256E850045DAEB/ $FILE/ Factbook_2003_d. pdf? OpenElement at 
Figure 1.1.2 
176 see Figure 6: Presence at DAX 30 AGMs (1998-2005) 
177 Gesetzentwurf der Bundesregierung Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Namensaktie und zur Erleichterung der Stimmrechtsausübung (Namensaktiengesetz - 
NaStraG)" (BT-Drucksache 14/4051) 2000 to download at http: //dip, bundestag. de/btd/14/040/1404051. pdf at Allgemeine Begründung 
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broker. A continuing registration does not exist, which can lead to difficulties with the 
evidence of property178. Such difficulties include problems in tracking the beneficial 
owner (e. g. in the case of takeover offers), and also in the case of disputes about the 
ownership of shares, say between the broker and his investor. 
Another issue with the German registered share is that of data protection. Before the 
NaStraG179 in 2001 each investor was entitled to get information about other 
shareholders from the register. Moreover, a registered shareholder was not supposed to 
object his registration. Hence, every other shareholder could gain any information 
regarding any of his fellow investors from the register180. This lack of privacy was 
solved by allowing the entitled shareholder to examine only his own registration, either 
in person or, if it has been made possible, via an on-line inquiry181. 
A further issue is the company's use of data gained from the stock register. In forming 
the bill, the legislator made clear that § 67 s. 5 AktG entitles the company to utilise all 
data of the shareholder for earmarked purposes such as all kinds of marketing of the 
corporation's products. The legislator is of the opinion that the shareholder has an 
alleged interest in what the company is doing. If he is not interested in any material of 
the company, he can inform them of his opinion182. Weber points out that the 
commercial economy criticised this approach183. Although the use of gained data for 
advertisement is not outlawed, companies should choose a low-key approach to take 
account of the fact that a shareholder is not comparable to an interested customer. 
Heidorn, Schmidt and Seiler express their opinions that due to the company's 
knowledge of the name, gender, address, age and the number or registration number of 
the registered shares, it is possible to construct an expressive profile of their 
shareholders184. The gained data could undoubtedly be utilised by the company to 
develop profiles on the movement and investments of shareholders. 
178 Wunderlich, Michael/Labermeier, Alexander Rechtliche Behandlung, 
Übertragung und Börsenhandel von Namensaktien in den USA" in Von Rosen, 
Rüdiger/Seifert, Werner G. "Die Namensaktie" Schriften zum Kapitalmarkt Band 3, Eschborn 2000 also to download at http: //www. dai. de/internet/dai/dai-2- 
ß. nsf/dai_publikationen. htm p. 143-175 at p. 173 
179 NaStraG - Gesetz zur Namensaktie und zur Erleichterung der Stimmrechtsausübung 2001 (Law on 
Registered Shares and Simplified Rules for the Exercise of 
Voting Rights) 
180 Dammann, Ulrich/Kummer, Tanja - Bundesbeauftragter für Datenschutz Namensaktie und 
Datenschutz" in Von Rosen, Rüdiger/Seifert, Werner G. "Die 
Namensaktie" Schriften zum Kapitalmarkt Band 3, Eschborn 2000 also to download at http: / /www. dai. de/intemet/dai/dai-2-0. nsf/dai_publikationen. htm at 45- 
62 at p. 48ff 
181 Gesetzentwurf der Bundesregierung Entwurf eines 
Gesetzes zur Namensaktie und zur Erleichterung der Stimmrechtsausübung (Namensaktiengesetz - 
NaStraG)" (BT-Drucksache 14/4051) 2000 to download at http: //dip. bundestag. de/btd/14/040/1404051. pdf at § 67 Abs. 6 AktG 
182 Gesetzentwurf der Bundesregierung Entwurf eines 
Gesetzes zur Namensaktie und zur Erleichterung der Stimmrechtsausübung (Namensaktiengesetz - 
NaStraG)" (BT-Drucksache 14/4051) 2000 to download at http: //dip. bundestag. de/btd/14/040/1404051. pdf at § 67 Abs. 6 AktG 
183 Weber, Martin Der 
Eintritt des Aktienrechts in das Zeitalter der elektronischen Medien - Das NaStraG in seiner verabschiedeten Fassung" in Neue Zeitschrift 
für Gesellschaftsrecht (NZG) 8/2001 p. 337-346 at p. 340 
184 Heidorn, Thomas/Schmidt, Peter/Seiler, StefanNeue Möglichkeiten durch die Namensaktie" Work Report No. 23 Hochschule für Bankwirtschaft Frankfurt 
2000, also Spindler, Gerald Internet und Corporate 
Governance - ein neuer virtueller (T)Raum? " in Zeitschrift für Unternehmens- und Gesellschaftsrecht (ZGR) 
3/2000 p. 428 
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However, it is not in the issuer's interests to distribute information amongst its 
registered shareholders unequally. An example of violating the equal treatment of 
shareholders principle would be the notification of a majority shareholder that the 
period to sign for new shares is about to expire, whilst leaving the remaining 
shareholders unaware of this message185. Allowances could be made to the extent of 
"special announcements for marketing purposes"186 as Noack calls them, with the 
knowledge that not being informed of company matters could be a shareholder's basis 
for compensation claims. 
A crucial question is whether the register's information could be used to detect when a 
takeover is about to take place187 and consequently, to allow the firm to engage counter 
measures against a shareholder before his takeover action is implemented. Hommelhoff 
and Teichnnann188 support the opinion that this usage is not possible, as counter 
measures against a takeover bid are not a specific task of the company and hence, are 
not covered by § 67 s. 6 s. 3 AktG. Furthermore, the shareholders are obliged to disclose 
their data in the register, this data must not been used against them. Finally, 
Hommelhoff and Teichmann refer rightly to the share disclosure requirements of the 
Wertpapierhandelsgesetz - WpHG (Securities Trade Act): Providing this is a 
shareholder's only data source it is not understandable why a corporation should 
receive special treatment. 
In conclusion the obvious advantage of the registered share is that it provides greater 
transparency of the corporations' business (registration, disclosure of accounts, ad hoc 
disclosure, reports in the event of specific occurrences within the company). The 
registered share improves the information flow between the company and its investors 
considerably. This a step in the direction of the position taken by the US Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC), which has long applied the principle of "disclosure, again 
disclosure and yet more disclosure" in the search for transparency within capital 
markets. Although some authors generally see the United States as still further 
185 Hommelhoff, Peter/Teichmann, Christoph Namensaktie, 
Neue Medien, und Nachgründung - aktuelle Entwicklungslinien im Aktienrecht" in Dörner, 
Dietrich/Menold, Dieter/Pfitzer, Norbert/Oser, Peter Reform 
des Aktienrechts, der Rechnungslegung und der Prüfung" 2nd Edition Stuttgart 2003 at p. 103-134 
at p. 112 
186 Noack, Ulrich Namensaktie und 
Aktienregister: Einsatz für Investor Relations und Produktmarketing" in Der Betrieb (DB) 2001 p. 27-31 at p. 28 
187 With sceptisism on the further utilisation on gained data: Spindler, Gerald Internet und 
Corporate Governance - ein neuer virtueller (T)Raum? " in Zeitschrift 
für Unternehmens- und Gesellschaftsrecht (ZGR) 3/2000 p. 420-445 at p. 426 
188 Hommelhoff, Peter/Teichmann, Christoph Namensaktie, 
Neue Medien, und Nachgründung - aktuelle Entwicklungslinien im Aktienrecht" in Dörner, 
Dietrich! Menold, Dieter/Pfitzer, Norbert/Oser, Peter Reform 
des Aktienrechts, der Rechnungslegung und der Prüfung" 2nd Edition Stuttgart 2003 p. 103-134 at 
p. 113f 
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developed than the European Union189 the fostering of the registered share is certainly a 
step towards greater transparency in the German market. 
5.3.3. Preference Shares 
According to § 139 s. 1 AktG it is also possible to issue preference shares. They must be 
vested with an extra payable preference with the allocation of the profits. More 
important with regard to shareholder engagement is the possibility to exclude the 
voting right190. Such shares can only be issued up to half of the capital stock 
(§ 139 s. 2 AktG). Hence, they are only a supplementation to the ordinary share. Their 
purpose is to make self-financing easier and to satisfy the interest of those investors 
who are only interested in yield and increase of substance191 
In recent years the preference share has gained considerable importance192, not only 
because of its financial possibilities but also as it is able to make takeovers difficult193. 
Especially because of this reason, the preference share has to be viewed critically, 
particularly as the share price displayed its own dynamic, which normally does not 
stand in relation to that of the ordinary share194. 
5.4. Implications of Modern Communication Forms 
As we have noted already, the increasing popularity of investing in the stock market 
since the end of the 1990's, particular because of the introduction of the "T-Aktie" by 
the Deutsche Telekom in 1996195, has had an impact on the environment of shareholder 
engagement. Additionally, the reform of the old-age pension scheme will also have a 
large impact upon the ownership of shares of German companies. These developments 
have demanded an increased applicability of modern communication forms, which 
changed the landscape of stock corporations as well. Noack196 describes the 
implications of forms of modern communication on the German Stock Corporation Act: 
189 Noack, Ulrich Moderne 
Kommunikationsformen vor den Toren des Unternehmensrechts" Zeitschrift für Unternehmens- und Gesellschaftsrecht (ZGR) 
3/1998, S. 592-616 and to download at http: //www. jura. uni-duesseldorf. de/dozenten/noack/texte/noack/kommunik. htm at IV 1; Tuerks, Robin A. 
"Depotstimmrechtspraxis versus U. S. -proxy-system: der Beitrag von Finanzintermediären zur Optimierung der Unternehmenskontrolle" Munich 2000 at p. 84 
190 For special rights with the preference share see chapter 6.2.5.1. Voting Restrictions 
191 Huffer, Uwe "Aktiengesetz" 6th Edition Munich 2004 at § 139 No. 2; Hopt, Klaus J. /Wiedemnann, Herbert Großkommentar zum Aktiengesetz" 4th Edition 
Berlin 1999 at § 139 No. 6 (Bezzenberger) 
192 Hopt, Klaus J. /Wiedemnann, Herbert Großkommentar zum 
Aktiengesetz" 4th Edition Berlin 1999 at § 139 No. 7 (Bezzenberger) 
193 Huffer, Uwe "Aktiengesetz" 6th Edition Munich 2004 at § 139 No. 3 
194 The spread in the share price between the ordinary share and the preference share in a statistic by the bank Merck Finck & Co. of 1996 respectively 1997 
Hopt, Klaus J. /Wiedemnann, Herbert Großkommentar zum 
Aktiengesetz" 4th Edition Berlin 1999 at § 139 footnote No. 7(Bezzenberger) ranged from 0,7% with 
SAP to 72,2% with Dyckerhoff in 1996 and from -4,1% with SAP to 75,4% with SPAR in 1997 
195 Gordon, Jeffrey N. Working 
Paper No. 161" in Columbia Journal of European Law, Vol. 5, No. 219, Spring 1999 (Symposium Issue) or download at 
http: //papers. ssrn. com/paper. taf? abstract_id=208508 , see appendix chart: 
Private Investors in Germany 
196 Noack, Ulrich Moderne 
Kommunikationsformen vor den Toren des Unternehmensrechts" Zeitschrift für Unternehmens- und Gesellschaftsrecht (ZGR) 
3/1998, S. 592-616 and to download at http: //www. jura. uni-duesseldorf. 
de/dozenten/noack/texte/noack/konununik. htm at IV 1 
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Five hundred years ago paper printing was a modern form of communication; a 
hundred years ago telegraphy was invented; for fifty years the telephone has been in 
common use, and for ten years fax machines have been spread widely. These technical 
innovations simply have not had recognisable influence on stock corporations. 
The increasing use of computer based online-systems has certainly not edged out more 
traditional forms of communication such as using the telephone, writing letters and 
using fax machines. Computer based systems are not even expected to make these 
forms of communication obsolete, but they have most certainly made a vital 
contribution to communication with innovations like E-mail, SWIFT, Internet, Intranet 
and computer based conferences via ISDN. 
The need for reform was also emphasised by a number of stock corporations. Blue-chip 
stocks changed their shares from bearer equities into registered. Other companies, 
mostly in the former Neuer Markt sector, were issuing registered shares right from their 
initial public offering. For instance a traditional form of keeping the registers was, out 
of financial and organisational reasons, not in the interest of the market participants. 
The established Girosammelverwahrung (electronic keeping of registers) by the 
NaStraG provides a universally applicable keeping of the registers. Furthermore, 
electronic proxy voting or the electronic edition of the Bundesanzeiger (federal gazette) 
should also be mentioned at this point. 
In addition to that, it had to be recognised that the Stock Corporation Act was not 
appropriate for the new economic situation. The technical and procedural conditions in 
the year of introduction (1965) on which the Stock Corporation Act was based have 
become outdated. Furthermore, the legislator had to recognise that the circle of 
shareholders was no longer manageable and predominantly national197. The growing 
request for information and an increased diversification of private and institutional 
shareholders considerably enhanced the requirements for distributing company data as 
well as the notice to the annual general meeting. 
All these implications of modern communication forms improved the environment for 
shareholder engagement considerably and moreover, accelerated the reform of 
Company Law. 
5.5. Purpose and Duty of the General Meeting 
The central body for shareholder engagement is the general meeting. As it can be seen 
in Figure 14, it carries a number of responsibilities. 
197 Gesetzentwurf der Bundesregierung Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Namensaktie und zur Erleichterung der Stimmrechtsausübung (Namensaktiengesetz - 
NaStraG)" (BT-Drucksache 14/4051) 2000 to download at http: //dip. bundestag. de/btd/14/040/1404051. pdf 
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Figure 14: Responsibilities of the General Meeting198 
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The annual general meeting199 serves two purposes. It is the platform on which the 
management informs and accounts to the shareholders and it is also the decision- 
making body of the shareholders200. It decides only in those cases explicitly stated in the 
law or in the articles of association (§ 119 s. 1 AktG). The decisions primarily concern the 
control of the administration such as election of the supervisory board representatives; 
appointment of the balance auditors; discharge resolutions; appointment of special 
auditors; and resolutions for the prosecution of damage claims against members of the 
administration body. They also dispose to a certain extent over the basis of 
shareholders' investments (alteration of the articles of association, closing down of the 
corporation, structure-changing resolutions)201. 
In its "'Gelatine202"as well as in the "Holzmüller203" - ruling the Bundesgerichtshof- 
BGH (Federal High Court)204 laid down the decision competences of the general 
meeting. In both cases the court dealt with the question under which conditions the 
management needs to seek approval in the general meeting for structural changes of the 
company. The "Holzmüller" ruling (1982) approved that structural changes, which 
effect the codetermination and administration rights of the shareholders are binding 
externally, but could cause claim for damages or injuctive relief to the benefit of the 
shareholders. Hence, the management should seek approval in the general meeting. 
198 Supplemented Draft - original in "Gabler Wirtschaftslexikon" 15th Edition Wiesbaden 2000 at p. 654 - Corporate Governance 
199 The number of special general meetings in Germany could be estimated as less than 1% of general meetings in total 
200 Report of the Government Panel on Corporate Governance July 2001 "Unternehmensführung - Unternehmenskontrolle - Modernisierung des Aktienrechts" 
to download at http: //dip. bundestag. de/btd/14/075/1407515. pdf at p. 78 
201 Report of the Government Panel on Corporate Governance July 2001 "Unternehmensführung - Unternehmenskontrolle - Modernisierung des Aktienrechts" 
to download at http: //dip. bundestag. de/btd/14/075/1407515. pdf at p. 78 
202 Gelatine" 
II ZR 155/02 in die Aktiengesellschaft 2004 p. 384-389 
203 Holzmüller" 
II ZR 174/80 in die Aktiengesellschaft 1982 p. 158-167 
204 Hierarchy of German Civil Courts: Bundesgerichtshof - Oberlandesgericht - Landgericht - Amtsgericht 
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Unfortunately, the BGH renounced to define precise conditions for the structural 
changes. This legal gap was picked up by the "Gelatine" ruling (2004). Fuhrmann2O5 
explains the situation as follows: The legislator made the general meeting the leading 
institution of the stock corporation but it did not pass on all responsibilities to it as the 
general meeting does not provide the structural requirements to control the company 
with the necessary flexibility. More specifically, in "Gelatine" the court ruled that 
unwritten participation powers of the general meeting are only acceptable within 
narrow limits when measures of the management are affected: 
Firstly, the measure needs to be a fundamental encroachment of member and property 
rights of the shareholders. In this respect Götze clarifies that the encroachment in its 
consequences must get close to an alteration of the statutes206. 
Secondly, a threshold value of far more than 50% of the company's assets must be 
exceeded. 
Consequently, with this narrow definition the BGH strengthened the position of the 
management in contrast to that of the AGM. 
As the stock corporation does not have a hierarchical constitutional body, the general 
meeting is not the supreme authority. Hence, equilibrium between the management 
board, the supervisory board and the general meeting is typical in corporate 
Germany207. This is an indication of the importance of shareholder engagement. 
It should not be neglected that the existing order of the general meeting is readily 
questioned. The excessive use of some shareholder rights, like the petition right, made 
this body an overloaded gathering of investors, which serves "socialising" purposes 
(the meeting of old colleagues) and thus acts inefficiently. 
In his standard work on the general meeting of the stock corporation, Butzke 
particularly criticised208 three features. The high presence of shareholders in the general 
meeting (which often is in contrast to the capital presence), abuse of the petition right, 
which prolongs the meeting disproportionately and attempts by shareholders to make 
resolutions contestable. 
Having provided a comprehensive view of the benefits and the wider environment of 
shareholder engagement, the following chapter will deal with the claimed hierarchy of 
shareholder engagement set out in Chapter 1.2. 
205 Fuhrmann, Lambertus "Gelatine" und die Holzmüller-Doktrin: Ende einer juristischen Irrfahrt? " in 
Die Aktiengesellschaft 7th Edition 2004 p. 339-342 at p. 340 
206 Götze, Cornelius "Gelatine" stattHolzmüller" - Zur Reichweite ungeschriebener Mitwirkungsbefugnisse 
der Hauptversammlung" in Neue Zeitschrift für 
Gesellsch. ', ý ýt cht Vol. 713/2004 p. 585-589 at p. 586 
207 Eisenhardt, Ulrich "Gesellschaftsrecht" 11th Edition, Munich 2003 at No. 574 
208 Ober'' ülier, Werner, Winden Die 
Hauptversammlung der Aktiengesellschaft" revised by Butzke, Volker 4th Edition Stuttgart 2001 at p. 4ff 
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6. Chapter: The Legal Environment for the Hierarchy of Shareholder 
Engagement 
As we have seen, shareholder engagement in Germany is still in a process of 
development. It is crucial that it is pursued most effectively, is in the interest of the 
company and its stakeholders, and does not infringe the law. In order to achieve this 
task a hierarchy of shareholder engagement was introduced in Chapter 1, which set out 
the framework of a sound shareholder engagement. Using an escalating order, this 
Chapter will now apply the hierarchy of shareholder engagement. 
The fact that it is the right of the shareholder to have a say in company matters at the 
general meeting is quickly recognised when attending an AGM in Germany. 
On the one hand, it is certainly an improvement for the corporate governance of a 
company, when a third institution other than the law and supervisory board, that is the 
shareholder meeting, supervises the performance of the management board. The 
general meeting has often urged management to change company policy and to 
improve shareholder value. Awkward questions are also capable of showing 
weaknesses within the enterprise. 
On the other hand, the status of being a shareholder is frequently used to achieve 
personal aims at the expense of the company. An example within this context is the 
type of investor who tries to find an occasion in the general meeting to block a 
resolution through a suit in order to demand financial compensation from the company 
to withdraw the legal action209. 
6.1. Information Right 
An essential condition for the shareholder to pursue a responsible engagement and thus 
make his contribution to good corporate governance, is the information right according 
to § 131 AktG210. Its purpose is to enable the shareholder to carry out his job as a 
member of the corporation in a responsible manner. Only broad knowledge about the 
209 It remains to be seen, if the UMAG of 2004 is capable to stopp the abuse of the right to sue. For more information look at chapter 9.4. UMAG 
210 § 1310 AktG Upon request, each shareholder shall be provided with information at the general meeting by the management board on the stock corporations' 
affairs to the extent that such 
information is necessary for a proper evaluation of an item on the agenda. The duty to provide information shall also extend to the 
stock corporation's 
legal and business relationships with any affiliated company. If a stock corporation makes use of the simplified accounting procedure pursuant 
to § 266 s. l s. 3, § 276 or § 288 of the 
Commercial Code, at the general meeting on the annual statements, each shareholder may request that it be presented with the 
annual financial statements 
in the unabridged form in which the accounts would have been if such provisions had not been applied. 
§ 1,1 i s, 2 AktG The information provided shall comply with the principles of conscientious and accurate accounting. 
§ 131 s. 3-s. 5 AktG not primarily necessary to grasp the scope of the 
information right 
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company's affairs allows him to act in its interest. Hence, due to the position of the 
shareholder, this right is a priority for him to use his vote competently211. 
The diagram below provides a complete hierarchy of this information right from 
obtaining material to suing the company. 
Figure 15: Information, Address and Petition Right in the General Meeting 
211 Hopt, Klaus J. 
/ Wiedemnann, Herbert Großkommentar zum 
Aktiengesetz" 4th Edition Berlin 2001 at § 131 No. 7 (p. 9) (Decher) 
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Right to Demand Information § 131 
AktG 
Restricted through: 
-no prior notice necessary 
-demand has to be made public 
(written or verbal) 
-the item of the GM -4 the topic has 
to be of current interest 
-time to address (approximately 5- 
15 minutes) 
-misuse of the right 
-end of debate 
Management board § 131 s. 1 AktG, 
in certain cases the chairman of the 
supervisory board, not the auditor § 
176 s. 2 s. 2 AktG 
Refusal of information § 77 s. 1 AktG 
Shareholder 
Every shareholder, who is 
eligible in the GM, incl. 
preference and legitimate 
shareholders as well as proxies 
Address Right results from 
§ 131 AktG - information 
right 
Restricted through: - look 
at right to demand 
information 
Petition Right 
-generally permissible 
Duty to communicate §§ 126,127 AktG: 
-reasonable counter-motion (100 words)(not necessary 
when nominating a supervisory board member or auditor, 
§127 AktG) to a petition by the board 
-counter-motion within one week 
-no inadmissible or misuse able counter-motion 
-ý To avoid disputes the corporation should act carefully 
Stock Corporation - duty to give information 
-generally only given verbally, when it is impossible to give the information in 
the GM, it could be given written or an inspection could be granted 
-the content of the information has to be substantial 
Restricted through: 
-matters of the corporation § 131 s. 1 s. 1 hs. 1 AktG 
-the information must be necessary to assess an item on the agenda 5 131 
s. 1 s. 1 hs. 2 AktG (to avoid an action the corporation should be generous 
giving the information) 
-misuse by the shareholder 
Right to Refuse the Information § 131 s. 3 AktG 
-risk of an disadvantage for the company (Standard is the assessment of a 
responsible businessman) 
-for tax purposes 
-hidden reserves (holdings, property, immaterial assets) - with new 
international audit standards (IAS or US-G4AP) hidden reserves are listed 
in the balance sheet 
-methods of accounting and valuation 
-if the management makes itself liable to prosecution (e. g data protection) 
-methods of accounting, valuation and clearing with respect to banks and 
financial institutions(§ 340 ff. HGB) 
-insider information § 38 s. 1 No. 2 in conjunction with § 14 s. 1 No. 2 WpHG 
Legal Remedy - by the shareholder 
-proceeding to enforce information § 132 AktG 
-Appeal against a resolution §243 s. 1 AktG 
both proceedings are independent from each other 
6.1.1. Collective Information 
in § 121 s. 3 and s. 4 AktG the Stock Corporation Act provides that the company has to 
give notice to the shareholders as the general meeting approaches. 
Along with the 
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notice of the general meeting, additional information is distributed to the 
shareholders212. This information includes, but is not limited to: 
-the agenda and items for resolution 
-suggestions for resolutions including complementary explanations 
-the annual settlement and eventually a consolidated settlement 
-information with the loss of 50% or more, of the capital stock 
-explanation of contracts and resolutions, which have to be approved by the general 
meeting 
-reports in connection with structural measures, including reports of examination and 
other documents: e. g. report of a merger and report of a division 
Butzke coined this kind of material "collective information"213. Its distribution by the 
company is not only requested by the law and necessary to avoid a flood of inquiries at 
the general meeting, but also to meet its duties towards investor relations. It is 
advisable for the company to take the quality of the information seriously as it is often a 
yardstick for the investor to stay with the company, or to trade his shares. 
The concept of collective information could be defined as material that is relevant for 
the forming of an opinion on matters of the agenda. It is given out by the stock 
corporation with the aim to inform the broadest possible spectrum of shareholders. 
Depending on the cost, this could happen in a number of forms, primarily according to 
the requested legal security. Hence, the notice to the general meeting is published in the 
Bundesanzeiger and additionally, every shareholder receives an individual statement. 
Certainly, not every topic can be covered this way; too manifold are the interests of the 
different shareholder groups. While institutional and corporate investors, banks, certain 
shareholder associations and the majority of private shareholders are mostly satisfied 
with positive figures in the report, interest groups, in particular employees, tend to 
scrutinise the company as a whole. Quite often the chief executive officer has to answer 
questions about the employment policy with regard to dismissals, overtime, 
handicapped and women, or the company's attitude towards environmental matters 
and more. Hence, the collective information can only serve as a tool to limit the thirst 
for information in the general meeting. 
It is essential to mention the duty of information with ad-hoc announcements according 
to § 15 WpHG. As per this paragraph, the management of a listed stock corporation has 
to issue facts immediately, which might influence the share price considerably. The ad- 
hoc announcements have to be published in at least one national deposit financial 
paper214. Unfortunately, especially in the former Neuer Markt Index numerous 
212 following: Obermüller, Werner, Winden Die Hauptversammlung 
der Aktiengesellschaft" revised by Butzke, Volker 4th Edition Stuttgart 2001 at p. 230 
213 Obermüller, Werner, Winden Die Hauptversammlung 
der Aktiengesellschaft" revised by Butzke, Volker 4th Edition Stuttgart 2001 at p. 230 
214 Very useful on this Issue: Leis, Josef/Nowak, Eric Ad-hoc 
Publizität nach § 15 WpHG" Stuttgart 2001 
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companies abused this provision to state share-price-influencing facts to market the 
performance of their company. By publishing whitewashed and exclusively positive 
information about the company, which were often not based on facts215, they intended 
to increase their market value and thus raise the stock's price. In a number of cases the 
public prosecutor's office has made inquiries. 
6.1.2. Entitled Person and Obligated Party 
The information right is compelling for the company, meaning that every shareholder 
who is eligible to attend the general meeting, including his legitimate proxy and owners 
of preference shares with no vote or unit shares, are entitled to this right. The articles of 
association can neither restrict nor extend this right. Only outside the general meeting 
certain regulations in the articles of association are permissible216. Correspondingly, this 
is also valid for boards of control. 
The obligated party is the stock corporation. The duty to inform is first of all carried out 
by the management board on behalf of the corporation217. This is true for information 
given by other departments, which the board also announces as its own 
communication. In other words, the board is the only institution to give out binding 
information. 
6.1.3. Conferral of Information 
Due to § 131 s. 1 s. 1 hs. 1 AktG, the requested information has to be about matters of the 
corporation. Huffer states in his comments that, everything referring to the stock 
corporation and its activity, including customer and supplier relations and the 
relationship with connected enterprises, can be subsumed under this point218. 
In general, the information is given verbally at the general meeting. Only when it is 
impossible to give the information in the set frame of time at the general meeting, may 
it be conferred in writing, or can inspection of the firm's books be granted to the 
shareholder. The content of the conferred information has to stand up to the principles 
of thorough and true accounting (Grundsätze einer gewissenhaften und getreuen 
Rechenschaft)219. Therefore the statements of the management board must be truthful, 
and the board cannot hold back important facts220. If a member of the board 
disguises 
215 e. g. EMTV, Kabel New Media, Comroad and many more 
216 Steiner, Klaus Die 
Hauptversammlung der Aktiengesellschaft" Munich 1995 at p. 84 
217 § 131 s. 1 s. 1 AktG 
218 Hoffer, Uwe "Aktiengesetz" 6th Edition 
Munich 2004 at § 131 No. 11 
219§131s. 2AktG 
220 Steiner, Klaus Die 
Hauptversammlung der Aktiengesellschaft" Munich 1995 at p. 88 
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information, or gives it incorrectly, he is threatened to be sentenced to three years' 
imprisonment or to be fined221. 
To avoid discussions getting out of control, the information right at the general meeting 
is restricted to the items on the agenda and limited by time, usually five to fifteen 
minutes. With regard to the timing of the AGM the Landgericht (District Court) 
Frankfurt ruled222 that it is not against Company Law to restrict the speaking time and 
to limit the duration of the AGM in the articles of association. 
The requirement by law that the information must be necessary for proper evaluation of 
an item on the agenda has a more practical meaning in the general meeting than the 
matters of the company mentioned above. However, it is very difficult to distinguish 
between information necessary for proper evaluation and irrelevant facts - each case has 
to be scrutinised on its own merits. Although, it is almost uncontested that this 
requirement has to be interpreted StriCtly223, the corporation is well-advised to be 
generous in divulging information, especially when its aim is to counter any 
threatening actions from investors. 
Corporate-policy facts necessary for proper evaluation include: numbers, quotes, 
results, comparisons with competitors or last year's results, achievements (e. g. 
environmental personnel), future planning, concepts and targets and more. The 
information does not need to be confined to the business of the year. Often facts of the 
current business year or of future years may be elements of the general meeting. 
Butzke, Huffer and Decher do not dispute that the additional necessary requirement is 
that the company's information has to be geared towards an objective shareholder, who 
is familiar with the conditions of the company due to publicly known f acts224. However, 
the vagueness of the legal concept that § 131 s. 2 AktG describes leads to a case-related 
differentiation. In general, it is accepted that information is not given at the general 
meeting when it is easily accessible elsewhere. To give a better insight into this issue, 
the figure below provides an overview where the judicature sees information right and 
where not. 
221 § 400 s. 1 nol AktG 
222 Langericht Frankfurt AZ: 3-05 O 
93/06 (28.11.2006) 
223 Hopt, Klaus J. / Wiedemnann, 
Herbert Großkommentar zum 
Aktiengesetz" 4th Edition, 16th delivery §§ 131,132 Berlin 2001 at No. 133 (Decker) 
224 Hopt, Klaus J. / Wiedemnann, 
Herbert Großkommentar zum 
Aktiengesetz" 4th Edition, 16th delivery §§ 131,132 Berlin 2001 at No. 135 (Decker), Huffer, Uwe 
"Aki;., gesetz" 6th Edition 
Munich 2004 at § 131 No. 12, Obermüller, Werner, Winden Die 
Hauptversammlung der Aktiengesellschaft" revised by Butzke, 
Volker 4th Edition 
Stuttgart 2001 at p. 246 
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Figure 16: Information Right - Cases 
Part of the Information Right in Not Part of the Information Right in 
§ 131 s. 1 AktG § 131 s. 1 AktG 
Composition of compensation of board Composition of compensation of 
members administration members 
(e. g. OLG Düsseldorf NJW RR 1997 p. 1399,1400; (e. g. LG Berlin AG 1991 p. 34,36) 
OLG Düsseldorf NJW 1988 p. 1033 and more) 
Qualifications and extent of jobs on the side of 
board members 
(e. g. BayObLG, WM 1996, p. 121,122; restricting 
OLG Düsseldorf AG 1987 p. 21) 
Inquiries about holdings of more than 5% Inquiries about holdings as far as they are 
(earlier decisions 10%) of the votes or the already stated in the annual balance -4 
capital, or with a market value of more than § 285 No. 11, hs. 2 HGB 
50 Mio. ¬uro (controversial position in the (e. g. KG WM 1994 p. 1479,1485) 
literature) 
(e. g. BayObLG WM 1996 p. 2149; LG Frankfurt 
WA41994 p. 1930,1931) 
Significant information of positions in the Explanations to the annual balance, which 
balance sheets or profit and loss could be deduced from the annual balance 
(e. g. BayObLG AG 1996 p. 322,323; OLG (e. g. OLG Düsseldorf WM 1991 p. 2153,2154; 
Frankfurt AG 1991, p. 206) BGHZ 93 p. 329,330) 
Group allocation and transfer prices Authorship of an analysis 
(e. g. OLG Karlsruhe AG 1990 p. 82) (e. g. OLG Düsseldorf WM 1991 p. 2148,2153) 
Assets of a public limited company, for which Details of internal calculation 
the GM has to decide a take-over (e. g. LG Dortmund AG 1987 p. 189) 
(e. g. LG München I AG 1993, p. 435,436) 
Total revenue of donations - not single Previous occurrences, which have no effects 
donations on the business year 
(e. g. OLG Frankfurt AG 1994 p. 39,40) (e. g. OLG Zweibrücken AG 1990 p. 496) 
Reasoning of the pre-emptive right in the case 
of a capital increase 
(BGHZ (10.10.2005) - II ZR 148/03) 
Inquiries about properties 
(e. g. LG Berlin WM 1994 p. 31; LG Frankfurt WM 
1994 p. 1930) 
It is necessary to restrict the right of the shareholder in the case of an abuse. Personal 
requitals, insults and ideological speeches are inappropriate when it comes to factual 
225 Obermüller, Werner, Winden Die Hauptversammlung 
der Aktiengesellschaft" revised by Butzke, Volker 4th Edition Stuttgart 2001 at p. 250 
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debates of the general meeting. 'Therefore the chairman will not face any consequences 
when he imposes silence on the speaker. 
It is also important to point out that prior announcement for the request of information 
in the general meeting is not necessary. 
6.1.4. Right to Refuse Information 
The right of the company to refuse information is conclusively listed in § 131 s. 3 AktG. 
The reason for this refusal right is that the legislator has assessed the information right 
of the shareholder less important than the corporation's right to protect sensitive 
business material226. The company also has the right to refuse to provide the demanded 
information to a shareholder if the investor could have received the required 
information from the company's web page. 
The introduction of the UMAG in 2005 will give the chairman of the general meeting a 
powerful tool to restrict the stakeholder's right to address and ask questions of 
management. According to § 131 s. 3 No. 7 AktG he will be able to refuse the requested 
information when the shareholder misused his right. This power can only be executed 
on the condition that the shareholder assembly has been notified of this rule. 
6.1.5. Information Right Outside the General Meeting 
§ 131 s. 4 AktG extends the information right to the effect that information which was 
granted to an investor outside the general meeting, has to be given to every other 
shareholder in the general meeting without any restrictions. Nevertheless, the practical 
importance of this norm is negligible. Regarding this information right so far no legal 
proceeding has been successful. 
6.1.6. Good Practice Provisions and other Possibilities for Improved Shareholder 
Information 
6.1.6.1. Investor Relations 
Closely related to the information right is the concept of investor relations. As its 
characterisations are numerous, at least the definition of the American National 
Investor Relations Institute (NIRI) should be quoted here. It defines investor relations as 
226 This includes: data which may place the company at a disadvantage in the marketplace (Standard 
is the assessment of a responsible businessman); figures 
relating tax; hidden reserves 
(holdings, property, intangible assets) - hidden reserves are listed in the balance sheet since the introduction of new international 
audit standards 
(IAS or US-GAAP); methods of accounting and valuation; cases where management makes itself liable to prosecution (e. g. data protection); 
methods of accounting, valuation and clearing with 
respect to banks and financial institutions (§ 340 ff. HGB); facts relating to insider information § 38 s. 1 \o 2 in 
conjun, tion with 
§ 14 s. 1 No-2 WpHG 
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"a strategic management responsibility that integrates finance, communication, marketing and 
securities law compliance to enable the most effective two-way communication between a 
company, the financial community, and other constituencies, which ultimately contributes to a 
company's securities achieving fair valuation"727. 
Taking this into account, investor relations could be seen as a completion of the legally 
required distribution of information, although their nature as a marketing tool to attract 
investors is by no means a legal obligation. The methods of conveying material for 
investor relations are diverse, including brochures, handbooks for investors, press and 
analyst conferences, one-to-one conversations228 but also tours of the workplace. 
Additionally, they use any compulsory publications to transport their information, like 
annual balances, semi-annual and quarterly interim reports, issue brochures and ad-hoc 
announcements229. 
Due to the NaStraG, corporations now have a tool to improve their investor relations. 
The possibility to communicate with the investor, not only on an informative basis but 
also on a service level, offers corporations a number of advantages. However, incorrect 
implementation could cause considerable troubles. 
Since the NaStraG replaced the words "to send" with "to provide" in 
§ 125 II 1. HS AktG, the legislator made clear that he now also accepts electronic 
transmission, without standardising the mode of the technology utilised for this 
purpose. Hence, corporations were able to improve their investor relations service via 
the Internet. 
On account of the fact that the registered shareholder is known by the corporation, the 
latter is obliged by § 125 II No. 3 AktG to get in touch with its investor. This has the 
undoubted advantage that shareholders are addressed faster, better and more 
informatively, and the detour via the custodian bank as an intermediary to investor and 
firm, has become dispensable. This has also led to improved back-office work. The 
administration of shares could be enhanced in every respect, e. g. dividends could 
be 
distributed in a more effective way. Particularly new and small stock corporations, 
which chose registered shares, profit from these enhanced communication possibilities. 
227 American National Investor Relations Institute (NIRI) - Definition of Investor 
Relations to download at http: //www. niri. org/about/mission. cfm; The 
differences in the definitions of investor relations are as big as their number. 
However, as it is not a legal concept, the definition should be left to the practicians. 
Other examples: Patrick Kiss "Investor Relations 
im Internet" Wolfratshausen 2001 at p. 16-18, Von Rosen, Rüdiger/Gebauer, Stefan Namensaktie und 
Investor 
Relations" in Von Rosen, Rüdiger/Seifert, Werner G. "Die 
Namensaktie" Schriften zum Kapitalmarkt Band 3, Eschborn 2000 also to download at 
http: //www. dai. de/internet/dai/dai-2-0. nsf/dai_pubfikationen. 
htm p. 127-140 at p. 129f 
228 Von Rosen, Rüdiger/Gebauer, Stefan Namensaktie und 
Investor Relations" in Von Rosen, Rüdiger/Seifert, Werner G. "Die Namensaktie" Schriften zum 
Kapitalmarkt Band 3, Eschborn 2000 also to 
download at http: //www. dai. de/internet/dai/dai-2-O. nsf/dai_publikationen. 
htm p. 127-140 at p. 132 
229 Von Rosen, Rüdiger/Gebauer, 
Stefan Namensaktie und 
Investor Relations" in Von Rosen, Rüdiger/Seifert, Werner G. "Die Namensaktie" Schriften zum 
Kapitalmarkt Band 3, Eschborn 
2000 also to download at http; //www. dai. de/internet/dai/dai-2 
0. nsf/dai_publikationen. htm p. 127-140 at p. 131 
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The flood of new emissions in the late 1990's and early 2000's led to constant ignorance 
by the economic press and analysts. With the new possibilities the option is given to 
offset this disadvantage230. 
Intelligent communication with the investor can lead to a healthier attitude of the 
investor towards the corporation. As mentioned the contact could be used as a basis for 
customer relations, but more important is the greater loyalty with which the 
shareholder may handle the shares in his custody. Especially the private investor tends 
to acknowledge good investor relations with a long investment term231 and a readiness 
to extend his custody232. 
However, use of the Internet as a cheap and effective way to contact the investor has the 
associated danger of abuse of the medium233. Publishing price sensitive information is 
prohibited through § 14 s. 1 No. 2 WpHG (Prohibition of passing on insider knowledge) 
and § 15 s. 3 s. 2 WpHG (Informing in a way other than publishing course-influencing 
facts). But it was not until the Fourth Finanzmarktfordungsgesetz (Act to Promote the 
Financial Market) that investor protection was taken very seriously234. 
6.1.6.2. Recognising the Possibilities of Electronic Distribution 
6.1.6.2.1. The Electronic Bundesanzeiger (Federal Gazette) 
A necessary step was made by the Transparenz- und Publizitätsgesetz (TransPuG) 
when it introduced the electronic Bundesanzeiger in § 25 s. 1 AktG. With this new tool 
for the shareholder it is not only possible to access recent information from anywhere in 
the most reasonable way, but also that subscribers could choose to get tailored 
information. Institutional investors in particular appreciate this new publication form. 
As they have to rely on the most topical general meeting information, the electronic 
access is a considerable improvement, especially in view of the fact that material 
provided by issuers or custodians often is inaccurate. Proxy voting services can also 
profit from this new tool as they now can improve delivery speed and access to their 
shareholder services. 
230 Von Rosen, Rtidiger/Gebauer, Stefan Namensaktie und 
Investor Relations" in Von Rosen, Rüdiger/Seifert, Werner G. "Die Namensaktie" Schriften zum 
Kapitalmarkt Band 3, Eschborn 2000 also to download at http: //www. dai. de/intemet/dai/dai-2-0. nsf/dai_publikationen. htm p. 127-140 at p. 135 
231 Heidorn, Thomas/Schmidt, Peter/Seiler, Stefan Neue Möglichkeiten 
durch die Namensaktie" Work Report No. 23 Hochschule für Bankwirtschaft and 
Kreditwesen 5/2001 at p. 32 
232 Von Rosen, Rüdiger/Gebauer, Stefan Namensaktie und 
Investor Relations" in Von Rosen, Rüdiger/Seifert, Werner G. "Die Namensaktie" Schriften zum 
Kapitalmarkt Band 3, Eschborn 2000 also to download at http: //www. dai. de/internet/dai/dai-2-O. nsf/dai_publikationen. 
htm p. 127-140 at p. 135 
233 Handelsblatt 25.09.01 Aktionär gewinnt gegen 
Neue-Markt-Firma" Infomatec-Fall/Falsche Ad-hoc-Mitteilung 
234 To gain a good overview about the problem of rate influencing 
facts, with spezial regard on § 14 1 Nr. 2 and § 15 Abs. 3 Satz 2 WpHG -. Ekkenga, Jens 
" 
Kapitalmarktrechtliche 
Aspekte der Investor 
Relations"" in Noack, Ulrich/Spindler, Gerald"Unternehmensrecht und Internet" Munich 2001 at p. 101-121 
85 
6.1.6.2.2. Notice to the General Meeting 
The NaStraG has enabled corporations to give notice of shareholders' meetings in 
electronic form. Sending notice of the general meeting in such a format saves the 
company a considerable amount of postage fees235 and administrative work. However, 
to use the Internet as a distribution channel it is necessary to have the e-mail address of 
each shareholder. Hence, spreading information only electronically is almost impossible 
for the company issuing bearer shares (custodian banks have not yet shown their 
intention to adopt the Internet as an informing tool). For companies with registered 
shares, however, this point is far more interesting as the system is currently in use and 
being refined. Although the switch to distribute shareholder information via the 
Internet will incur intensive set-up costs and will be a longstanding process, the result 
will significantly reduce distribution, administration and time costs. Therefore it is quite 
incomprehensible that the planning of the vast majority of the stock corporations is not 
heading in this direction. 
The corporation is obliged to give notice of the shareholders' meeting to all 
shareholders, at least to maintain their activism and meet their assignment of corporate 
governance. According to § 125 IV AktG, it is sufficient to make decisions of the 
shareholders' meeting accessible to the shareholder on the Internet. However, it needs 
to be remarked critically that the Internet is not yet a means of mass media like 
television236 and that, therefore, some sections of the population might have problems 
in obtaining the desired information. So the offer of the corporation to send the 
decisions (hard or soft copy) upon investors' requests is sufficient legally, and 
economically reasonable for businesses. 
For the providers of proxy voting services, which have electronic contact information 
for their clients, the decisions of the meeting could easily be attached to the voting 
reports, which are already sent electronically, providing that the issuers are willing. 
Having said that, it should be remarked that although the law states that the electronic 
publication (§ 125 s. 4 AktG) is equivalent to hard copy reports, still a number of 
corporations and custodians prefer the latter. 
6.1.6.2.3. Countermotions 
Since the introduction of the TransPuG in 2002 it is legally possible to publish 
countermotions of shareholders on the company's webpage (g 126 s. 1 s. 1 AktG). At first 
glance active shareholders will view their rights as having been reduced, but this new 
235 The Deutsche Börse Systems estimated that 20.000 shareholders with 250.000 transfers will cost a corporation 2,19 Euro per shareholder per year. - Börsen- 
Zeitung 27.01.2000 "Börse präzisiert Aktienbuch-Kosten" 
236 Spindler, Gerald Internet und 
Corporate Governance - ein neuer virtueller (T)Raum? " Zeitschrift für Unternehmens- und Gesellschaftsrecht (ZGR) 2000 at 
p. 429 
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practise will bring a number of improvements. Notably deadlines for countermotions 
could be cut to two weeks prior to the general meeting. Although it will become more 
difficult to make other shareholders aware of the countermotion, as they would rarely 
check the company's webpage for opposing views on items of the agenda, the quality of 
reply will be enhanced. In any case the opposing shareholder will formulate his 
countermotion at the general meeting, where he has the opportunity to make other 
investors aware of his issue for a second time. Additionally, communication among the 
shareholders would be improved. 
6.1.6.2.4. Shareholder Forum 
With respect to enhanced shareholder pluralism, the introduction of a shareholder 
forum within the electronic Bundesanzeiger (according to § 127a AktG) has to be 
welcomed. Accordingly, it is now possible for shareholders to communicate and 
coordinate themselves with the aim of executing their shareholder rights. For instance 
in those cases where the legislator requires certain thresholds: such as the calling for a 
general meeting (§ 122 AktG), the special accounting (§ 142 s. AktG) and the request for 
compensation (§ 147 s. 2 s. 2, § 147a s. 1 AktG)237. 
This provision is the consequence of an increasing free float and an ongoing 
internationalisation of the shareholder structure, as well as the recognition that it is not 
possible for holders of registered shares to make use of the register, and the anonymity 
of the investors in bearer stocks238. 
6.1.6.2.5. Further Application of the Internet 
Another field of application of the Internet is that of "Shareholder Boards". With their 
help shareholders are able to communicate among each other as the general meeting 
approaches. Noack suggests a commitment of the corporations to install such a board 
on its own website to improve the possibility to achieve capital presence and aid 
coordination among shareholders239. 
If the articles of association provide the possibility to transmit the AGM in picture and 
sound, the AGM could also be broadcasted via the World Wide Web, making the full 
length AGM accessible to connected shareholders worldwide. This facilitates various 
levels of service, for example if the company decides not only to broadcast the meeting 
237 Seibert, Ulrich/Schütz, Carsten Der Referentenentwurf eines 
Gesetzes zur Unternehmensintegrität und Modernisierung des Anfechtungsrechts - UMAG" in 
Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht (ZIP) 2004 p. 252-258 at p. 255; Bundesjustizministerium "Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Unternehmensintegrität und Modernisierung 
des Anfechtungsrechts (UMAG)" 2004 to download at http: //www. bmj. bund. de/media/archive/701. pdf at § 127a AktG 
238 Seibert, Ulrich/Schütz, Carsten Der 
Referentenentwurf eines Gesetzes zur Unternehmensintegrität und Modernisierung des Anfechtungsrechts - U%IAG" in 
Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht (ZIP) 2004 p. 252-258 at p. 255; Bundesjustizministerium 
"Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Unternehmensintegrität und Modernisierung 
des Anfechtungsrechts (UMAG)" 2004 to download at http: //www. bmj. bund. 
de/media/archive/701. pdf at § 127a AktG 
239 Noack, Ulrich Moderne 
Kommunikationsformen vor den Toren des Unternehmensrechts" Zeitschrift für Unternehmens- und Gesellschaftsrecht (ZGR) 
3/1998, S. 592-616 and to download at http: //www. jura. uni-duesseldorf. 
de/dozenten/noack/texte/noack/kommurük. htrn at Iv 1 
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but also to allow online voting or the request to address the forum. Although some 
stock corporations already have offered a live-transmission of their AGM via the 
Internet and proxy voting via the web, doubt arises regarding the on-line request to 
speak or pose questions. This is due to understandable reluctance of corporations to 
widen the right to speak at AGMs often exceeding a thousand investors, but also 
because of the increased danger of legal conflicts initiated by shareholders who 
overestimate their role. 
With respect to transmission in picture and sound, it is important to mention the fact 
that the legislator does not see problems regarding the right of personality. As it is 
unreasonable to demand that an on-line viewer sits in front of a black screen because 
the current speaker does not want his speech transmitted, it is reasonable for the orator 
to appoint a representative, who will speak on his behalf240. 
If the articles of association provide this option, then it is possible for members of the 
supervisory board to also participate via video and sound (§ 118 s. 2 AktG). Members of 
the management board have the duty to inform investors at the meeting while reducing 
the presence requirements of shareholder representatives, especially from abroad, is not 
regarded as counterproductive241. 
It should be documented that further applications of the Internet with regard to 
publication requirements are already manifested in the law or being drafted. For 
example the requirement to publish the investors' subscription rights242 also has to be 
made accessible electronically. Also there is demand to publish the remuneration of the 
management on the company's web pages according to the German Corporate 
Governance Code243. 
It should not be neglected that intermediates also make extensive use of the electronic 
distribution channels. For them this is a perfect sales argument as clients save postage 
fees and are enabled to automate some of the processes in conjunction with the general 
meetings. 
6.1.6.2.6. Conclusion 
Certainly, the Internet is more than suitable for distributing any information, including 
publicity, in a reasonable way. This makes it quite attractive to stock corporations, 
especially for the investor relations departments. With regard to a number of 
provisions, especially the Bundesanzeiger, which have the obligation of disclosure, it 
240 Gesetzentwurf der Bundesregierung Entwurf eines 
Gesetzes zur weiteren Reform des Aktien- und Bilanzrechts, zu Transparenz und Publizität (Transparenz- 
und Publizitätsgesetz)" 2002 to download at http: 
//www. bmj. bund. de/media/archive/301. pdf at reasoning of § 118 s. 3 AktG 
241 Gesetzentwurf der Bundesregierung Entwurf eines 
Gesetzes zur weiteren Reform des Aktien- und Bilanzrechts, zu Transparenz und Publizität (Transparenz- 
und Publizitätsgesetz)" 2002 to 
download at http: //www. bmj. bund. de/media/archive/301. pdf at reasoning of § 118 s. 2 AktG 
242 § 186 s. 2 s. 2 AktG 
243 Especially foreign investors believe that the information policy with regard 
to management renumeration in Germany is considerably poor. 
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has to be acknowledged that the Internet is so far only able to be an additional tool to 
distribute information. 
However, if the issuers exhausted the good practice provisions and other possibilities 
for improved shareholder information, they could not only adjust their investor 
relations more effectively but could also put the shareholders in a position in which 
they could assess the corporate performance more easily, especially with regard to 
corporate governance. 
Finally, the Transparency Directive244 (2004) of the EU should be mentioned. Its 
declared aim is to improve investor protection and boost market efficiency. To that end, 
it also seeks to ensure greater openness to the world of international finance in terms of 
use of languages and the more widespread use of modern technologies to disseminate 
information245. However, its impact on the information provided by the issuers will 
only be minor. As the European Economic and Social Committee explains: 
"It must be borne in mind that the proposed directive seeks not maximum, but minimum 
harmonisation. "246 
Having explained the information right I will now introduce the next form of 
engagement according to the introduced hierarchy. Shareholder negotiations are an 
instrument, which is, in contrast to the other forms of engagement, not regulated by 
Company Law. 
6.2. Shareholder Negotiations 
Shareholder negotiations (including informal discussions as a "softer" form of 
negotiations) are an alternative to the tools provided to the shareholders by the 
different legal systems. Institutional or other influential investors, rather than small 
private shareholders, have the option to inform the management of their interests in 
another fashion than through proxy voting or buyouts. As has been shown above, 
shareholder negotiations, for instance, often provide a more positive impact on 
corporate performance than voting on an agenda item. Pound stated that the most 
significant aspect of the new political process (shareholder power) is the rise of 
informal 
political mechanisms to supplant, and even replace, the extreme measure of the 
formal 
244 European Parliament and the Council "Directive 2004/109/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council - of 15 December 2004 - on the harmonisation of 
transparency requirements in relation to information about 
issuers whose securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market and amending 
Directive 
2001/34/EC" Official Journal of the European Union, Issue L390 (31.12.2004) p. 
38-57 
245 Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on 
the "Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
harmonisation of transparency requirements with regard to 
information about issuers whose securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market and 
amending Directive 2001/34/EC" 
Official Journal of the European Union, Issue C80 (30.04.2004) at p. 128 
246 Opinion of the European Economic and Social 
Committee on the "Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on the 
harmonisation of transparency requirements with regard 
to information about issuers whose securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market and 
amending Directive 
2001/34/EC" Official Journal of the European Union, Issue C80 (30.04.2004) at p. 
129 
89 
voting challenge247. Although this statement is contentious it shows that investors are 
well-advised to take into account additional measures than those provided by 
Company Law. The examples provided by Pound of successful shareholder campaigns 
at IBM, American Express, Eastman Kodak, Kmart248 and Daimler Chrysler support this 
assessment. 
Shareholder negotiations are a form of engagement not based on legal provisions. This 
advantage to "bargain in the shadow of the law"249 allows the investor to see them as a 
preliminary stage to general meeting resolutions and litigation. The position "outside 
the law" leaves the parties sufficient room to find an agreement and to move forward in 
a common sense. Legal limits might not only endanger the success of the negotiations 
and other measures, which are not regulated in the Company Law, but will also draw a 
wall between the owners and the issuers and will certainly foster overregulation. 
6.2.1. Shareholder Negotiations as a Supplementing Tool 
As it can be seen in figure 17, one popular tool used by institutional investors after 
voting is shareholder negotiation or informal discussion. 
Figure 17: Action Taken by Investors250 
Put forw and alternative proposals for vote 
Sell the shares 
Vote against the proposal 
Negotiations have at least three advantages over voting on resolutions. First, 
negotiations are not bound to the proxy season but can 
be pursued as a year-round 
activity. 
247 POUND, John "The Rise of the Political Model of Corporate Governance and 
Corporate Control", 1993 New York University Law Reviev, w Volume 68 No-5 PP 
1003-1071 at p. 1008 
248 POUND, John "The Rise of the Political Model of Corporate 
Governance and Corporate Control", 1993 New York university Law Re%ieoo Volume o8 
\o. 5 pp. 
1003-1071 at p. 1008 
249 BLACK, Bernard/Coffee, John "Hail Britannia?: Institutional 
Investor Behavior Under Limited Regulation, " in Michigan Law Review, Vol. 92,1994, p. 1997- 
2087 
250 GRUBAUGH, Richard H. Survey of 
Global Voting Trends" 2004 to download at www. iirf. org (International Investors Relation 
Federation) Figure 21 
90 
012345 
Out of five investors 
Second, it has to be recognised that dialogue and strategic campaigning could be better 
means of achieving corporate change than resolutions. While the latter could target only 
a limited number of agenda items at a certain point of time, shareholder negotiations 
could cover broader issues over a longer period and thus also have strategic 
advantages. In contrast to the attempt of improving corporate performance by voting 
on an agenda item, which will most probably fail, it could be claimed that the 
management could prove to be more flexible in negotiations as in the end they could 
claim an outcome as their success. 
A third advantage of shareholder negotiations is suggested by Black and Coffee251. They 
assume that both sides, investors as well as corporations, can lose from voting contests. 
This could explain the strong preference for behind-the-scenes settlements. Both sides 
have reason to threaten steps that are costly to them, hoping that a bluff will work. By 
"bargaining in the shadows", costs, including reputational damage to individuals and 
institutions, can be minimised252. 
However, I would also argue that shareholder negotiations have the greatest impact 
when they are used as a supplement tool. Dubiel253 points out that normally the 
company would be informed of a shareholder issue before a voting recommendation is 
given. This gives the stock corporation the opportunity to react and make necessary 
changes. Consequently, the shareholder is well advised to begin the engagement by 
searching for a dialogue with the company before they formulate a proposal to the 
general meeting. Carleton, Nelson and Weisbach254 describe this process as follows: 
"When an institution has an issue it is concerned about, it typically will contact a firm privately 
about the issue first. Depending on the firm's response, the institution will determine whether to 
file a proxy resolution. The process potentially is repeated for several years until either the firm 
changes its policy or the institution decides not to pursue matters further. " 
A good example that supports this hypothesis is the Daimler Chrysler AGM in 2004. 
Negotiations prior to the AGM showed the management that a vast majority of 
shareholders intended to oppose the proposed remuneration of the management. 
Consequently, the boards decided to withdraw this agenda item. 
The findings of Gillian and Starks255 also support this statement. According to their 
study, negotiations lead to an increase of withdrawals of shareholder proposals. In the 
251 BLACK, Bernard/Coffee, John "Hail Britannia?: Institutional Investor Behavior Under Limited Regulation, " in Michigan Law Review, Vol. 
92,1994, p. 1997- 
2087 
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years 1987-1994 they investigated 2042 proposals of which 244 were withdrawn following shareholder negotiations256. 
To point out the impact of shareholder negotiations, figure 18 provides an idea of its 
success rate. It shows the response rate of issuers as a result of shareholder pressure. 
Figure 18: Changes in Strategy, policies or Disclosure have been made or not as a 
Result of Shareholder Pressure257 
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Although this figure does not show the exclusive response rate to shareholder 
negotiations but to other instruments of shareholder engagement like voting, the 
number of two thirds is considerable and gives proof to the fact that shareholder 
engagement could lead to the desired aims258. 
For the successful outcome of shareholder negotiations in Germany the subject of the 
negotiations plays a decisive part. It is understandable that an agreement on less far- 
reaching issues like changing a stock option is easier to achieve than radical changes of 
the statutes or dismissing the CEO. Additionally, the ownership structure also plays an 
important role. The management of a company where the stocks are widely held is 
certainly more responsive than the management of a company where 50% of the stocks 
are concentrated. 
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Moreover, it is important to understand that to increasing extent institutional investors 
formulate their own corporate policies or use those of a third party259. In doing so a 
strict standard is applied not only for voting but also for negotiations. Consequently, 
institutional investors only have limited room for negotiations. The following figure 
gives proof of this assessment. 
Figure 19: Does the Institutional Investor Have a Voting Policy? 260 
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For example, if a Kapitalanlagegesellschaft (investment fund) has a policy that does not 
allow a capital increase of more than 20%, then a company which intends to exceed this 
mark will face opposition, first in negotiations then in the AGM, before the stocks are 
sold. It can be observed that this practice put negotiations into a fixed scheme. By 
saying this I mean that institutional shareholders expect the issuer to act within the set 
frame, with the result that the company's room for manoeuvre has become tight. For 
this reason the question is not, as some authors suggest261: What is the subject 
shareholders target most often? It is rather: Where are issuers most likely to exceed the 
limits? To be more precise, the investment funds only have limited room to manoeuvre 
within their corporate policy. In contrast to that the company could create its own 
guiding principles. Certainly this development restricts entrepreneurial freedom to a 
certain extent, but it has the advantage that political standards are set for the 
companies. This could save costs and efforts on both sides. 
Finally it needs to be added that Carleton, Nelson and Weisbach discovered that 
insider-controlled firms are less concerned about their reputation with shareholders 
and thus are less open for negotiation but are more willing to let the issues go to a 
proxy vote262 
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6.2.2. Limits of Shareholder Negotiations 
When pointing out the limitations of shareholder negotiations it is essential to stress 
their shortcomings. 
First, shareholder negotiations usually do not create a short-term reaction on the stock 
market as the results will probably be kept confidential. However, at least they have the 
potential to create some shareholder value on a long-term basis. 
Second, there is the risk that if large numbers of shareholders are excluded from 
negotiations they might get the impression that they have no influence on corporate 
decision making, with the consequence that they sell their shares rather than raising 
their voice. This emphasises the importance of making negotiations a "shareholders' 
issue" 
In other words, negotiations with the management should be based on an interest 
which is supported by all investors. Problems of transparency for other shareholders 
without the same informal concessions and information privileges must be avoided. 
Although the option to benefit from the negotiations without getting involved (free- 
riding) will leave the excluded shareholders inactive, it will be favourable to inform 
them of discussions. Especially, private shareholders might have difficulties in 
assessing the company's present situation accurately. 
In addition to that, unless other significant institutions participate, there is the danger 
that efforts by a single shareholder fail due to insufficient pressure and influence. 
Strenger points out that, institutional investors in Germany have not been coordinating 
their engagement sufficiently so far. In contrast to other countries263 German investors 
rarely form alliances. The consequence is that their voices often do not get the desired 
hearing264. The reason for this lack of coordination needs to be seen historically. 
Usually, it were the custodian banks who determined corporate policy. Not until the 
last couple of years (probably starting with the introduction of the NaStraG in 2001) the 
legislator as well as clients demanded that institutional investors should pursue more 
responsible investment, which included the safeguarding of fiduciary duties. Only 
slowly institutional investors recognise their responsibility and start to emancipate from 
(in-house) custodian banks. 
Just like that the share of foreign investors is mostly insufficient to raise corporate issues 
to the interest of other investors, providing that there is actually an interest. 
Additionally, the opinion is still widely spread that criticising the management is a 
form of activism which produces negative publicity. 
263 Examples include the forming of primarily Anglo-American alliances to address issues at ABN Amro (2007), Deutsche Börse (2005) or CeWeColor (2007) 
264 STRENGER, Christian - Member of the Cromrne Commission and chairman of the supervisory 
board of DWS (Germany's biggest fund company) - personal 
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The result is that primarily institutional investors neglect the option of communicating 
and forming alliances with fellow shareholders. 
Moreover, it has to be recognised that the position of small private shareholders is too 
weak anyway. Although they have the possibility to coordinate themselves through 
web-based platforms, their influence will still be too negligible for the management to 
take up raised issues. 
Especially with respect to institutional investors this reluctance towards coordinated 
engagement in Germany needs to be overcome. Firstly, a common voice of the 
shareholders will show the management that there is indeed an issue that cannot 
simply be ignored. Secondly, it will strengthen the position of engaged investors 
towards those who prefer selling the shares (Exit Versus Voice). Finally, a coordinated 
action could make the administration easier, avoid the free rider problem and 
consequently, save costs. 
Besides that, it has to be recognised that institutional investors do not have a sufficient 
infrastructure to pursue responsible engagement. For instance, they do not have an 
electronic voting platform; cover national meetings only; have no defined corporate 
policy; still rely on their in-house custodian or do not have the experience to pursue 
sound shareholder engagement. 
Moreover, in general their influence in negotiations or general meetings is not 
proportional to their share. Often success is achieved by chance. Only when the broad 
number of shareholders or even the public raises interest in certain issues more 
coordinated activity is recognisable. A good example in this respect is the Daimler 
Chrysler AGM in 2004. Here a number of investment funds publicly announced that 
they did not intend to approve the acts of the management. At the end the 
DaimlerChrysler management received an approval of "only" 88%. 
In this respect it has also to be recognised that sometimes a strong interest, carried by 
the public opinion or the shareholders towards the management is necessary to pave 
the way for negotiations. While it is relatively easy to play down issues raised by small 
shareholders, it is not advisable to ignore majorities. 
Another universally applicable issue is raised by Brennan265. He states that in general 
experience also exposes the limitations of shareholder negotiations: 
"Shareholder disputes reveal the relative power of capitalist firms to manage the assets of 
shareholders according to their own capitalist wishes...... When companies face challenges from 
265 BRENNAN, David M. ""Fiduciary Capitalism, " the "Political Model of Corporate Governance, " and the Prospect of Stakeholder 
Capitalism in the U. S. ", 2003 
to do vnlo. at http: 
//www. newschool. edu/cepa/papers/workshop/040910_Brennan. pdf also in Review of Radical Political Economics, Vol. 37, n° 1- winter 
2005 at p. 39-62 
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shareholder resolutions, they often produce their own persuasive rhetoric in defence of current 
business practices to sway public and shareholder opinion...... Their responses demonstrate clearly 
that corporations are willing and able to argue persuasively against seemingly "popular" 
shareholder issues. In part because of savvy corporate public relations, shareholder resolutions face 
the difficult task of getting enough votes to change corporate policy. This issue has lasting 
significance, because shareholder resolutions represent a significant challenge to corporate 
behaviour; as businesses defeat these resolutions, corporations severely weaken shareholders' 
power to negotiate issues of corporate governance. " 
Finally and most importantly, it needs to be pointed out that the outcome of 
shareholder negotiations will typically lack a "legal base"'. It will not, in other words, 
result in an agreement that is binding upon the company. As a result some uncertainty 
will always remain. However, when misgivings following negotiations come true, the 
general meeting provides a perfect platform to remind the other party of the outcome of 
the negotiations. 
6.2.3. Using the Publicity to Support Shareholder Negotiations 
Shareholder negotiations (as well as other forms of engagement) are sometimes 
supported by public campaigns. A crucial factor with those campaigns is that they are 
mostly driven by the media and less by investors. The latter might initiate the campaign 
but cannot control its content or direction. Therefore campaigns are not a form of 
controlled shareholder engagement, although the investor might seek the support of 
public campaigns. 
A successful example of a public campaign is provided by the case of the U. K. based 
Hedge Fund TCI. In connection with the Deutsche Börse bid for the London Stock 
Exchange in 2005, the fund (which owned about 8% of the Deutsche Börse) announced 
that it refused to support the attempts by the German company. Other primarily Anglo- 
American investors followed TCI's example with the result that the CEO of the 
Deutsche Börse had to withdraw the offer. Prior to the AGM 2005 the CEO and the 
chairman of the supervisory board of the Deutsche Börse resigned. 
However, campaigns often are not in the interest of shareholders as their result is 
mostly negative. The stock price suffers and the image of the company could be harmed 
lastingly. A good example in this respect is the Mannesmann case in 2004, where a 
public campaign on excessive management compensation was pursued. Not only were 
the involved managers heavily criticised, but also the stock price of the affected 
companies (e. g. Deutsche Bank) was put under pressure. This example indicates that 
public campaigns are often populist levers rather than an instrument to be used to 
implement a desired corporate change. Consequently, Strenger points out that a public 
campaign could only be one of the last options for institutional investors as negotiations 
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regularly promise better results266. If an investor decides that his engagement needs the 
support of a public campaign he needs to be aware of the fact that he will not be able to 
control the campaign. 
6.2.4. Conclusion 
For the investor it is well worth considering alternative forms of engagement to those 
provided by Company Law. As it has been shown, shareholder negotiations carry the 
shareholders' interest to the management's attention and further. This is based on the 
assumption that this form of engagement might be more cost effective than other forms 
provided by Company Law and that it could be more successful when used 
supplementary to the tools provided by Company Law. 
Unfortunately, there is no documentation showing to what extent shareholder 
negotiations are successful. 
Finally I would like to complement the following universally applicable observation of 
Brennan267 
"When an investor fails with a proposal to negotiate a certain issue or similar measure he still could 
propose a shareholder resolution in the AGM or file a suit. " 
When an investor prefers to submit a counter proposal or to go to court first and is 
unsuccessful, his chances of negotiating a compromise with the management later are 
considerably limited. This statement is supported by the assumptions of Galanter268. 
According to him, "settlements" entail "bargaining in the shadow of the law, " so the 
influence of legal doctrine is present but is thoroughly mixed with considerations of 
expense; delay; publicity and confidentiality; the state of the evidence; the availability 
and attractiveness of witnesses; and a host of other contingencies that lie beyond the 
substantive rules of law. It is "the law" in its broad sense of process that casts the 
shadow, not merely its doctrinal core. 
"269 
The described shareholder negotiations are a relatively "informal" way of engagement. 
Following the hierarchy of shareholder engagement, the Stock Corporation Act 
provides further "formal" forms of activity the investor could pursue. Having already 
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introduced the information right, the following chapter will describe the right to speak 
at the general meeting. 
6.3. Speaking at the General Meeting 
Another shareholder engagement right Company Law recognises is speaking at the 
general meeting. Its nature is closely related to the information right, as § 131 AktG 
provides the right to speak in order to obtain information. As this shareholder right 
does not bear any consequences it plays a less important role legally than politically. 
This derives from the fact that speaking at the general meeting can be an effective tool 
to express discontent or satisfaction with the management's performance. It needs to be 
acknowledged that constructive criticism is formulated in few cases only. Mostly only 
asset managers or representatives from shareholder associations stick to the agenda and 
specify their concerns. In numerous other cases, however, the right to speak at a general 
meeting is frequently abused, which makes an efficient carrying through of the general 
meeting almost impossible. The tendency to use the lectern in the general meeting as a 
platform to pursue ideological aims, to perform showmanship270, to advertise products 
or even for cultural contributions distorts the purpose of the general meeting. An 
excellent example is the Daimler Chrysler AGM in 1993, where Prof. Wenger was 
forced to leave as he worded his criticism of the management too rudely271. 
Therefore it was only a consistent development that with the introduction of the UMAG 
the authority of the chairman was increased to the extent that he now has the possibility 
to limit the time of the shareholder to speak or to ask his questions. This measure to 
make the shareholder assembly more efficient has been expected for quite some time272. 
According to the Stock Corporation Act, the right to speak should give the shareholder 
the opportunity to make an inquiry and to specify his information request. Here it must 
be accepted that the "inquiry" may turn out to be a corporate political speech. Although 
this serves the dialogue between the shareholders and management, it is necessary that 
during the shareholder meeting certain rules are applied in order to maintain a 
qualitatively high standard while removing cumbering factors. 
270 Brost, Marc/Heuser, Uwe Jean Das sind absurde 
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http: //www. zeit. de/2001/18/Wirtschaft/200118_beistueck_corpor. html; Obermüller, Werner, Winden 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6.4. Shareholder Proposal or Calling a General Meeting 
§ 122 AktG provides that shareholders holding 5% or 500,000 Euro of the capital stock 
are entitled to request the announcement of agenda items to be decided in the general 
meeting. Additionally, shareholders who hold together more than 5% of the capital 
stock have the right to call a general meeting. The same rights are also granted to single 
shareholders who meet these requirements. 
Therefore to a certain extent, § 122 AktG serves the separation of powers between the 
shareholders, the management board and the supervisory board273. This possibility for 
the shareholders supports the critical dealing with the company and avoids a diktat of 
the agenda by the management. 
The latter is obliged to execute the request of the shareholders and has no latitude. Only 
when the formal requirements are not met; the general meeting is not responsible; the 
resolution is illegal; not in accordance to the statutes or the request is abused, an action 
is unnecessary274. 
With respect to formal requirements it needs to be pointed out that the argument for 
requesting the announcement of a shareholder proposal does not need to be made 
substantiate; it is sufficient that the argument is designated. 
More complex is the discussion about the abuse of the rights according to § 122 AktG. 
However, to maintain the protection granted by § 122 AktG, high demands are made to 
classify a request as being used improperly275. 
For instance, the right to file a shareholder proposal is assumed to be abused when276: 
-an item should be put on the agenda, although an earlier general meeting already dealt 
with the issue and circumstances have not changed since. 
-the resolution insults or obviously provides false or misleading statements. 
-the item is obviously superfluous or does not serve the pursuit of shareholder interests, 
but intends to harm the company. 
-there is an easier way to achieve the desired aim. 
-the approval of a third party is required, while it is certain that the approval will not be 
given 
It is also an abuse to call a general meeting if the next general meeting could deal with 
the agenda item and thus no urgency is given. 
However, it needs to be made clear that a resolution is not improper simply because it 
could never expect a majority of votes. 
273 Halberkamp, Thomas/Gierke, Olaf Das Recht 
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In the case that the board rejects the calling of a general meeting or the announcement 
of an agenda item, the course of law is provided by § 122 s. 3 AktG. 
Even where minority shareholders are successful with their request for a new agenda 
item, the general meeting is not obliged to deal with it and could simply decide to take 
the item off the agenda277. However, the general meeting, respectively the management, 
is well advised to approach this decision carefully, as shareholders are bound by their 
duty of loyalty and as the board should avoid taking sides in this matter. It is 
recommendable that the chairman explains that a decision to take the item off the 
agenda will be equal to a vote against it. This approach would make the holding of the 
meeting more economical278. 
It should be made clear that the costs for a successful shareholder request according to § 
122 s. 1 and s. 2 AktG have to be covered by the company. 
The right to call a general meeting serves the protection of minority shareholders and 
facilitates the participation right, the right to file a suit, and the execution of shareholder 
rights with regard to the general meeting279. This means the request to call a general 
meeting is virtually less important than the request to announce a shareholder proposal. 
Although investors make less use of this right today than in the late 1990s, Butzke 
explains that § 122 s. 2 AktG has often been abused to supplement the agendas of DAX- 
companies by often identical, socio-political items, which obviously did not serve the 
prosperity of the corporation280. This abuse was largely stopped as a result of the critical 
scrutiny of the formal and material right mentioned above. 
6.5. Voting Right 
The most powerful tool of the investor beside the right to sue is the voting right, 
allowing the shareholder to verbalise his opinions towards management and the 
meeting issues. Here the connection between shareholder engagement and corporate 
governance becomes most obvious, as corporate policy is directly influenced. 
The possibility to co-determine corporate policy is given by § 12 s. 1 AktG, which 
guarantees the voting right to every share, although preference shares may be issued 
without the voting right. For the shareholder to exercise this right, he has to have paid 
his contribution281, and be present at the general meeting. If the shareholder is unable to 
attend the meeting he may only exercise his vote by authorising a proxy. 
277 Obermüller, Werner, Winden Die 
Hauptversammlung der Aktiengesellschaft" revised by Butzke, Volker 4th Edition Stuttgart 2001 at p. 57 
278 Obermüller, Werner, Winden 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279 Huffer, Uwe "Aktiengesetz" 6th Edition Munich 2004 at § 122 No. 1 
280 Obermüller, Werner, Winden Die 
Hauptversammlung der Aktiengesellschaft" revised by Butzke, Volker 4th Edition Stuttgart 2001 at p. 54 
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As the vote is a legal declaration of intention, it is possible to apply the civil-law 
regulations: receipt, appeal and nullity, with the consequence that a successful action to 
set aside could defeat the resolution. 
While the execution of the voting right is voluntary for the private shareholder, 
institutional investors are urged to contribute. This is not only demanded by the 
Bundesverband Deutscher Investment- und Vermögensverwaltungs- Gesellschaften 
(BVI) in his Wohlverhaltensregeln282 (Rules of Good Behaviour) but also by § 32 s. 1 s. 3 
InvG - Investmentgesetz (Investment Act). As per this law, the investment trust should 
exercise the vote in the interest of its shareholders. Interestingly, the law in other 
countries is stronger. E. g. in the US or Spain institutional investors are oblidged to vote 
or France and the UK where the institutional investor has to vote or explain why he did 
not vote. 
The scope of § 32 s. 1 s. 3 InvG is that the investment trusts, which could be seen as a 
small private shareholder for a third party account, should act independently of the 
custodian bank283. To what extent this rule is obeyed can only be estimated. Fact is that 
vast numbers of Kapitalanlagegesellschaften still rely on their custodians. This allows 
the trusts to exculpate themselves if their stocks are not voted or the vote was not in the 
interest of the investors, and also means they do not need to set up voting guidelines. 
They expect the custodian, which most often is in-house, to execute the vote with the 
necessary fiduciary duty. Additionally, they do not need to invest in a proxy voting 
service - custodian banks generally offer this service free of charge. 
Again it should be emphasised that the law does not cover this practice. Only in the 
single case the transfer of the vote is covered. The Kapitalanlagegesellschaft must not 
subordinate its management to the custodian284. 
6.5.1. Voting Restrictions 
The role of the Höchststimmrecht (highest voting right) was a controversial section of 
the articles of association. The Höchststimmrecht provided that the votes of one 
shareholder exceeding a certain percentage (e. g. 20%) were not counted. As a tool to 
prevent hostile take-overs, it has been quite common for stock corporations to limit the 
shares that are eligible to vote. It is probably due to this characteristic that the 
Höchststimmrecht was heavily criticised by the Corporate Governance Panel of the 
government285. 
282 Bundesverband Investment und Asset Management e. V. (BVI) BVI-Wohlverhaltensregeln" to 
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However, with the introduction of the KonTraG (1998) this 'privilege' was abolished for 
listed companies. Now, only unlisted stock corporations are entitled to lay down 
Höchststimmrechte in their articles of association. 
The voting restriction is implemented through an absolute maximum amount, a certain 
percentage of the capital stock, or a gradation of the votes. It is irrelevant whether the 
shareholder is a private person, a proxy or a connected enterprise. Due to 
§ 134 s. 1 s. 5 AktG it is impossible to impose a restriction on single shareholders. 
Although the intention of the Höchststimmrecht is primarily to serve as an alarm for 
hostile take-overs it undoubtedly serves further functions. As already noted, in general 
the structure of ownership in Germany is more concentrated and less diversified than 
that in the United States or the United Kingdom286. Therefore the Höchststimmrecht 
guarantees enhanced pluralism at the general meeting. Through the integration of wide 
sections of shareholders the minority rights are strengthened. 
However, this form of decision making promotes controversial rather than constructive 
discussions at the AGM. It is questionable whether this is in the interests of the 
company287. Furthermore, this piece of legislation is seen to protect inefficient 
administrations from reform-willing shareholders. Additionally, the argument is put 
forward that the Höchststimmrecht can have negative effects on stock exchange rates as 
it lowers the chances of possible takeovers288. Fortunately the legislator has 
acknowledged the predominantly negative impact of the Höchststimmrecht and 
repealed it. Especially foreign capital was not really attracted as equal shareholder 
rights were not granted in companies which maintained the Höchststimmrecht. 
In contrast to France and the Scandinavian countries, Mehrstin -nrechte (multiple 
voting rights)289 are not possible according to § 12 s. 2 AktG. A repeal of this provision in 
order to get the management to pursue long-term profit maximisation would not be 
beneficial. Firstly, this is justified by the Equal Treatment Principle: The voting right in a 
stock corporation should correspond to the invested capital290. Secondly, especially 
foreign and institutional investors will be scared off. Thirdly, the capital presence in the 
general meetings will drop even further while accidental majorities would become 
more possible. Fourthly, Mehrstimmrechte in certain companies could lead to a diktat 
of large blockholders and would certainly be beneficial for the crossholdings network. 
Finally, the High Level Group of Company Law Experts291, which was appointed by the 
286 La Porta, Rafael/Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio/ Shleifer, Andrei/Vishny, Robert W. Law and 
Finance" in Joachim Schwalbach Corporate 
Governance - Essys 
in Honor of Horst Albach" Berlin-Heidelberg 2001 p. 26-68 at p. 60 
287 Romano, Roberta "Less is More: Making Institutional Investor Activism a Valuable Mechanism of Corporate Governance" Yale Law School and National 
Bureau of Economic Research; Draft: October 26,2000 p. 1-78 
288 Hoffmann-Becking, Michael "Münchner Handbuch des Gesellschaftsrecht - Band 4 Aktiengesellschaft" 2nd Edition Munich 1999 at § 38 No. 10 (Semler) 
289 Shares with a multiple voting right have more than only one vote 
290 Zöllner, Wofgang (Editor) "Kölner Kommentar zum Aktiengesetz" 2nd Edition, Cologne 1988 at § 11No. 7 
291 "Report of the High Level Group of Company Law Experts on a Modern Regulatory Framework 
for Company Law in Europe" 2002 to download at 
http: / /europa. eu. int/ comm/ intemal_market/ en/company/ company/modern/consult/ report_en. pdf 
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European Union, saw in the Mehrstimmrecht an obstacle for takeovers as small 
shareholders could easily target such offers. Hence, they support a European wide 
repeal of this voting right so that at least in the case of a takeover the one share - one 
vote principle will prevail292. 
Another point to mention is the restriction of voting rights for allocated preference 
shares293. The holders of preference shares have the same administration rights as the 
ordinary shareholder. They are entitled to participate in the general meeting, can take 
an action to set aside a resolution by the general meeting, and have the information and 
petition right. However, the concept of "preference" shares derives from the right to be 
first with the distribution of dividends. Therefore it is not surprising that the voting 
right is granted in cases where the preference share is concerned294. 
In addition to this, voting prohibitions are imposed on board members and certain 
shareholders who are personally affected by matters which are inherent in their 
status295. 
Restrictions are also imposed on a stock corporation holding own shares. Due to 
§ 71 AktG it is possible for the corporation, under certain conditions, to acquire own 
shares, but according to § 71 b AktG the company cannot assume the rights associated 
with these shares. This includes voting rights and the dividend claim296. An attempt to 
evade this barring of rights using third or dependent companies is not possible. This 
can be compared with § 328 AktG, which restricts the rights of companies having 
mutual interests exceeding 25% of the total number of shares, while rights for 
companies with mutual interests below 25% remain untouched. However, an exception 
is made where the firm does not carry out its disclosure of information duty with 
regard to these interests297. An infringement will have the consequence for the company 
that the rights will be lost. 
Violations by board members or corporations against the restrictions mentioned above 
could make the resolution contestable, and the offender may be fined. 
292 Wagner, Oliver for Deutsche Bank Research EU-Übernahmerichtlinie - 
Erfolg nach 30 Jahren Diskussion? " 22nd May 2003, to download at 
www. dbresearch. de/PROD/999/PROD0000000000055473. pdf at p. 5 
293 § 12 s. 1 s. 2 AktG 
294 In particular: no distribution of dividends in one year and no balance payments in the following year (§ 140 s. 2 AktG); lifting or encroachment of the 
preference (§ 141 s. 1 AktG); an introduction of further preference shares (§ 141 s. 2 AktG); alteration of the articles of association, if preference shares are concerned 
(§ 179 s. 3 AktG); capital increase, if preference shares are concerned (§ 182 s. 2 AktG in conjunction with § 193 s. 1 s. 
3, § 202 s. 2 s. 4, § 221 s. 1 s. 4 and s. 3); capital 
decrease, if preference shares are concerned (§ 222 s. 2 AktG, in combination with § 229 s. 3 AktG). 
295 For instance: no vote on own ratification of the acts (§ 136 s. 1 AktG); no vote for ratification of acts in conjunction with a special investigation (§ 142 s. 1 s. 2 and 
3 AktG); restriction to vote with personal liable partners in a limited partnership on shares (§ 285 s. 1 AktG); questions of the management in the case of liability 
release or alteration (§ 119 s. 
2 AktG); duty to pay compensation (§ 117 AktG); assertion of claims for compensation (§ 147 AktG). 
296 Obermüller, Werner, Winden Die Hauptversammlung 
der Aktiengesellschaft" revised by Butzke, Volker 4th Edition Stuttgart 2001 at p. 176 
297 § 20 AktG, § 21 WpHG 
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A special act is the so-called Volkswagen Act, as it restricts proxies to the general 
meeting298, with the effect that whatever will happen the state of Niedersachsen (Lower 
Saxony), as the major shareholder, will prevail in any proxy fight. As the German 
legislator is not prepared to alter this Act, the Commission of the European Union filed 
a suit against this practice saying it violated the Treaty of the European Union with 
regard to the free movement of capital (Art. 59) and the freedom of establishment (Art. 
43)299. A ruling is pending at this point in time. 
In the context of voting restrictions it is relevant to mention the possibility of voting 
agreements. The law (§ 136 s. 2 AktG) restricts such arrangements; however, it is 
accepted that under certain circumstances the shareholders may commit their voting 
towards a third party, or the corporation. These agreements are legal. 
The acknowledgement of voting agreements is only logically consistent. With regard to 
the fact that most of the corporate policy is not determined in the general meeting, an 
enhancement of legal security for the corporation often is necessary. 
Finally, a ruling by the BGH30° needs to be pointed out. According to the judgement of 
the court an AGM resolution does not become invalid because a shareholder was 
according to § 20 s. 7 s. 1 AktG not entitled to vote. It only becomes contestable due to an 
infringement of the law. 
6.5.2. Proxy Voting 
A crucial point of the voting right principle is the authorisation of an agent by the 
shareholder301. Proxy voting is generally possible, although the exercise of the vote via a 
messenger is not covered by this provision. The authorisation of credit institutes, 
shareholder associations and other intermediates is also possible. The provisions in the 
BGB - Bürgerliche Gesetzbuch (Civil Code)302 cover the conferral of authorisation if the 
Stock Corporation Act (§§ 134 s. 3,135 AktG) does not state an exception. 
A compelling condition for a legitimate proxy agent is the authorisation by the 
shareholder. Here a written notice is required. However, the NaStraG has allowed some 
considerable changes to this point. Although it does not waive the written form, it 
adopts a more flexible concordance with the regulation, by allowing other forms 
298 §3 Gesetz Ober die Überführung der Anteilsrechte an der Volkswagenwerk GmbH 21.7.1960 (Act Regarding the Transition of Volkswagenwerk GmbH 
Shares) 
299 European Commission Press Release IP/04/1209 "Free movement of capital: Commission takes Germany to the Court of Justice on Volkswagen law" 13th 
Oct. 2004 to download at http: //www. eu. int/rapid/pressReleasesAction. do? reference=IP/04/1209&format=HTML&aged=0&Ianguage=EN&guiLanguage=en 
300 BGH II ZR 30/05 (24th of April 2006) at p. 1 
301 The determining legal provisions regarding the relation between the shareholder and the proxy are set down in §§ 134 s. 3,135 AktG, §§ 675,665 BGB 
(contract of agency). 
302 §§164 - 185 BGB 
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including fax, e-Mail or SWIFT3° . 
This provides a relative simplification of proxy 
voting with a number of positive consequences for the company. If implemented by the 
articles of association, it is not only possible for the corporation to reduce the enormous 
mailing and administrative costs (also derived from incoming enrolments and other 
administrative work) but also to simplify voting for shareholders, which would 
consequently enhance capital presence at general meetings. 
Figure 20: Voting Methods of Institutional Investors304 
In person at meetings 1 2,3 
By post IT3 
Other 3,6 
Electronically 3,6 
0 0,5 1 1,5 2 2,5 3 3,5 4 
Out of four investors 
Although this reform was made on behalf of the rediscovery of the registered share, 
electronic voting with bearer shares can also be executed. Here, in contrast to the 
registered share where the registrar has all necessary information, the entrance card of 
the custodian bank is decisive. As the company does not know the shareholder, it has to 
provide the investor with all required information. 
Unfortunately, the custodian banks tend to give up their proxy voting services, rather 
than putting an effort into reforming their system. It would seem they are waiting on 
further development of the registered share, before investing in a system that allows 
proxy voting via the bank. Furthermore, they possibly fear spending money on a 
service which has produced high losses and criticism from many social groups, 
especially in the period following instalment. 
Since 2001, a number of companies issuing registered shares have already been offering 
electronic voting via the Internet to shareholders. Such companies include Allianz AG, 
Advantec AG, Daimler-Chrysler AG, Deutsche Bank AG, Münchner Rück, Celanese 
AG, Telekom AG and others. So far RWE is the only company with bearer shares that 
offers such a service. 
This development indicates that this form of shareholder service is technically and 
legally achievable. Although shareholder response to this offer in the first years should 
not be overestimated, it is expected that the adoption of the technology will increase as 
303 Gesetzentwurf der Bundesregierung Ent wwurf eines 
Gesetzes zur weiteren Reform des Aktien- und Bilanzrechts. zu Transparenz 
und Publizitit (Transparenz- und 
Publizitätsgesetz)" to download at http: //www. bmj. bund. de/media/archive/301. pdf at §134 AktG 
304 Grubaugh, Richard H. Survey of 
Global Voting Trends" 2004 at p. 14 to download at www. iirf. org (International Investors Relation Federation) 
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companies market the service comprehensively; Internet access grows, enabling users 
to get familiar with the option; and as restraints, especially from foreign investors, are 
overcome. 
Voting via the company's webpage must be differentiated from proxy voting services 
(e. g. IVOX, Institutional Shareholder Services, Automatic Data Processing). Here the 
investor is voting via the webpage of the voting service supplier, and often follows a 
voting recommendation based on the agenda according to national corporate 
governance standards like the German Corporate Governance Code. The proxy voting 
service organises the distribution of the votes to the general meetings, normally via the 
national custodian of their clients or completely electronically, especially for the Anglo- 
American States. As the authorisation of the custodian is not feasible in Germany (due 
to the retreat of some banks), proxy voting services sometimes have to rely on 
alternatives. Such alternatives are: Xchanging (formerly European Transaction Bank), 
associations like the Deutsche Schutzvereinigung für Wertpapierbesitz (DSW), others or 
proxy committees, which are provided by the issuer. 
Although it appears possible for corporations to pursue an electronic poll, and voting 
investors have the impression their vote is given directly to the company, the NaStraG 
still requires the physical presence of an intermediary at the General Meeting. One may 
have the impression that this requirement is another obstacle for the investor to make 
his ballot valid. However, it has paved the way legally for a new institution: the Proxy 
Committee. The Proxy Committee is composed of representatives of the stock 
corporation, often the notary who is not dependent on the company. Their only job is to 
accept the incoming votes and put them into the ballot box. As they do not have any 
freedom of choice, meaning they are not allowed to change a vote, a conflict of interest 
cannot arise and it is therefore legally safe305. However, it has to be made clear that 
§ 665 BGB should not be valid. According to this section, the proxy has a "duty of 
thinking things through"306. To avoid conflicts of interest in the case of new petitions, or 
the alteration of existing ones, the proxy committee should not be allowed to vote, 
according to an analogous application of § 135 s. 1 s. 2 AktG307. 
The authorisation has to be presented to the corporation. Here again the NaStraG 
altered the regulation considerably. Safekeeping of the certificate of authority by the 
company is no longer necessary. According to § 134 s. 3 s. 3 AktG, it is sufficient when 
the company is able to verify the proxy. This reform has the undisputed advantage that 
administrative work is enhanced. 
305 OLG Düsseldorf "Goldzack AG" 16U 79/02 to download at http: //www. justiz. nrw. de/RB/nrwe/olgs/duesseldorf/j2003/16_U_79_02urteil20030328. htrnl 
at No. 76 
306 Hanloser, Stefan Proxy-Voting, 
Remote-Voting und Online-HV: § 134 111 3 AktG nach dem NaStraG" in Neue Zeitschrift für Gesellschaftsrecht (NZG), 
Volume 8,27.04.2001 p. 355-358 at p. 357 
307 Zetzsche, Dirk "NaStraG - ein Schritt in Richtung Virtuelle Hauptversammlung für Namens- und Inhaberaktien" in Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht (ZIP), 
Volume 16,20.04.2001, p. 682-691 at p. 684 
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The ability to allow a proxy to safeguard the interests of the shareholder is fundamental 
to maintaining stable capital presence at the general meeting, thus avoiding accidental 
majorities. Therefore the proxy agents play an important part in corporate policy. Not 
only because they enable the administration to improve their efficiency (e. g. notice to 
the general meeting by the custodian banks) but also because they serve as a force 
which the board is able to negotiate corporate issues with. 
6.5.2.1. The Proxy Agent 
Until the renaissance of the registered share it was the almost unrestricted privilege of 
the custodian banks to act as a proxy agent in general meetings. This has changed. It is 
now possible for the registered share-offering corporation to contact the shareholder 
themselves, with the result that the banks see organised proxy voting increasingly as 
unwelcome business308. Another reason is the banks having become "exceptional 
brokers"309, as Noack describes. With the gradual retreat of the banks a vacuum of 
power has been evident. The lack of capital presence at general meetings gives proof 
that this issue has to be taken seriously. 
Shareholders have the liberty to choose a proxy. According to the prevailing opinion, 
the articles of association demand certain requirements for a proxy. Therefore it is 
possible to stipulate that the proxy himself has to be a shareholder310. Nevertheless, it is 
accepted that the exceptions cannot enhance the exercise to vote immoderately311. 
The internal relationship between the shareholder and the proxy is determined by a 
contract of agency (§ 675 BGB) or if the representation is free of charge by § 662 BGB 
(Mandate). 
6.5.2.1.1. Information Duties of the Proxy 
The voting right is not only transferred because the shareholder is not able to attend the 
general meeting personally, but also because he expects the proxy to have expert 
knowledge of the issuing company and, in the case of cross-border voting, the 
respective financial market. Consequently, as the general meeting approaches, 
information and consulting duties are conferred upon the proxy. 
Hence, it is uncontested that a proxy agent (lawyer, intermediary, shareholder 
association or other) has larger duties compared to the custodian banks. It could be 
alleged that they have, because of their predominant role in corporate policy, a superior 
308 The Volksbanken (cooperative banks) and the Sparkassen (savings banks) do not offer proxy voting to depositors anymore, others only on a regional, larger 
banks on a national, two on a global level - own research 
309 Noack, Ulrich Die internetgestützte 
Hauptversammlung" in Noack, Ulrich und Spindler, Gerald" Unternehmensrecht und Internet" Munich 2001 p. 13-35 at 
p. 22 
310Happ, Wilhelm/Brunkhorst, Heike/Zimmermann, Norbert Aktienrecht Handbuch - Mustertexte - Kommentar" Cologne, Berlin, Bonn, Munich 1995 at p. 584 
311 Ruoff, Christian "Stimmrechtsvertretung, Stimmrechtsermächtigung und Proxy-System" Munich 1999 at p. 15; Huffer, Uwe "Aktiengesetz" 6th Edition 
Munich 2004 at § 134 No. 26 
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knowledge. Therefore the prevailing opinion takes the enumeration in § 128 AktG 
exhaustively312. 
When the shareholder elects to confer full discretionary power upon the proxy, the 
latter has to execute the vote in the interest of the investor (§ 128 s. 2 s. 3 AktG). Since this 
rule does not define the voting behaviour of the proxy satisfactorily, the latter's 
responsibility is applied more properly when assuming that, he has to act in the interest 
of the average shareholder313, with an aim to solid growth over an appropriate interest 
and course rate314. 
Besides information and consulting duties, the proxy also bears the responsibility of an 
inquiry. This is particularly the case when he intends to use the vote in an atypical and 
particularly venturesome manner - e. g. blocking resolutions which were instigated by 
the management315. 
6.5.2.1.2. The Custodian Banks 
The custodian vote of the banks remains one of the most contentious issues in Company 
Law. This derives from a number of facts regarding the function of the banks as a credit 
institute, as a custodian bank and as an investment bank. This discord gives credence to 
the accusations of critics316 when it comes to involvement of custodian banks in the 
issuer's business. The uncoupling of capital risk (granted credits, own investments) and 
influence potential contains the danger that the custodian votes, in doubtful cases, are 
not exercised in the interest of the shareholder. This is even more probable when the 
custodian bank has interests in the company. Here, relations between the issuing 
company and the custodian bank in its function as a creditor are often the stumbling 
block317. 
Clearly the custodian bank has conflicting interests. On the one hand it has to represent 
investors with the objective of increasing shareholder value (e. g. higher dividends, 
lower interest rates), while on the other hand they must also consider any credits given 
to the issuer. Their aim is a good creditworthiness (which could mean lower dividends 
for higher interest rates). 
312 Henssler, Martin "Verhaltenspflichten bei der Ausübung von Aktienstimmrechten durch Bevollmächtigte" in Zeitschrift für das gesamte Handels- und 
Wirtschaftsrecht (ZHR) Volume 157,1993 p. 91-124 at p. 99 
313 Geßler, Ernst/Eckardt, Ulrich/Hefermehl, Wofgang/Kropff, Bruno Aktiengesetz" 
Volume II §§ 76-147, Munich 1974 at § 128 No. 50 (Eckardt) 
314 Wolfgang Zöllner (Editor) "Kölner Kommentar zum Aktiengesetz" 2nd Edition, Cologne 1988 at § 128 No. 16 
315 Henssler, Martin "Verhaltenspflichten bei der Ausübung von Aktienstimmrechten durch Bevollmächtigte" in Zeitschrift für das gesamte Handels- und 
Wirtschaftsrecht (ZHR) Volume 157,1993 p. 91-124 at p. 101 
316 Fraune, Christian Der 
Einfluss institutioneller Anleger in der Hauptversammlung" Berlin 1996 from p. 35ff; Schmidt, ThomasMacht der Banken" Friedrich 
Ebert Stiftung, Bonn 1995 to download at http: //library. fes. de/fulltext/fo-wirtschaft/00366toc. htm from p. 27ff; Tuerks, Robin A. "Depotstimmrechtspraxis versus 
U S. _pro -sý stem: 
der Beitrag von Finanzintermediären zur Optimierung der Unternehmenskontrolle" Munich 2000 from p. 25ff; Hoffmann, Jochen "Systeme der 
Stimnuechtsvertretung in der Publikumsgesellschaft" Baden-Baden 1999 from p. 23ff 
317 Fraune, Christian Der 
Einfluss institutioneller Anleger in der Hauptversammlung" Berlin 1996 from p. 36ff 
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Further conflicts of interest occur during the initial public offering business. Again the 
bank of issue is interested in achieving high commissions, while the shareholders prefer 
to see easier financing terms. 
Friction also arises from manpower policies as the supervisory boards usually have a 
number of bank representatives, leading to doubts with regard to discharges, bank 
financed takeovers318 and objectivity with respect to management interweaving. 
Another point of criticism arises when looking at the attitude of the custodian banks 
regarding their participation in voting at general meetings of weak performers, 
especially in the former Neuer Markt Index. Although a number of depositors decided 
to leave their proxies with their bank, the latter refused to work out proposals. It is 
assumed that the custodians feared enormous costs regarding corporate governance, 
bad publicity, and contributing to the total breakdown of the company. The custodian 
bank has to provide its own suggestions to the shareholder, per § 128 s. 2 s. 1 AktG, if it 
intends to offer proxy voting. Unfortunately, the wording of this provision is vague, 
allowing room for interpretation. For instance, an own suggestion could also be advice 
to vote according to management recommendations. 
Nevertheless, in an important moment the banks refused to play their part in the 
corporate governance system. At general meetings of struggling start-up companies the 
shareholder relies on proposals by his custodian bank, which the latter does not 
provide. Usually, other major shareholders do not take up the initiative to cover the 
bank's role, and a lack of corporate governance occurs. 
These arguments are emphasised by the fact that custodian banks (own shares, 
investment subsidiaries and custodian votes) control on average 80% of the votes at an 
AGM. 
The banks, however, are often unfairly accused of abusing their power, when 
considering the number of administrated votes and their field of agitation. Apart from 
the proxy voting services, they are almost the only responsible and competent partners 
in conversations for corporate policy. Hence, they do not only function as a stabilising 
but also as an accidental majority-preventing factor319. Furthermore, because of their 
professional education, bankers on supervisory boards are seen as even more efficient 
regarding corporate governance than major shareholders320. Additionally, the custodian 
vote is often the only reasonable possibility for the holder of widely diversified shares 
to participate in corporate policy making. 
318 e. g. With the attempt of a hostile take-over of Thyssen AG by Krupp AG the Deutsche Bank placed consulting and capital 
for Krupp's disposal, although they 
had a member in the supervisory board of Thyssen. More detailed: Tuerks, 
Robin A. "Depotstimmrechtspraxis versus U. S. -proxy-system: der Beitrag von 
Finanzintermediären zur Optimierung der Unternehmenskontrolle" Munich 2000 from p. 33ff 
319 Obermüller, Werner, Winden Die Hauptversammlung 
der Aktiengesellschaft" revised by Butzke, Volker 4th Edition Stuttgart 2001 at p. 191 
320 Teichmann, Christoph Corporate 
Governance in Europa" in Zeitschrift für Unternehmens- und Gesellschaftsrecht (ZGR) September 2001 30. Volume number 
5 p. 645-679 at p. 653 
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Given these facts it is quite surprising that custodian banks only get limited 
compensation for their work which does not even cover their expenses. Their payments 
are for covering their costs with the distribution of notifications (§ 128 s. 6 No. 2 AktG in 
conjunction with the "Decree to Compensate Expanses of Credit Institutes"), and for the 
distribution of additional material, e. g. quarterly reports (via an agreement between the 
banks and the industry). Further payments to custodian banks do not exist; there is no 
hidden fee in the costs for the securities account. 
The proxy system with the custodian banks has a long tradition, not only the system 
itself but also discussion of this issue. In the reasoning of the German Stock Corporation 
Act 1937 it is stated: 
"Among the most disputed issues in public is the proxy vote of the custodian banks"321. 
Already in 1892 the Supreme Court of the German Reich authorised the proxy voting 
system322. Based on this decision, Hoffmann states that the banks developed a system in 
order to promote proxy voting in an enlarged framework323. With the growing 
economic power of the banks their influence in stock corporations increased, with 
accompanying criticism. 
Under the Stock Corporation Act of 1937, the proxy voting system of the custodian 
banks was regulated for the first time. With some exceptions this draft outlines the 
actual Stock Corporation Act. One of the basic ideas of this regulation was to maintain 
the influence of small rather than large shareholders. This should guarantee equilibrium 
between these two fractions, which was thought to be well preserved using the proxy 
voting system of the custodian banks324. 
With ongoing economic recovery during the post-war period people were able to build 
up small but considerable assets. Again it were also the banks which were the 
beneficiaries of this up turn. Hence, their position in the German economy was further 
extended. The result was new regulations in the Stock Corporation Act of 1965325, where 
the duty of information between the shareholder and the custodian bank was enhanced. 
Also transparency was improved and the duration of the proxy was limited to fifteen 
months. This discussion has received fresh impetus with the introduction of the 
KonTraG 1998 and the NaStraG 2001. 
321 Tuerks, Robin A. " Depotstimmrechtspraxis versus U. S. -proxy-system: der Beitrag von Finanzintermediären zur Optimierung 
der Unternehmenskontrolle" 
Munich 2000 at p. 1 
322 Amtliche Sammlung der Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichtes in Zivilsachen (RGZ) - decisions of the supreme court in civil law Volume 30 p. 51ff 
323 Hoffmann, Jochen "Systeme der Stimmrechtsvertretung in der Publikumsgesellschaft" Baden-Baden 1999 at p. 23 
324 Hoffmann, Jochen "Systeme der Stimmrechtsvertretung in der Publikumsgesellschaft" Baden-Baden 1999 at p. 23 
325 Tuerks, Robin A. " Depotstimmrechtspraxis versus U. S. -proxy-system: 
der Beitrag von Finanzintermediären zur Optimierung der Unternehmenskontrolle" 
Munich 2000 at p. 1 
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On account of the number of votes the banks represent they have to recognise their 
special responsibility towards the depositor and the corporation when working out 
proposals. Here the KonTraG makes allowances for separating working proposals for 
the general meeting from own business interests; disclosure of personal and business 
interests with the corporation326; and custody scrutiny from the banking supervision327. 
In addition to that the NaStraG has repealed the duration of the proxy of fifteen months 
and renounced the written conferral328. 
A condition for carrying out the vote on behalf of the shareholder is the information 
disclosure in the lead up to a meeting and the presentation of proposals. The passing on 
of materials of the company for the general meeting is compulsory (bearer shares), but 
the bank does not have to present any proposals if it does not intend to offer proxy 
voting329. However, if a customer has own proposals to the general meeting the 
representing bank is obliged to act on his behalf. 
An important factor in reducing intensive costs associated with the general meeting is 
the option to confer a substitute authorisation (§ 135 s. 3 AktG). Especially with 
regionally active stock corporations this proceeding is even advisable, as the corporate 
policy might contain local aspects. In addition to that, it is possible to combine forces of 
different banks, shareholder associations or proxy voting agents. Nevertheless, 
proposals suggested previously have to be taken into account. 
A point at issue is the demand of the investor to file an application330. Of course, the 
support of this shareholder right seems to be obvious when looking at the proxy voting 
practice of the banks. However, this approach has to be rejected. Firstly, a petitioner has 
to show his engagement in the corporate policy. Secondly, misunderstandings with the 
argumentation in the general meeting become most possible. The risk for the bank to be 
sued or the corporation to be met with an annulment action by an unsatisfied 
shareholder is too unpredictable. 
Often petitions are altered during the general meeting. Here a change of the vote by the 
bank is still covered if it acted in the interest of the shareholder. A far narrower frame is 
set when the bank wants to alter its own petitions. According to § 135 s. 5 AktG this is 
possible when new facts or occurrences have arisen so that the bank can argue that their 
behaviour to change their initial petition is in the interest of the shareholder. As a 
consequence, the credit institute has to justify its deviation from the original authority 
to the shareholder. There is no special formal requirement for this determined by the 
law. In addition to that, an offence against the interests of the shareholder is only 
326 § 128 s. 2 AktG 
327 § 30 s. 1 s. 2 KWG 
328 § 135 s. 2 AktG 
329 Especially with the start-up companies in the (former) Neuer Markt the banks were very unobtrusive 
330 Obermüller, Werner, Winden Die Hauptversammlung 
der Aktiengesellschaft" revised by Butzke, Volker 4th Edition Stuttgart 2001 at p. 197; Huffer, Uwe 
on the "Aktiengesetz" 
6th Edition Munich 2004 at § 128 No. 10 
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contestable internally and not towards the company. However, it is difficult, if not 
impossible, for the shareholder to prove that he suffered financial damage following the 
behaviour of the bank331. 
It is also necessary to mention the hidden proxy of the custodian banks. Under these 
circumstances the credit institute does not disclose the identity of the shareholder. It is 
sufficient to prove the authorisation. 
Additionally, recent reforms of § 135 s. 2 AktG, have enabled the credit institute to offer 
permanent authorisation requiring that it annually informs investors of the possibility 
of retraction or other ways to be represented (e. g. shareholder associations). 
6.5.2.1.3. The Intermediaries - Towards a Global Proxy Voting and Advisory Service 
Although the share of proxies financial intermediaries represent is already quite 
considerable332, it can be expected that with the retreat of the custodian banks333, their 
influence will increase proportionally. In future they will become the determining part 
in corporate policy. In this context it needs to be pointed out that an "Acting in 
Concert" according to § 35 s. 1 s. 1 WpÜG must be avoided. This paragraph binds the 
shareholder who has the control over the voting rights (30%) to present a takeover 
proposal. In a number of cases this threshold is not without the limits of a global active 
proxy. Hence, he needs to be aware not to give a binding vote recommendation, which 
is for instance the case when the investor has automated the voting process based on 
the policy of the proxy334. Ina ruling335 the BGH narrowed down the limits of acting in 
concert. The court stated that in the case of a supervisory board election acting in 
concert is not applicable. Similarly the Oberlandesgericht Frankfurt336 decided that the 
conditions for acting in concert are only met when a conscious practiced collaboration is 
given. 
Other factors than the retreat of the custodians also foster the growth in importance of 
the intermediates337. Firstly, they can promote their service independently. Especially 
Anglo-American investors assess this point as significant. This assumption is reinforced 
by the relatively poor capital presence in general meetings of companies with a high 
share of foreign investors338. Therefore it is probable that the proxy voting service will 
adjust itself internationally, which will give it the best possible utilisation of its 
customers' holdings. 
331 Very comprehensive on the internal relation between the custodian bank and the depot customer: Busse, Andreas Depotstimmrecht der Banken" Wiesbaden 
1962 p. 87-96 
332 e. g. Proxies represented by ISS at the 2004 AGM of Siemens: 20,4% of the capital being present 
333 Noack, Ulrich/Spindler, Gerald" Unternehmensrecht und Internet" Munich 2001 at p. 22 
334 Schneider, Uwe H. /Anziger, Heribert M. Institutionelle 
Stimmrechtsberatung und Stimmrechtsvertretung - A quit guru's enormous clout" in Neue 
Zeitschrift für Gesellschaftsrecht (NZG), No. 3,2007 pp. 88-96 at p. 93 
335 BGH II ZR 137/05 
336 OLG Frankfurt a. M. Az. WpÜG 5/03a (25.06.2004) in to download at http: //www. hefam. de/urt2O/WPUEG503A. htmi 
337 Juschus, Alexander - Working Paper for the Finance Committee of the German Parliament "Standards für Finanzintermediäre" 2002 at p. 4 
338 See Figure 29: Shareholder Structure of Selected Stock Corporations 2004 
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Figure 21: Institutional Investors on the Influence and Accuracy of Proxy Advisory 
Firms339 
Influence on all voting issues 
Growth of influence on all voting issues 
Influence in connection with governance 
matters 
Accuracy of advice given to shareholders 
These voting services are capable of concentrating on a target group. As they do not 
need to represent every private shareholder like the custodian banks, they can serve 
institutional and corporate investors exceptionally we11340. This does not only enhance 
their effectiveness but also improves investor relations. Moreover, with the integration 
of other services like class action tracking, vote disclosure, voting results, corporate 
governance rating, or most importantly, voting recommendations, they can represent 
themselves as the omnipotent corporate governance service. Consequently, they are not 
only capable of functioning as a balance to the custodian banks, but of superseding 
them in a number of fields with respect to corporate action. 
Voting services generate the ballots for the general meeting from the information they 
receive from the custodian, the investment company, the issuer, or from official sources 
like the Bundesanzeiger in Germany. Having received the necessary data, they 
customise it for each client and transfer it to the voting platform. The person who is 
entitled to vote, usually the fund manager, now views not only the agenda of the 
meeting on his screen but also his holdings, and if available, voting recommendations 
or research. He may cast his vote and send it to the proxy voting service. The latter puts 
it in an accepted ballot format (most often Email or SWIFT) and distributes the votes 
electronically via ADP or comparable systems, custodian banks and other 
intermediaries (e. g. registrar), or proxy committees, to the general meetings. The fund 
manager subsequently receives the information that his vote has been delivered 
successfully. 
339 Grubaugh, Richard H. Survey of 
Global Voting Trends" 2004 at p. 9 to download at www. iirf. org (International Investors Relation Federation) 
340 Steiger, Max Institutionelle 
Investoren im Spannungsfeld zwischen Aktienmarktliquidität und Corporate Governance" Baden-Baden 1999 at p. 73 
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Figure 22: Tasks Taken over from a Custodian by a Proxy Voting Service341 
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In contrast to the custodian bank the legal ground of the intermediate is exclusively 
based on the contract of agency according to §§ 675,665 BGB. 
A crucial point for the intermediate is the question of finance. As the intermediate 
cannot raise custodian fees and will also not receive refunds for the distribution of the 
materials for the general meeting, he is dependent on other sources. 
Two possibilities are likely. Firstly, the intermediate can raise a charge towards the 
company, which depends on the amount of the votes handed in. It should be pointed 
out that, unfortunately, such a solution implies the risk of a conflict of interest where 
the intermediate also offers voting recommendations. 
Alternatively the investor pays the intermediate. As he cannot expect to represent 
private shareholders, they have to receive compensation from institutional 
shareholders. This system has the advantage that the intermediate does not need to be 
concerned with national characteristic features with regard to Company Law. 
Additionally, the group of institutional investors would be more open to other 
products, like corporate governance analysis, corporate governance ratings or 
publication services. Under this method the intermediate would avoid any accusations 
of a conflict of interest. Due to § 135 s. 9 AktG the proxy acts permanently for the 
investor. 
341 GPD (Global Proxy Distribution) selling document from Institutional Shareholder Services 
This figure shows the tasks taken over from a custodian by a proxy voting service. The first task is the procurement work (all meeting information and relevant 
holdings of the investor), which is described on the top. This information is provided to the institutional investor via the voting platform (bottom left). The 
institution instructs the voting service via the electronic voting platform. When this has happened the voting service sends blocking instructions to the custodian, 
respectively subcustodians. 
The vote is send to the relevant custodian. Finally a report is produced that the vote has been delivered according to the shareholder's 
instruction (bottom center). 
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In summary, although the developing business of the intermediaries/ proxy agents is 
capable of countering the dominance of the custodian banks internationally, and may 
stabilise declining capital presence, their existence will rise and fall with their 
acceptance among the institutional investors and with the costs involved. 
6.5.2.1.4. Shareholder Associations 
Shareholder associations342 also offer proxy voting to shareholders. However, in 
contrast to the enormous share of proxies with custodian banks, their fraction is 
considerably modest343 with less than one percent (excluding employee associations). 
Although their influence on a ballot basis seems negligible, their role, especially in the 
general meeting, has to be assessed as being substantial. In general, legitimate criticism 
of the company respectively the management board is mostly generated through these 
shareholder associations as well as fund managers. Depending on the interest group 
they are representing, they make contributions to topics like increasing shareholder 
value, the situation of women in the corporation, environmental activities and 
recruitment policies towards handicapped persons. However, as they are associations 
for special interest groups and are not geared solely towards an economic existence, it is 
to be expected that their share with proxies will not increase. 
6.5.2.1.5. Employee Shareholders 
Another point to put into perspective is the interest of employees' shares in certain 
companies344. As they are in a position to form an association for the general meeting, 
their influence could be remarkable. Thus, they could be a serious opposition towards 
the management. For instance the Deutsche Bank has employee shareholders worth 
11%, while the overall employee numbers at the general meeting is more than 30%. 
Hence, the perfect association of Deutsche Bank employees could be able to block 
important decisions by the management. Unfortunately, most of the employees have 
their shares in the custody of a bank, which offers special conditions for employees of 
certain companies (e. g. no charge for the custody of Daimler-Chrysler employee 
shareholders at the Deutsche Bank). Consequently, the proxies are also given to the 
bank or the vote is simply not executed. 
According to § 135 s. 9 No. 1 AktG the period of the proxy is conditionally permanent. 
342 e. g. Deutsche Schutzvereinigung für Wertpapierbesitz (German Protective Association for the Possession of Securities) at www. dsw-info. de 
343 Tuerks, Robin A. " Depotstimmrechtspraxis versus U. S. -proxy-system: der Beitrag von Finanzintermediären zur Optimierung der Unternehmenskontrolle" 
Munich 2000 at p. 26 
344 see Figure 29: Shareholder Structure of Selected Stock Corporations 2004 
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6.5.2.1.6. Other Intermediaries 
Other intermediaries include lawyers, tax accountants and private individuals. In 
general they act for a small number of larger investors. Nevertheless, as they rarely 
work out proposals they could rather be assessed as being messengers. Regarding the 
fact that they do not offer proxy voting on a commercial basis (it cannot be assumed 
that lawyers or tax accountants offer proxy voting as business) the proxy is delegated to 
them only for a single case and not permanently. 
6.5.2.1.7. The Problem with the Dependant Proxy Committee 
A point at issue is the role of Proxy Committees345 who are dependent on the stock 
corporation. Their job is to accept incoming votes, in the form of fax, E-mail, SWIFT 
message, the companies' own online voting system, or whatever the issuer's articles of 
association provides, and places them into the ballot box. Thus, they function as the 
extended arm of investors who are not able to attend the meeting personally or cannot 
send a representative, but have, or feel, the obligation to vote. Generally the proxy 
committee consists of members of the investor relations departments, Company 
Lawyers, but mostly notaries346. It must not contain members of the management. 
The prevalent opinion of the literature, including Huffer and Zöllner, pleads that a 
representation of votes by the stock corporation or its executive body is not possibleT7. 
This is also valid for a company established to accept proxies348. This derives from an 
exemption, which is made by § 135 s. 1 s. 2 AktG, that the custodian bank is allowed to 
carry out the proxy in its own general meeting. Prohibition would bear the danger that 
competing custodian banks could push through uncomfortable decisions. Regarding 
this exception it has to be assumed that the legislator intended to ban any self- 
representation, which is contrary to the understanding of corporate governance. Even if 
the scope of the proxy was limited to the utmost, still a danger of abuse would exist. 
Representation by a certain member of the corporation349 is judged differently. Here the 
opinions are unanimous, if the delegation concerns only isolated cases. 
Nevertheless, particularly since the introduction of online voting via the company's 
web page, discussion has been rife. A number of issuers offering this service to their 
345 Recommended by the Deutscher Corporate Governance Kodex to download at http: //www. corporate-governance- 
code. de/eng/download/DCG_K_E200305. pdf at 2.3.3 (English Version) 
346 The role of the notary is comprehensively described by: OLG Düsseldorf "Goldzack AG" 16U 79/02 to download at 
http: / / www. justiz. nrw. de/ RB/ nrwe/ olgs/ duesseldorf/j2003/ 16_U_79_02urteil20030328. html 
347 Huffer, Uwe on the "Aktiengesetz" 6th Edition Munich 2004 at § 13 No. 25; Zöllner, Wolfgang (Editor) in "Kölner Kommentar zum Aktiengesetz" 2nd 
Edition, Cologne 1988 at § 135 No. 73; other opinion LG Stuttgart in Die Aktiengesellschaft (AG) 1974 at p. 260 
348 LG Baden-Baden in Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht (ZIP) 1998 p. 1308-1313 at p. 1310; OLG Karlsruhe Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht (ZIP) 1999 p. 750-754 at 
p. 750 
349 Huffer, Uwe "Aktiengesetz" 6th Edition Munich 2004 at § 13 No. 25; Hoffmann, Jochen "Systeme der Stimmrechtsvertretung in der Publikumsgesellschaft" 
Baden-Baden 1999 at p. 77 
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shareholders put in a representative who accepted the online votes and deposited them 
in the ballot box350. This issue is crucial as, on the one hand the NaStraG demands a 
representative at the general meeting, and on the other hand this procedure comes close 
to the representation of the company or its executive body mentioned above. However, 
this concept is actually a courier service rather than proxy representation. The 
shareholder votes on his screen by clicking a number of buttons before he sends his 
explicit vote to the server of the company (Fax or hard copy proxy card are also an 
option). Hence, the representative has no influence over the vote for his own or other 
reasons. Unfortunately, the institution of a messenger is not possible in Company 
Law351, yet the company has almost no other choice. If it decides to appoint a third 
person the problem of an inadmissible representative will occur. However, as Noack 
and Spindler recognise the danger of a self-representation, self-control is not topical 
with this constitution352. Therefore there is no reason to prohibit this proxy voting 
system, as long as the representative has no decision right. 
Since the introduction of the proxy committee, it proved to be a successful tool to 
encounter the decreasing interest in voting. Now it is discussed to make the 
introduction of an independent proxy committee legally compulsory353 and not to leave 
it dispositive to the statutes of the company. 
Yet to be settled is the question of the period over which the proxy is assigned to the 
representative. To protect the interests of the shareholder the authorisation should only 
be valid for a single vote. As the Stock Corporation Act does not state a position on this 
issue, it is argued that due to the period required in § 134 s. 3 s. 3 AktG, the legislator 
acknowledges the proxy only for the single case354. This is also valid for proxies 
appointed by the company, although they might be subjected to § 135 s. 9 AktG. This is 
a logical consequence. It would be implausible to say on the one side that proxy voting 
via the company's administration is only legally incontestable in the case of an explicit 
proxy and on the other side to accept it durably. 
6.5.2.2. Questions of Liability in the Shareholder - Proxy Relationship 
In the first instance it is important to mention that the investor does not have the right 
to file an appeal against resolutions, according to § 243 s. 1 and s. 2 AktG, which arose 
because the proxy breached his duty of the internal relationship with the shareholder355. 
350 e. g. Deutsche Bank AG, DaimlerChrysler AG, Deutsche Telekom AG 
351 Noack, Ulrich/Spindler, Gerald "Unternehmensrecht und Internet" Munich 2001 at p. 22 
352 Noack, Ulrich/Spindler, Gerald "Unternehmensrecht und Internet" Munich 2001 at p. 25 
353 Klubs, Hannes Präsenzboni 
für die Teilnahme an der Hauptversammlung - Ein Vorschlag zur Steigerung der Hauptversammlungspräsenz bei 
Aktiengesellschaften" 2005; Paper No. 124 to download at http: //publikationen. ub. uni-frankfurt. de/volltexte/2005/2335/pdf/l24Aufsatz_pm. pdf at p. 2 
354 Noack, Ulrich Stimmrechtsvertretung 
in der Hauptversammlung nach NaStraG" in Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht (ZIP) 2001 p. 57-63 at p. 62 
355 Tuerks, Robin Depotstimmrecht versus 
US. -proxy-system: der Beitrag von Finanzintermediären zur Optimierung der Untemehmenskontrolle` Munich 2000 
atp. 13 
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This is emphasised by the requirement that only shareholders stating their protest while 
attending the general meeting in person, are entitled to take this course of law 
(§ 245 No. 1 AktG)356. 
Having said that, it has to be mentioned that with regard to the question of liability in 
the shareholder-proxy relationship two possibilities are provided by the law: 
contractual and offence. The great difficulty for the shareholder is not only to assert 
damage but also to show the causality and the infringement of interest357. While the 
small private shareholder will probably struggle to assert damage because the 
custodian bank or shareholder association did not vote according to his instruction, the 
institutional or major investor will probably have difficulties to show that his proxy 
infringed his interest. This derives from the assumption that the latter had a good 
reason not to follow the instruction and covered himself as the voting approached. 
According to Kropff, the liability of the credit institute stated in § 135 s. 11 AktG, has 
more of an academic background, and should prevent an exclusion in the custodians' 
general terms and conditions (not in those of the associations and others) 358. 
Nevertheless, a proxy infringement by a custodian bank could be treated as an 
administrative offence359 and pursued by the banking supervision. Accordingly, it 
should be mentioned that an administrative consequence of infringing a proxy by an 
intermediate is a dilemma yet to be solved. 
6.5.2.2.1. Contractual Liability 
However, the shareholder might seek compensation based on contractual liability. This 
right is granted to the investor in § 280 s. 1 BGB. The problems he will face have been 
stated above, and it is generally thought to be extremely difficult for the shareholder to 
succeed on this course of law against the proxy360. 
6.5.2.2.2. Liability out of an Offence 
Another possibility is to make the proxy liable because of an offence. Here the 
shareholder could assert compensation according to § 823 II BGB, which states that the 
proxy must have infringed a protective law. Whether § 135 AktG is such a protective 
law is a point at issue361. The question is where does this provision have a protective 
356 Hoffmann-Becking, Michael Münchner 
Handbuch des Gesellschaftsrechts" Volume 4- Aktiengesellschaft, 2nd Edition, Munich 1999 at § 39 No. 62 
357 Geßler, Ernst/Eckardt, Ulrich/Hefermehl, Wofgang/Kropff, Bruno Aktiengesetz" 
Volume II §§ 76-147, Munich 1974 at § 135 No. 131 (Eckardt) 
358 Geßler, Ernst/Eckardt, Ulrich/Hefermehl, Wofgang/Kropff, Bruno Aktiengesetz" 
Volume II §§ 76-147, Munich 1974 at § 135 No. 132 (Eckardt) 
359 § 405 s. 3 No. 4 and 5 AktG 
360 A research did not show any rulings, which indicate that a suit has been filed on conditions yet. 
361 In support of § 135 AktG as a protective law: 
Geßler, Ernst/Eckardt, Ulrich/Hefermehl, Wofgang/Kropff, Bruno Aktiengesetz" 
Volume II §§ 76-147, Munich 1974 at § 135 No. 131 (Eckardt), Tuerks, Robin 
Depotstimmrecht 
versus US. -proxy-system: der Beitrag von Finanzintermediären zur Optimierung der Unternehmenskontrolle" Munich 2000 at p. 14 
Against: J. von 
Staudingers Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch mit Einführungsgesetz und Nebengesetzen", Second Book - Law of Obligations §§ 823- 
825, Thirteenth Revision 1999 by Hager, Johannes at § 823 G43 
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feature362 justifying a compensation case following its violation? The discussion is left 
open since, because of the difficulties mentioned above it would only be of theoretical 
nature. 
A further possibility to make the proxy liable could be through § 826 BGB. Condition in 
this case is that the proxy has intentionally caused an immoral damage. This is for 
instance the case when the proxy has approvingly accepted impairment of the 
represented shareholders. 
For good reason the legislator repealed UMAG § 117 s. 7 No. 1 AktG, which provided 
that the shareholder was not liable to compensate the damage he caused with the 
execution of his vote. This norm was interpreted restrictively, as in severe cases, 
§ 826 BGB is applicable363. 
The Federal High Court ruled that an offence against good customs (according to 
§ 826 BGB) is made when the execution of the vote bears no relation to the purpose. 
This approach is heavily criticised as being too restrictive364 as it might lead to 
punishing minority shareholders, which cannot be the idea of the legislation. The 
voting conduct should be determined by entrepreneurial thinking, which naturally 
includes certain risks, rather than by addressing the question of potential liability. 
6.5.2.3. Liability towards Third Party Shareholders365 
It is also true that the instructing shareholder and his proxy are liable towards third 
party shareholders. 
The third party shareholder is in the first instance dependent on an appeal against the 
resolution366 he intends to challenge. Hence, the mentioned liability provisions are 
secondary courses of action. 
The represented investor might be liable (via § 280 s. 1 BGB) towards third party 
shareholders because he instructed his proxy and used him as a vicarious agent 
(§ 278 BGB)367, subject to the condition that the proxy has caused a damage in fulfilment 
of his obligation to his investor. Liability could also be accepted if the shareholder has 
to take the responsibility for culpable impossibility. 
However, most probably the investor will have difficulties proving that he has suffered 
damage. 
362 This assumption is also supported by the BGH in Der 
Betrieb" (DB) 1992 p. 1673ff 
363 J. von Staudingers Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch mit Einführungsgesetz und Nebengesetzen", 
Second Book - Law of Obligations §§ 826-829, 
Thirteenth Revision 1998 by Oechsler, Jürgen at § 826 No. 282 
364 J. von Staudingers Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch mit Einführungsgesetz und Nebengesetzen", 
Second Book - Law of Obligations §§ 826-829, 
Thirteenth Revision 1998 by Oechsler, Jürgen at § 826 No. 288; Henssler, Martin "Verhaltenspflichten bei der Ausübung von Aktienstimmrechten durch 
Bevollmächtigte" in Zeitschrift für das gesamte Handels- und Wirtschaftsrecht (ZHR) Volume 157,1993 p. 91-124 at p. 123f 
365 Shareholders, which are outside the contractual proxy-shareholder relationship 
366 § 243 s. 1 AktG 
367 Henssler, Martin "Verhaltenspflichten bei der Ausübung von Aktienstimmrechten durch Bevollmächtigte" in ZHR Zeitschrift für das gesamte Handels- und 
Wirtschaftsrecht Volume 157,1993 p. 91-124 at p. 111 
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The BGH (Federal High Court) also did not accept a liability in the Law of Obligations 
of the proxy towards third party shareholders. Only if the proxy used his voting right 
"für den, den es angeht" (for that party, whose concern it is) and he did not reveal the 
principal, is he liable via § 179 s. 1 BGB368. 
Finally, liability through a breach of § 826 BGB, covered under 'The Questions of 
Liability in the Shareholder - Proxy Relationship" may be used by third party 
shareholders. However, in this respect it is necessary to mention that professional 
liability does not exist, as Henssler points out369. 
As a result, the conclusion which must be drawn is that infringement of a proxy is only 
sanctioned in the area of an administrative offence and breach of loyalty. The sanction 
between the shareholder and his representative is only of theoretical nature. 
6.5.2.4. Validity of the Vote 
Once the proxy has given his vote contrary to the agreements with the shareholder, the 
question arises whether this vote is still valid. For reasons of legal security this has to be 
answered in the affirmative370. It would not be comprehensible to make resolutions of 
the general meeting contestable because of deficiencies in the relationship between the 
shareholder and his proxy, which, in addition, are not in the sphere of influence of the 
company371. This detail was recognised by the legislator, who did not acknowledge the 
power of contestability for the shareholder in § 245 AktG. The last option for the 
investor (or a third party) would only be to file a contradiction in the general meeting. 
However, a shareholder who authorises a proxy will probably not obtain information 
about his behaviour before the end of the meeting. The legal requirements are 
aggravated by the prerequisite that the vote had to be decisive for the resolution to be 
accepted. 
The same is valid for shortcomings with legal justifications. If the proxy votes without 
being authorised by the shareholder, the latter is only entitled to file an action when he, 
or a third party, files a contradiction against the resolution. 
6.5.2.5. Conclusion of the Proxy Agent Issue 
As a conclusion it would be extremely interesting to trace the developments of the 
proxy agent sector. With the retreat of the custodian banks it is probable that 
commercial intermediates will fill the gap. Since they are in the position to act 
368 Bundesgerichtshof (Federal High Court), Ruling from 20.03.1995 - II ZR 205/94 
369 Henssler, Martin "Verhaltenspflichten bei der Ausübung von Aktienstimmrechten durch Bevollmächtigte" in ZHR Zeitschrift für das gesamte Handels- und 
Wirtschaftsrecht Volume 157,1993 p. 91-124 at p. 122f 
370 Ruoff, Christian: "Stimmrechtsvertretung, Stimmrechtsermächtigung und Proxy-System" Munich 1999 at p. 54 
371 Hoffmann-Becking, Michael "Münchner Handbuch des Gesellschaftsrecht - Band 4 Aktiengesellschaft" 
2nd Edition Munich 1999 at § 38 No. 62 (Semler) 
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efficiently and hence more profitable, intermediates could become a force to be 
reckoned with. Naturally, it is essential for them to solve the problem of financing, and 
to gain the confidence of both stock corporations and investors to become successful 
players. 
Ongoing globalisation will also have impacts. Hopefully, the EU-Commission's Action 
Plan on modernising Company Law and enhancing corporate governance and the 
resulting Directive will set necessary standards for the member states, as the issue of the 
proxy voting agent is capable of improving corporate governance and the control and 
quality of international capital flow. 
6.5.3. Aspects of Cross-Border Voting 
With regard to capital presence in general meetings it is peculiar that although foreign 
investors' interest is considerable for shares, especially in the DAX (e. g. 2004: Adidas 
84%, Deutsche Börse 2004: 59% - 2005: 77%)372, the rights that accompany the property 
of the shares seem rarely to be practised. Figures 23 (German institutional investors) 
and 24 (global institutional investors) offer prove for this phenomenon. 
Figure 23: German Kapitalanlagegesellschaften which Safeguard their Cross-Border 
Voting Right373 
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Figure 24: Global Institutional Investors which Safeguard their Voting Right374 
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372 see Figure 29: Shareholder Structure of Selected Stock Corporations 2004 
373 Survey of the DSW - Deutsche Schutzvereinigung für Wertpapierbesitz among 
German Kapitalanlagegesellschaften, 2004 to download at v%, vN, w. ds", - 
info. de/DSW-FonLisumfrage. 442.0. htnd#698 
374 Grubaugh, Richard H. Survey of 
Global Voting Trends" 2004 at p. 32 to download at wv%wtiw. iirf. org (International Investors Relation Federation) 
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There are a number of reasons for this trend. First, the vast amount of different 
regulations375 can be identified. Although numerous markets make considerable efforts 
to make voting easier still the variety of rules serves as an excuse. (E. g. Blocking and 
record date markets, requirement of re-registration of the shares prior to the meeting) 
Furthermore, the insufficient flow of information between custodians, investment funds 
or other institutions could make voting more difficult as well. Still, especially small 
stock corporations only provide AGM material in the local language. 
In Germany, it could also be assumed that investors see voting more as a necessary evil 
(and consequently keep it on a minimum) rather than an opportunity to promote 
fiduciary responsibility or to express satisfaction and dissatisfaction with the 
management of the company. 
Figure 25 provides prove for this assumption by pointing out the shortcomings in 
detail. 
In any case, it is astonishing that stock jobbing takes a practically normal course, while 
shareholder rights give the investor a number of problems. 
375 The vast variety of different legal systems in the 
EU is presented in Baums, Theodor "Shareholder Representation and Proxy Voting in the European Union" 
in Hopt/Wymeersch "Comperative Corporate Governance" 1997 to download at www. jura. uni-osnabrueck. 
de/institut/hwr/papers. htm 
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Figure 25: Obstacles for Executing the Cross-Border Voting Right376 
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Appointing a proxy for the meeting 
Small size of most investors' holdings 
The need for beneficial owners' authority 
Stock lending 
We have no voting policy 
3,5 
4,1 
3,6 
8 
2,1 
3,4 
3,2 
2,3 
2, 
2,5 
2,6 
3,5 
3 
172,1 
,9 
012345 
Out of five investors 
As the title suggests, cross border voting describes action of voting rights of the global 
shareholder, without national barriers. 
In a first step the European Union had therefore introduced an Expert Group on 
Company Law, which also investigated aspects of Cross-Border Voting, chaired by Jaap 
Winter (Henceforth "The Winter Committee")377, to suggest methods of harmonising 
the systems. In addition to that a special Cross-Border Voting Group has conducted its 
own consultation process and presented its final report in September 2002378 
The suggestions made by the EU Expert Group were picked up by the EU-Commission, 
with the consequence that an action plan on modernising Company Law and enhancing 
corporate governance was drawn. This Plan should be understood as the preparation 
for an EU- directive379. 
376 Grubaugh, Richard H. Survey of 
Global Voting Trends" 2004 at p. 33 to download at www. iirf. org (International Investors Relations Federation) 
377 "Report of the High Level Group of Company Law Experts on a Modern Regulatory Framework for Company Law in Europe" (2002) at 
http: / /europa. eu. int/ comm/ intemal_market/en/ company/company/ modem/consult/ report_en. pdf 
378 Expert Group on Cross-Border Voting "Consultative Document on Cross-Border Voting in Europe" 2002 to download at 
http: / / www. ministerievanjustitie. nl: 8080/ B_ORGAN/ wodc/ reports/ crossb. htm 
379 European Commission - Directorate General Internal Market,, Fostering an Appropriate Regime for Shareholders' Rights" 2004 to download at 
http: //europa. eu, int/comm/intemal_market/company/shareholders/ consultation_en. pdf at p. 5 
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In contrast to a number of stock corporations, the EU Expert Group found that market 
forces operating alone would not address or remedy problems experienced in voting 
shares. In particular the committee scrutinised possibilities in the areas of share 
blocking before up-coming meetings; differing settlement periods; issues of lending 
shares; problems surrounding privacy; questions of the beneficial voter for regulatory 
purposes; and direct communication between issuer and shareholder. The latter area is 
very interesting for the future of the bearer share especially, as the committee asks 
whether two different types of shares are still opportune in a common market. 
Not surprisingly, the High Level Group of Company Law Experts found that in cross- 
border situations, shares are typically held through chains of intermediaries, which 
makes it difficult to identify the person entitled to vote. Often cross-border voting is 
almost impossible in practice, yet the integration of financial markets calls for an urgent 
solution380. 
The Cross-Border Voting Group recommends that the rights and obligations of 
accountholders and securities intermediaries in the securities holding systems in 
Member States be regulated at EU level to ensure that accountholders across the EU can 
effectively exercise voting rights on shares they hold through these systems. 
To that end, the Cross-Border Voting Group basically recommends that "accountholders in 
European securities holding systems, who are not participating in these systems as securities 
intermediaries holding shares for their accountholders (such accountholders are defined as 
"Ultimate Accountholders" in the Final Report of the Cross-Border Voting Group), should be 
acknowledged across the EU to have the right to determine how to vote on shares they hold in 
their accounts (the primary rule). An ultimate accountholder should be granted the options 
available under the law of the member state of the company in which he holds shares to be either 
recognised as the formal shareholder entitled to vote, or to receive a power of attorney from the 
securities intermediary who is formally entitled to vote, or to instruct that securities intermediary 
to vote according to his instructions. Securities intermediaries are to be prohibited from voting on 
shares they hold for their accountholders, unless explicitly instructed or authorised by their 
accountholders. 
Where an ultimate accountholder is not a securities intermediary in the regulated European 
securities holding systems, but nonetheless holds shares on behalf of third parties (e. g. a US 
securities intermediary), such an ultimate accountholder should be able to designate its clients to 
be recognised as entitled to determine how the shares are voted (the supplementary rule)381. " 
Additionally, the High Level Group of Experts emphasises that: 
"A proper system for shareholder information, communication and decision-making in Europe 
facilitates the exercise of voting rights of all shareholders in European listed companies, 
regardless of the member state in which they are located and whether they wish to vote on shares 
380 "Report of the High Level Group of Company Law Experts on a Modern Regulatory Framework for Company Law in Europe" (2002) to download at 
http: //europa. eu. int/comm/internal_market/en/company/company/modern/consult/report_en. pdf at p. 8 
381 "Report of the High Level Group of Company Law Experts on a Modern Regulatory Framework for Company Law in Europe" (2002) to download at 
http: //europa. eu. int/comm/intemal_market/en/company/company/modern/consult/report_en. pdf at p. 54 
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of companies in their own jurisdiction or in another jurisdiction. It is also important that such a 
system allows shareholders outside the EU to exercise their rights efficiently, as the Cross-Border 
Voting Group has recommended through the combination of the proposed primary and 
supplementary rule. Finally, such a system should operate efficiently for all parties concerned: 
shareholders, listed companies and securities intermediaries, with respect to both administrative 
and operational burdens and costs. Modern technology can be highly instrumental in achieving 
these ends and its use by all parties concerned should be stimulated to the maximum382. " 
In summary, the Cross-Border Voting Group as well as the High Level Group sees the 
issue of cross-border voting as a key priority for modernising Company Law in the 
European Union. 
Regarding the increasing institutionalisation of the entire international capital markets, 
it is worth considering whether intermediates could become a prism capable of 
compensating for shortcomings of the different legal systems. With respect to voting, 
especially for proxy voting services, adjustment to local market requirements is 
essential to carry out business. Enhancing the role of globally operating intermediates 
might be a solution beyond the European Union. Especially with respect to the 
construct of the American Depositary Receipts (ADRs)383, the upvaluation of 
intermediates will make sense. 
Reforms in this area are absolutely necessary to ensure cross-border voting, as the 
current state of law impedes the economically essential free flow of funds but also 
hinders effective monitoring of the investments. Appropriate regulation may even build 
an often-demanded link to exercise a certain control over globalisation. 
6.5.4. Conclusion 
The future of voting will not have much in common with the practice existing in 
Germany so far. The retreat of the custodian banks and the arrival of modern 
communication technologies in the Stock Corporation Act will alter the status of 
shareholders in Germany considerably. Whether this development will enhance the 
position of all shareholders is questionable. This derives from the fact that electronic 
proxy voting is, with the exception of RWE, only made possible for AGMs of companies 
issuing registered shares (in Germany: about 10% registered shares, 90 % bearer shares) 
and that proxy voting services are (as yet) contracting only institutional investors. 
Therefore the majority of small private shareholders will face difficulties when trying to 
carry out their shareholders' rights. However, it should not be neglected that the new 
environment will certainly enhance pluralism and responsibility at the shareholder 
meetings. New communication possibilities will ease the distribution of information to 
382 "Report of the High Level Group of Company Law Experts on a Modem Regulatory Framework for Company Law in Europe" (2002) to download at 
http: //europa. eu. int/comm/intemal_market/en/company/company/modem/consult/report_en. pdf at p. 55 
383 Definition: see Appendices at Definitions 
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shareholders and should improve their opinion-forming process. At least the 
availability of alternative analysis of the agenda will be enhanced. 
6.6. Right to File a Suit 
The most powerful instrument for the shareholder in the case of a dispute with the 
stock corporation is the right to file a suit. A number of courses are possible for the 
shareholder, depending on the infringement by the corporation. 
In first place the appeal against a general meeting resolution (Anfechtungsklage - 
§ 246 AktG) should be mentioned. 
The second possibility is to take a nullity action (Nichtigkeitsklage -§ 249 AktG). In 
contrast to the appeal action, where ruling in favour of the investor leaves room to 
reshape the resolution, in this case the court will void the corporate resolution. 
It is also possible to file an action for damages (Schadensersatzklage). Unfortunately, 
shareholders in Germany had to experience the break down of the former Neuer Markt 
to realise the law did not provide even fundamental shareholder protection. With the 
introduction of the Anlegerschutzverbesser-ungsgesetz (Act to Protect the Investor), the 
legislator has addressed this issue. This act converts the EU- Direction on Market Abuse 
in the areas of capital market information and the protection from undue market 
practices and extends it to investment forms, which are not vested in securities. Now 
shareholder protection is enhanced regarding insider trading, ad hoc publication and 
market manipulation. 
The shareholder may also file an appeal according to § 243 s. 2 AktG if another 
shareholder used his voting right to get himself or a third party special advantages, or a 
procedure to enforce information according to § 132 AktG. 
To complete the legal protection of the shareholder, he could also apply a judgement 
procedure according to the Spruchverfahrensgesetz (Judgement Procedure Act), if he 
seeks compensation following entrepreneurial restructuring measures of the company. 
6.6.1. Checking Resolutions 
In general the Stock Corporation Act differentiates between nullity (a grave 
infringement of the law so no action is necessary) and contestability (a less serious 
infringement of law and therefore dependent on an appeal, which could make the 
resolution inoperative) where a stakeholder has filed an action against a resolution of 
the general meeting. 
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6.6.1.1. Appeal against General Meeting Resolutions 
6.6.1.1.1. Technical Introduction 
Any shareholder may file an appeal against a general meeting resolution (§ 245 AktG) if 
he stated his protest in evidence384, or has not been invited properly. The same right is 
granted to management and, under certain circumstances, even to members of the 
management or supervisory board. 
A prerequisite is that the law or the articles of association have been infringed 
(§ 243 s. 1 AktG). In this context, irregularities arising from the resolution are quite 
important. The prevalent opinion supports the view that irregularities, which have 
become causal for the coming about of the resolution lead to the annulment of the 
latter385. Usually these shortcomings are results of formal mistakes, unequal treatment 
of shareholders or infringements of law386. Absolutely necessary for the appeal is that 
the month's grace is met (§ 246 s. 1 AktG). 
Unsuccessful appeals against resolutions are valid, even if they do not meet the 
requirements stated in the law or in the articles of association. Surely it must be 
recognised that this rule is restricted. If the resolution endangers the public interest or 
the protection of the creditor it is nullified387. 
A requirement regarding the number of shares necessary to file a suit does not exist. 
Hence, one share with the nominal amount of one Euro is sufficient for an action 
against a resolution388. 
Baums explains in his working paper "Die Anfechtung von 
Hauptversammlungsbeschlüssen" that it is not necessary for the plaintiff to claim that 
he was infringed in his rights as a shareholder. His interest that the resolution should 
conform to the law and the articles of association is sufficient389. This comprehensive 
legal protection is difficult to understand. Why should a shareholder have the right to 
take an action when a third shareholder was not invited properly and therefore was not 
able to vote, or was excluded from the option to subscribe in the case of an increase in 
384 This could only be the case if the shareholder attended the meeting personally. As the represented shareholder is not able to state his protest in evidence he is 
not entitled to sue (exemption, when the proxy stated the protest in evidence). Among other reasons this explains why most often shareholder associations are the 
plaintiffs. 
385 Obermüller, Werner, Winden Die Hauptversammlung 
der Aktiengesellschaft" revised by Butzke, Volker 4th Edition Stuttgart 2001 at p. 491 
386 Some examples cover the areas of: a formal mistake - e. g. formal shortcomings with the notice to the general meeting (no concrete intervention in participation 
rights); mistakes with the preparation of resolutions and realisation of the meeting - e. g. notice to an inadmissible place -§ 121 s. 4 AktG (no concrete intervention 
in participation rights); infringement of participation rights, especially information rights - e. g. § 131 AktG; mistakes with the findings in the resolution - e. g. 
mistakes with the majority; general infringements of the law; unequal treatment of shareholders; objective contents control and breach of trust - e. g. duty of 
loyalty; acceptance of special advantages - e. g. a special advantage to a certain circle of shareholders. In-depth with a number of rulings: Hopt, Klaus J. / 
Wiedemnann, Herbert Großkommentar zum Aktiengesetz" 4th Edition Berlin 1995 at § 243 from no. 15 (p. 62) (Schmidt) 
387 § 241 AktG 
388 §8s. 2 AktG 
389 Baums, Theodor Die 
Anfechtung von Hauptversammlungsbeschlüssen" Working Paper No. 85,2000 - to download at http: //www. jura. uni- 
frankfurt. de/ifawzl/baums/Arbeitspapiere. html at p. 2 
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capital stock? It can only be assumed that if there were not the considerable costs of 
litigation, this right of action would allow a flood of 'white knights' who were only 
acting on behalf of the shareholders. It is worth discussing whether the shareholder has 
to maintain his interest for the duration of the suit. However, to avoid abuse this needs 
to be answered in the affirmative. 
The material resolution control is the crucial review criteria. This ruling by the 
Bundesgerichtshof in "Kali und Salz" 390 should be qualified by saying that this 
statement is only valid for certain resolutions391. Furthermore, since the "Linotype"- 
case392 the duty of loyalty, under certain circumstances, is also seen as an object of the 
resolution control. 
6.6.1.1.2. § 243 s. 2 s. 1 AktG 
It is important to mention the justification of an appeal according to § 243 s. 2 s. 1 Akte. 
A suit could be based on the reason that a shareholder used his voting rights to achieve 
special benefits for himself or a third party, and that the resolution has served this 
purpose. As this norm ignores safeguarding the interests of the creditor, it is 
restrictively applied in its practical use393. Therefore it is only consistent if this provision 
will be annulled. 
6.6.1.1.3. Shareholders' Reasons for the Appeal 
An important reason for an appeal is the increase of capital stock. According to 
§ 255 AktG this proceeding is not only possible in the case of an increase in capital stock 
by contributions but also when the issue or minimum price is too low and the 
acquisition right of the shareholder has been ruled out. The purpose of this norm is to 
increase protection for the minority shareholder and in contrast to § 243 s. 2 AktG it does 
not consider subjective elements394. 
255 s. 1 and 3 are superfluous and s. 2 could be seen as equivalent to § 243 s. 2 despite the 
subjective elements395. Therefore it is disappointing that with the reform of the 
Spruchverfahren (judgement procedure)396 the legislator missed the opportunity to 
include this proceeding. On account of the fact that the majority of the appeals have the 
purpose of finding adequate compensation, this step should have been obvious. 
As it can bee seen in figure 26, further reasons for an appeal against a resolution are 
manifold. 
390 Amtliche Sammlung der Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofs in Zivilsachen - BGHZ Volume 71 at p. 40,43,49 
391 Baums, Theodor Die Anfechtung von 
Hauptversammlungsbeschliissen" Working Paper No. 85,2000 - to download at http: //www. jura. uni- 
frankfurt. de/ifawzl/baums/Arbeitspapiere. html at p. 4 
392 Amtliche Sammlung der Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofs in Zivilsachen - BGHZ Volume 103 at p. 184,193 
393 Baums, Theodor Die Anfechtung von 
Hauptversammlungsbeschlüssen" Working Paper No. 85,2000 - to download at http: //www. jura. uni- 
frankfurt. de/ifawzl/baums/Arbeitspapiere. html at p. 58 
394 Korpff, Bruno/ Semler, Johannes Münchner Kommentar zum 
Aktiengesetz" Munich 2001 at § 255 No. 2 (Huffer) 
395 Aktiengesetz -Großkommentar" 
4th Edition, 6th installment, Berlin New York 1996 at § 255 No. 1 (Schmidt) 
396 see Chapter 6.2.6.1.4.2. 
Spruchverfahrensgesetz (Judgement Procedure Act) 
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Figure 26: Further Reasons for an Appeal against a Resolution (1980-1999)397 
Contested Resolution Number of Appeals 
Discharge 69 (24%) 
Resolutions regarding the utilization of 
returns 
10 (3%) 
Elections to supervisory board 18 (6%) 
Restructuring 33 (12%) 
Statement of annual accounts 6 (2%) 
Capital measures 53 (18%) 
Election of auditor 13 (5%) 
Issue of 
"Wandelschuldverschreibungen" / optional 
bonds and bonus shares 
9 (3%) 
Alteration of articles of association 34 (12%) 
Resolutions according to § 119 Abs. 2 AktG 8 (3%) 
Winding up respectively liquidation 
resolutions 
4(1%) 
Company contracts 17 (6%) 
Other 13 (5%) 
Thereby the plaintiffs claim a number of different infringements398, mostly formal 
mistakes forming the majority. Taking all this into account it is astonishing that only 
thirteen actions have been taken, reprimanding the infringement of the articles of 
association399 
6.6.1.2. Nullity Action 
Closely related to the appeal against the resolution is the nullity action. This form of 
legal action aims to set aside a resolution. Any shareholder, the management, or a 
member of the management or the supervisory board is entitled to take a nullity action 
against a resolution of the general meeting. It is even possible to assert the nullity other 
than by filing a suit400. Reasons for nullity include resolutions endangering the public 
397 Baums, Theodor/ Vogel, Hans-Gert/Tacheva, Maja Rechtstatsachen zur 
Beschlusskontrolle im Aktienrecht" 2000 to download at http: //www. jura. uni- 
frankfurt. de/ifawzl/baums/Arbeitspapiere. html Paper No. 86 at p. 12 
398 E. g.: infringement of regulations regarding the election and composition of the supervisory 
board; infringement of report and formal requirements according 
to the law of conversion (91 cases); in the case of discharges, a breach of 
duty of the management might be claimed (22); often violations of the duty to inform and 
to report (87); also popular are formal mistakes regarding the preparation and summoning of the general meeting 
(55) - Baums, Theodor/ Vogel, Hans- 
Gert/Tacheva, Maja Rechtstatsachen zur 
Beschlusskontrolle im Aktienrecht" 2000 to download at http: //www. jura. uni- 
frankfurt. de/ifawzl/baums/Arbeitspapiere. html Paper No. 86 at p. 12 
399 More detailed regarding the reasons for appeals: Baums, Theodor Die Anfechtung von 
Hauptversammlungsbeschliissen" Working Paper No. 85,2000 - to 
download at http: //www. jura. uni-frankfurt. de/ifawzl/baums/Arbeitspapiere. 
html at p. 12ff, Baums, Theodor/ Vogel, Hans-Gert/Tacheva, Maja 
Rechtstatsachen 
zur Beschlusskontrolle im Aktienrecht" 2000 to download at http: //www. jura. uni-frankfurt. de/ifawzl/baums/Arbeitspapiere. html Paper 
No. 86 p. 12ff 
400§ 249AktG 
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interest or the protection of the creditor as stated in § 241 AktG. However, as it is an 
exceptional norm a number of other reasons could be claimed by the plaintiff401. 
It is essential in this proceeding that the plaintiff is a shareholder during all stages of the 
suit402, although it is not necessary that he held shares at the time the resolution was 
passed. There is debate as to whether a plaintiff (no shareholder) could alter his petition 
through a declaratory action403 into an action to nullify, if he becomes a shareholder 
before the last oral hearing. 
Additionally, the Stock Corporation Act provides in § 242 AktG the possibility to cure 
the nullity. Here it is stated404 that shortcomings can be cured with entry in the 
commercial register. Furthermore, the new release procedure according to § 246a AktG 
should be taken into account. 
6.6.1.3. Positive Proceeding to Approve a Resolution 
It is also relevant to mention the positive proceeding to approve a resolution. This 
proceeding becomes relevant when the forming of the resolution is not in question, but 
the chairman of the AGM used the wrong means of approval and thus made it 
contestable. Having said that, it needs to be mentioned that this proceeding does not 
have a major impact on the legal practice. 
6.6.1.4. Further Proceedings 
6.6.1.4.1. § 243 s. 2 AktG - Compensation Contra Appeal 
§ 243 s. 2 s. 2 AktG provides that an appeal according to § 243 s. 2 s. 1 AktG (a shareholder 
used his voting rights to achieve special benefits for himself or a third party and the 
resolution has served this purpose) is possible when appropriate compensation was not 
offered. 
There is plenty of criticism of this provision. Authors like Hüffer405, Schmidt406 or 
Zöller407 argue that this norm does not meet the creditor protection. Also a case is made 
of the possibility to buy out the right of appeal against the will of the shareholder. In 
401 E. g.: Grave shortcomings with the notice to the general meeting§ 121 s. 2,3,4 AktG; formal shortcomings according to § 130 s. 1,2,4 AktG; incompatibility with 
the essence of the corporation or infringement of provisions, which protect the creditor or the public interest (limited application possibility - only with 
shortcomings in the content); violating good morals (limited application possibility); resolution that is in conflict with a resolution regarding the conditional 
capital increase (§ 192 s. 4 AktG); infringement of principle: shareholders are entitled to subscribe new shares equivalent to their interest of the capital stock (§ 212 
s. 2 AktG); § 217 s. 2, § 228 s. 2 § 234 s. 3, § 235 s. 2 AktG become invalid if the decision is recorded on the commercial register in a certain time frame; successful 
contest against a resolution (see below); final ruling to cross out resolutions in the commercial register officially. Furthermore, specific reasons for nullity are 
standardised too; election of members of the supervisory board (§ 250 AktG); resolution regarding the utilisation of the balance sheet profit (§ 253 AktG); nullity of 
the annual balance - only applicable for the general meeting, as generally the board has already passed the annual balance (§ 256 s. 3 AktG). 
402 Huffer, Uwe "Aktiengesetz" 6th Edition Munich 2004 at § 249 No. 29 
403 § 256 ZPO 
404 Exception: § 242 s. 2 s. 4 AktG 
405 Huffer, Uwe Aktiengesetz" 
6th Edition Munich 2004, § 243 No. 37 and No. 40 
406 Aktiengesetz - 
Großkommentar" Berlin, New York 1996 4th Edition at § 243 No-59 (Schmidt) 
407 Zöllner, Wofgang(Editor) "Kölner Kommentar zum Aktiengesetz" 2nd Edition, Cologne 1988 at § 243 No. 236 
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practice the application of § 243 s. 2 s. 2 AktG is, because of an infringement of the equal 
treatment principle408 and of the duty of loyalty (in detail see Chapter 7) of the majority 
shareholder, handled restrictively. The compensation must be made from the 
company's assets409. 
Creditor protection is up to a point ensured by the "German system"; the creditor is 
also a major investor (Custodian banks/ institutional investors control up to 80% of the 
votes). Having said that, it could even be claimed that the creditor/ investor has the 
freedom of choice between creditor protection by voting against a resolution, or as an 
investor by filing a suit for compensation. 
As Geßler410 states, the protection of the shareholder is limited to the avoidance of 
economic loss. 
Furthermore, if § 243 s. 2 s. 2 AktG becomes relevant the investors are at risk of losing 
their borrowing power. Hence, such a step should always be the result of a well 
thought-out and balanced process. 
In Germany creditor protection compared to shareholder protection is always of major 
importance. 
In the case of a squeeze out the majority shareholder also seeks to achieve a special 
benefit by paying compensation, even though this might be against the will of the 
shareholder. The same is valid in a compensation payment following a takeover. 
Therefore trying to hold up the concept of creditor protection against the just 
mentioned cases is contradictory and also inconsequent. As already said with respect 
to the equal treatment principle it could be alleged that an adequate compensation is in 
the interest of the shareholder and therefore is not inconsistent with § 53a Akte. 
A breach of the duty of loyalty is certainly more serious. Here the course of law must be 
open to the shareholder and hence, § 243 s. 2 s. 2 AktG is not applicable. 
As a conclusion, § 243 s. 2 s. 2 AktG is too restrictive. A more generous interpretation of 
the norm would certainly benefit the vast majority of investors who are interested in 
shareholder value. 
It is questionable to use the argument of creditor protection. As has been stated, most 
creditors also control the vast majority of votes (custodian banks). Logically this would 
mean that any resolution in a general meeting, which aims at creditor protection 
(e. g. 
dividend payments) must be scrutinised carefully as it could simply have the 
function 
to benefit those investors who are also creditors. Therefore the argument for creditor 
protection is counterproductive. 
408 § 53a AktG 
409 Baums, Theodor Die 
Anfechtung von Hauptversammlungsbeschlüssen" Working Paper No. 85,2000 - to download at http: //www. jura. uni- 
frankfurt. de/ifawzl/baums/Arbeitspapiere. 
html at p. 59 
410 Geßler, Ernst Zur 
Anfechtung wegen Strebens nach Sondervorteilen nach § 243 s. 2 AktG" in Festschrift 
für Barz" 1974 at p. 103 
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What certainly counts is the duty of loyalty. In this case no restriction should be made 
as this could encourage major investors to pursue company-destructive policies. 
6.6.1.4.2. Spruchverfahrensgesetz (Judgement Procedure Act) 
This proceeding allows a legal remedy for minority shareholders who have a right of 
compensation where the company has carried out entrepreneurial restructuring 
measures (§ 1 SpruchG). The great advantage of this proceeding is that it is neither 
necessary to block AGM resolutions411 nor, with respect to § 246a AktG, to pursue a 
release procedure. 
The judgement procedure was considerably altered by the legislator in 2002 and was 
transferred to the Judgement Procedure Act. This became necessary due to the 
introduction of the Corporate Governance Code. Another reason was the length of the 
judgement procedure that existed up until then. Due to the complexity of the valuation, 
the claiming shareholder often had to wait years until awarded compensation412. In 
addition to that it is expected that the importance of this proceeding will be enhanced in 
the ensuing years. Not least because the German Government introduced in a new act 
(WpÜG - Wertpapiererwerbs- und Übernahmegesetz (Security Acquisition and 
Takeover Act)) the possibility to squeeze out minority shareholders. Whether this made 
another act necessary remains to be seen. 
Fortunately the legislator has removed a warped condition413 with this new act. In 
§ 15 s. 1 UmwG the legislator explicitly manifested that the shareholder of the takeover 
company could also file a petition to determine an appropriate extra payment if the 
exchange ratio was too low. 
It is incomprehensible that the judgement procedure is not applicable when a 
shareholder was excluded from the option to subscribe for shares in the case of an 
increase in capital stock. 
The argument that a fixing of the issue could not be considered due to the enormous 
organisational expenses, which will arise for the issuing banks or for the issuer itself 
(whoever will carry the costs)414 is not convincing. These expenses will also emerge 
following a successful appeal against the resolution. 
411 Gesetzentwurf der Bundesregierung "Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Neuordnung des gesellschaftsrechtlichen 
Spruchverfahrens (Spruchverfahrensneuordnungsgesetz)" 2004 to download at http: //dip. bundestag. de/btd/15/003/1500371. pdf at A; The BGH has even ruled 
that shortcumings in the information flow regarding the valuation should only be denounced in the Spruchverfahren. (Amtliche Sammlung der Entscheidungen 
des Bundesgerichtshofs in Zivilsachen - BGHZ Volume 146,179). 
412 Gesetzentwurf der Bundesregierung "Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Neuordnung des gesellschaftsrechtlichen 
Spruchverfahrens (Spruchverfahrensneuordnungsgesetz)" 2004 to download at http: //dip. bundestag. de/btd/15/003/1500371. pdf at I. 1. 
413 Bayer, Walter Kapitalerhöhung mit 
Bezugsrechtsausschluss und Vermögensschutz der Aktionäre nach § 255 s. 2 AktG" in Zeitschrift für das gesamte 
Handelsrecht und Wirtschaftsrecht (ZHR) Volume 163 (1999) p. 505-553 at p. 547; Baums, Theodor Die Anfechtung von Hauptversammlungsbeschlüssen" 
Working Paper No. 85,2000 - to download at http: //www. jura. uni-frankfurt. de/ifawzl/baums/Arbeitspapiere. html at p. 64 
414 Baums, Theodor Die Anfechtung von 
Hauptversammlungsbeschlüssen" Working Paper No. 85,2000 - to download at http: //www. jura. uni- 
frankfurtdr/ iiiý%, zI/biunis/Arbeitspapiere. html at p. 66 
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The same is valid for the opinion that the shareholders prefer to appeal against the 
exclusion itself and not the price for which they are entitled to buy the new stocks415. 
First of all the shareholder will seek compensation for lost profit. Even when he claims 
to have an interest in an appeal against a resolution it could be assumed that it is driven 
by the demand to not be financially worse off than other shareholders. If this is not the 
case, another interest of the minority shareholder could be assessed as an abuse of a 
right416. From a typical point of view the shares of minority shareholders are essentially 
regarded as capital investment417. The stock corporation must have a noteworthy 
entrepreneurial interest in structural and company-related measures418. 
The issuer can pay the compensation as a cash settlement. If a corporation decides to 
exclude the option to subscribe it could be expected that this measure is balanced and 
well thought-out. Hence, an increase in capital stock on one side and the danger of a 
compensation payment on the other do not exclude each other. 
Furthermore, if an increase in capital should be carried out by investments in kind, the 
judgement procedure is also appropriate, as it presents a property asset and can, 
therefore, follow a stock price. 
This measure by management is for a number of reasons (no encroachment in the 
property, market pressure, no structural and qualitative dissimilarity between a merger 
and an increase in capital419) not as drastic as in the case of a squeeze out. 
To draw a conclusion, a judgement procedure will not only accelerate the proceeding 
(§ 9 SpruchG) as shareholders could be compensated faster, but will also give all parties 
more comfortable legal protection (no blocking of resolutions), whilst at the same time 
maintaining shareholder rights. Promoting this course of law is truly a step in the right 
direction, as it will at least ease the workload of the courts. 
6.6.1.4.3. Squeeze Out and Integration 
The concept of a squeeze out describes the buy-up of shares by the majority shareholder 
in order to obtain 100 percent of them. Although this occurrence has a negative 
connotation it is most often based on reasonable and necessary economic decisions. For 
example the realisation of necessary structural reforms is far less complicated and cost 
intensive when there is only a single shareholder involved as there is no need for a 
general meeting and therefore no blocking of reforms and no formal requirements with 
regard to shareholders. The Stock Corporation Act provides in § 327a s. 1 s. 1 AktG that 
415 Report of the Government Panel on Corporate Governance July 
2001 "Unternehmensführung - Unternehmenskontrolle - Modernisierung des Aktienrechts" 
to download at http: //dip. bundestag. de/btd/14/075/1407515. pdf at No. 152 
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Übernahmegesetz" Munich 2002 at Art. 7 § 327a AktG No. 29 (Grzimek) 
418 Hirte, Heribert/ Von Billow, Christoph "Kölner Kommentar zum 
WpÜG" Cologne 2003 at § 327a AktG No. 11 (Hasselbach) 
419 Bayer, Walter 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the general meeting could decide the transfer of shares by the minority shareholders to 
the majority shareholder on the condition that he holds 95 percent of shares or more. As 
a countermove they are granted a reasonable compensation in cash. To strengthen the 
position of the investor the Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court) 
ruled420 that the compensation must not ignore an existing market price. Although the 
minority shareholder is not entitled to file a suit according to § 327f s. 1 s. 1 AktG in 
conjunction with § 243 s. 2 AktG against this "squeeze out", he has the possibility of 
nominating a judgement procedure for a legal inspection of the granted compensation - 
or where compensation is not offered, or incorrectly offered, inspection as to why this 
was the case421. 
The same course of law is open to excluded shareholders of an integrated company422 . 
They are also entitled to obtain compensation, which they cannot claim by means of an 
appeal against the resolution, but by applying a judgement procedure for legal 
inspection. 
When assessing these provisions, which made their way into the Judgement Procedure 
Act, it can be assumed that the legislator recognised that shareholding is a form of 
investment rather than a claim for possession. Hopefully this realisation will also find 
its way into the reform of the appeal against a resolution, which aims at compensation 
rather than safeguarding of ownership. 
6.6.1.4.4. Procedure to Enforce Information (§ 132 AktG) 
The procedure of enforcing information is quite unspectacular, only becoming relevant 
when the management board refuses to provide information. The shareholder can 
either take an action according to § 132 AktG to enforce the information that was 
rejected in the general meeting, or appeal against a resolution according to 
§ 243 s. 1 AktG. As both proceedings have different aspirations, they are independent 
from each other and thus can be pursued in parallel. Although this measure seems to be 
too expensive for the small private shareholder it might be crucial for the institutional 
investor, as it could influence his recommendations, and capital market decisions are 
based on this information. 
A precondition to enforce information legally is that the refusal of information is stated 
in evidence. This may be enforced by the affected shareholder423. 
420 BVerfG, 1 BvR 1613/94 (27.4.1999) at No. 61 to be downloaded at 
http: / / www. bverfg. de/ entscheidungen/ rs19990427_1 bvr161394. html? Suchbegriff=B %F6rsenkurs 
421 § 327f s. 1 s. 2,3 AktG 
422 § 320 AktG 
423 § 131 s. 5 AktG 
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6.6.1.5. New Possibility for the Company: The Release Proceeding (§ 246a AktG) 
With the release proceeding, the UMAG implemented one central demand of the 
Corporate Governance Commission. Although this new provision primarily serves the 
interest of the company it also has a considerable impact on the shareholders and their 
engagement of an appeal or nullity action. 
According to § 246a AktG it is possible for the corporation to circumvent the blocking 
impact of the appeal or nullity action. However, the release proceeding is only open for 
structure-changing resolutions, which require registration. In other words the 
corporation could choose this course of law in the case of capital measures, which aim 
to increase or decrease the capital stock as well as in the case of company contracts. 
Other registration requiring resolutions, especially further changing of the articles of 
association, are not subject to this legal remedy. 
Hence, according to § 246a s. 1 AktG the company could file an application to the 
process court. The aim will be to achieve a statement that the filed suit does not oppose 
the registration of the resolution and that faults of the resolution do not affect 
registration. Consequently, this means that even a successful appeal or nullity action 
cannot rescind registration424. Crucial for the ruling of the court in a release procedure is 
less the case of an inadmissible suit, but the question if the suit is obviously baseless or 
if the validity of the resolution is primarily to avert substantial disadvantages from the 
company or its shareholders425. Schütz explains that the suit is seen as obviously 
baseless, when this could be predicted with a high certainty426. The aversion of 
substantial disadvantages is subjected to careful consideration of all interests by the 
court427. 
At this point it should be added that § 246a AktG is subsidiary to § 16 s. 3 UmwG and 
§ 319 s. 6 AktG, which also provide release proceedings. 
Hirschberger428 sees the release procedure quite critical. According to him, the 
investment of a single shareholder has an economic and rational basis. Therefore it 
would be more beneficial to protect the single shareholder through Capital Market Law 
instead through Company Law429. Additionally, due to the different periods of time for 
the appeal, the release procedure and the appeal against the release decision, 
Hirschberger calculates that a delay of seven months could occur, which would make 
424 § 242 s. 2 s. 6 AktG in conjunction with § 144 s. 2 FGG 
425 § 246a s. 2 AktG 
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428 Hirschberger, Max Das 
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Aktionäre? " in Der Betrieb Number 21 21.05.2004 p. 1137-1139 
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Das 
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the intention of the release procedure superfluous430. Even though his opinion is well 
founded and thus should not be ignored, the release procedure has to be seen as a 
compromise. It should maintain legal protection to the plaintiff without endangering 
the economic interest of the company. Although a clear cut with respect to the right of 
action might have been more beneficial not only for the company but also for all 
stakeholders, this legal reform will hopefully serve its purpose: to limit the abuse of the 
right to appeal. 
To draw a conclusion, it is simply understandable that in certain cases the request of the 
company to register the resolution prevails over the interest of the plaintiff to block the 
resolution, especially as his right to claim compensation remains untouched and hence, 
is at least subsidiary. 
6.6.1.6. Effect of the Ruling 
It is important to add at this point that a decision that rules a resolution invalid cannot 
be registered if a legally binding finding according to § 246a s. 1 s. 1 AktG is effective. 
However, in cases where the release proceeding is not applied and the final ruling has 
declared the resolution invalid, the resolution will be quashed. 
According to § 244 AktG it is possible that the issuer repairs the contestable resolution. 
With this step the corporation could avoid an appeal precautionary. When the plaintiff 
has succeeded in a nullity action a healing is not possible. 
6.6.1.7. Abuse of the Right to File a Suit 
Unfortunately, before the presentation of the UMAG there had been considerable abuse 
of the right to file a suit. This was also acknowledged by the Bundesgerichtshof431. As 
Baums points out, filing a suit with the intention to achieve a profitable settlement or 
getting an exaggerated compensation for "legal consulting" has been quite popular 
with some active shareholders432. Quite easily, resolutions could be blocked by a 
shareholder until he received a financial settlement for the withdrawal of his action. At 
the same time it has been difficult to find a correlation between the abuse and a specific 
430 Hirschberger, Max Das 
Freigabeverfahren fair Hauptversammlungsbeschlüsse nach dem UMAG-Entwurf (§ 246a AktG-E) - Ein Aus für räuberische" 
Aktionäre? " in Der Betrieb Number 21 21.05.2004 p. 1137-1139 at p. 1138 
431 Amtliche Sammlung der Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofs - 
BGHZ Volume 107 at p. 296,308 ff ; Huffer, Uwe Aktiengesetz" 
6th Edition Munich 2004 
at § 245 No. 22 
432 Baums, Theodor Die Anfechtung von 
Hauptversanlmlungsbeschlüssen" Working Paper No. 85,2000 - to download at http: //www. jura. uni- 
frankfurt. de/ifawzl/baums/Arbeitspapiere. html at p. 14,15; Baums, Theodor shows 
in this study, among other interesting statistics, that 11 shareholders were 
responsible for at least 
50 % of 408 actions taken against AGM resolutions between the years 1980 and 
1998. They are even named and listed according to the 
number of their appeals 
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html Paper No. 86 at p. 10 
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shareholder right433. This fact increased the difficulty of the legislator to take selective 
action against the abuse. However, due to the increased awareness of stock 
corporations, who now approach certain issues at an AGM with greater care and the 
mentioned acknowledgment by the BGH that the right to file a suit could be abused, 
these kinds of actions have been repelled. Furthermore, with the release proceeding 
according to § 246a AktG, abusing legal suits will be more difficult as such suits will be 
dismissed by court more easily. 
Of interest is the fact that the vast majority of proceedings (79%434) end in a ruling. Only 
11 % ended in settlement, which was the desired outcome for a shareholder taking such 
action. 
6.6.2. Reforming the Contestability of Resolutions 
In the past, abuse of appeal or nullity actions almost reduced this legal remedy to an 
absurd move, although the stock corporations and courts targeted a number of 
procedures displaying signs of abuse435. 
Conditions for the appeal or nullity action led to discussion as to how this system could 
be reformed so that only legitimate procedures are taken to court. Some suggestions 
were taken up by the legislator and documented in the new UMAG436. Baums, and the 
Government Panel on Corporate Governance, who developed some of the proposals, 
supported the idea of the suspension of the blocking effect437. A summary review 
determines whether the appeal (only against alteration of the articles of association, 
capital measures and approval of company contracts) is likely to be successful and 
therefore the interest in the suspension of the blocking effect is justified. If this is not the 
case, a register blockade is not possible when the company has a prevailing interest in 
the registration. With regard to the possibility to set aside the blockade of the register in 
the case of mergers, takeovers and other transformations438 that already existed, the 
Government Panel on Corporate Governance suggested modifying the phrasing of the 
proceeding from "obviously baseless" to "adequate chances of success"439. 
433 Baums, Theodor Die Anfechtung von 
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Another idea implemented in the UMAG was to impose a duty to publish settlements 
on the webpage, in the papers of the company and the Bundesanzeiger. This suggestion 
became supportable, not at least because of its salutary preventive function440. 
However, if the new provisions in the UMAG will serve the purpose of opposing the 
abuse of the right to file a suit has yet to be proved. Consequently, it has to be doubted 
whether the legislator will consider new measures before the UMAG has shown its 
effectiveness. 
Taking into account that not only the abuse of the right to file an action should be on 
trial, further points at issue should be considered when scrutinising reform of the 
system. 
Further suggestions in the pipeline to reform the shareholder's right of action beyond 
the UMAG should include explanation and examination of the following: 
It is discussed to introduce a certain quorum of the capital stock to make a shareholder 
or pool of shareholders become entitled to file a suit441. So far even the One-¬uro-Share 
fulfils the right of action. This idea is supported by the argument that a shareholder 
with a splinter interest is more closely related to a creditor with a promissory note on 
returns, than to a partner. Additionally, it is difficult to demand reasonable behaviour 
in the interest of the company442 from quorums comprised of shareholders with 
objectives driven by increasing shareholder value. Corporate interests such as socially 
responsible investment and solidarity with a company (as an employee) are beyond the 
scope of most private shareholders. 
In contrast to these ideas the government panel on corporate governance states that the 
shareholder must be able to protect himself against an encroachment in his 
constitutional ownership laws443. In any case it will be difficult to determine a fair 
quorum and it might be alleged the minority investors' only interest is shareholder 
value. 
440 Report of the Government Panel on Corporate Governance July 2001 "Unternehmensführung - Unternehmenskontrolle - Modernisierung des Aktienrechts" 
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Secondly it is suggested that only an association or a common representative should be 
entitled to sue444. 
A third opinion suggests a certain time of ownership should be required to avoid the 
situation where shareholders buy shares only after the notice of the AGM has been 
given445. It should be mentioned that the proof of holding would not be the critical 
factor446, regardless of whether the company issues registered or bearer shares. With 
reference to the waiting period and the accompanying danger of loss of legal protection, 
this suggestion is also seen as a threat to the capital market - shareholders may 
postpone their investments. 
Fourthly, application of the principle of appropriateness should be taken into 
account447. This infers an action which should be scrutinised from the angle of the duty 
of loyalty. This solution is also a point at issue448. 
Fifthly, it is well worth evaluating the option of limiting the AGM competences. This 
becomes clear when scrutinising Figure 7 (Appeals against General Meeting 
Resolutions). It shows the continuous increase in resolution items per general meeting. 
Unfortunately, trimming these could result in a wider point of attack for shareholders 
looking for a reason to appeal. Therefore this solution only promises success with 
parallel reforms of the articles of association and information policy. However, for 
reasons of efficiency, legal certainty for the issuers and repelling the abuse of the right 
of action, this approach is certainly supported. 
Sixthly, rather than abolishing the resolution in a successful appeal, a strong opinion 
pleaded for a partial quashing. This would mean that not the whole resolution is invalid 
but the part in question449. In the case of a takeover this approach is already supported 
by the argument of increased efficiency. At this point it should be mentioned that a 
sentence by the court, which binds the issuer to mend the resolution in the case of 
minor shortcomings is not in the pipeline450. 
With the introduction of the UMAG and its release proceeding, this partial quashing is 
most probably no longer an issue. 
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Seventhly, the idea to set aside the settlement should, especially after the release 
procedure, not be considered seriously451. 
Eighthly, it is demanded that the courts should not hesitate to approve damage claims 
when the shareholder tried to abuse the right of action452. Again, this possibility is not 
seen without scepticism453. 
Ninthly, a reform of the requirement to state the protest in evidence is not supported454. 
Tenthly, a relief in the case of shortcomings during a decision process is seen in the 
statutory opening for arbitrational procedures (this is especially the case in smaller, 
cohesive companies)455. 
Finally, even a repeal of this form of action could be considered. As it has already been 
shown it could easily be possible in a number of cases to refer the shareholder to the 
course of law of the judgement procedure. A precondition is the acknowledgment of the 
fact that the primary interest of the shareholder is to receive compensation rather than 
being awarded with the quashing of a resolution. The smaller the share of the investor, 
the easier it is to allege a prevalent interest in compensation. This is the case in a 
squeeze out for example, as already explained above. Here a breach of the 
constitutional right of property is disclaimed. 
However, one point at issue regarding this suggestion is the probable stimulation of the 
exit rather than the voice. 
Taking all this into account, it must be admitted that the UMAG took some of these 
suggestions off the agenda. However, it has to be doubted that the introduction of the 
UMAG was the necessary fundamental alteration of the right of action, as it has been 
discussed at the 63rd German Lawyers Congress456. 
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6.6.3. Manipulation and Wrong Presentation towards the Capital Markets 
6.6.3.1. Compensation Claims against the Issuer 
In this section I will introduce a number of claims shareholders could file. This will 
provide a comprehensive idea how he could seek compensation for the infringed right. 
For the shareholder such a list is important to articulate his claims in a legal proceeding 
and to highlight the fact that he has indeed suffered damage. 
6.6.3.1.1. Compensation Through §§ 37b and 37 c WpHG 
In 2002, §§ 37b and 37c WpHG were introduced by the 4. Finanzmarktforderungsgesetz 
(Act to Promote the Financial Market). Theses paragraphs provide compensation for 
investors who suffered damage in trading their securities, because of omitted or late 
publication or false assertion of potential price-relevant facts by the issuer. 
6.6.3.1.2. Further Basis for Compensation 
§ 79 AktG: A liability for executive organs457 is given for the issuer if the management, a 
member of the management or a so-called constitutional appointed representative have 
made themselves liable for compensation, and the act was committed in the execution 
of chores, which they are entitled to execute458. 
§ 823 s. 2 BGB in conjunction with § 92 s. 1 and s. 2 AktG: As per this paragraph a claim 
could be asserted if the management has infringed its duties in the case of loss, debt 
overload or insolvency. However, § 92 s. 1 and s. 2 AktG do not fulfil the necessary 
requirement for § 823 s. 2 BGB of being a protective law. This derives from the fact that 
this norm has the purpose to restore the information and legal capacity of the general 
meeting and does not grant individual protection to shareholders459. 
§ 823 s. 2 BGB in conjunction with § 93 s. 2 AktG: (Typical case: insolvency delaying460) 
Nothing else is valid for a claim via this provision. For shareholders there is neither a 
basis of claim in § 93 s. 2 AktG, nor in § 823 s. 2 BGB in conjunction with § 93 s. 2 AktG. In 
addition to that they cannot assert the claim of the issuer461. 
§ 823 s. 2 BGB in conjunction with criminal law provisions: Untouched is the possibility to 
claim compensation when for example a criminal law provision (e. g. § 266 StGB - 
457 § 31 BGB 
458 Huffer, Uwe Aktiengesetz" 
6th Edition Munich 2004, § 79 at No. 23 
459 Huffer, Uwe Aktiengesetz" 
6th Edition Munich 2004, § 92 at No. 15f; other opinion in Zöllner, Wofgang(Editor) "Kölner Kommentar zum Aktiengesetz" 2nd 
Edition, Cologne 1988 at § 92 No. 24 (Mertens) 
460 Schmidt, Karsten Gesellschaftsrecht" 
4th Edition, Cologne, Berlin, Bonn, Munich 2002 at p. 817 
461 Huffer, Uwe Aktiengesetz" 
6th Edition Munich 2004, § 93 at No. 19 
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Breach of Trust or § 399 ff AktG - false information/ presentation of the company's 
circumstances) is infringed. 
6.6.3.2. Compensation Claims, which Could also be Filed against Third Parties 
6.6.3.2.1. Manipulation of the Quotation and Market Price According to § 20 a WpHG 
In general, this section provides legal security to the shareholder in cases in which a 
domestic quotation or the market price of an asset is influenced462. The act prohibits 
false assertion of facts relevant for the assessment, or the omission of information as 
well as acts of deception. 
The intended manipulation could be committed in a number of ways463, such as 
- Giving orders with gradually higher prices or high volume orders at the end of the 
day 
- Manipulation through buy-outs, repurchases or price care 
- Taking control of demand of the basic value or derivatives, so that they can be 
manipulated. 
It is important to mention that § 20a s. 2 WpHG provides the possibility for the 
Supervisory Authority BAFIN as well as for the Federal Ministry of Finance to 
introduce statutory instruments, which should function as guidelines. This provision is 
absolutely necessary to differentiate legal measures, which are for example essential to 
stabilise the share price. 
6.6.3.2.2. Compensation Through § 13 WpÜG 
In addition, a shareholder could search for compensation via § 13 s. 2 WpÜG. This 
paragraph regulates the financing of the offer to acquire securities. A distinction should 
be made between takeover of control and the ordinary acquisition of shares. Regarding 
the latter, the bidder is free in his choice of the quid pro quo. In contrast to this, the 
requirements for takeover of control are higher. Cash payments, compensation in liquid 
securities or securities tradable at a stock exchange in the European economic area, are 
the common methods of financing in this case. The legislator has rejected any further 
regulation464. 
This claim could be asserted legally. In this case the opposing party is not the bidder but 
the financial service corporation that produced a letter of confirmation that the bidder is 
462 Lenzen, Ursula Das neue 
Recht der Kursmanipulation" 2002 Paper No. 101 at p. 6 to download at http: //www. jura. uni- 
frankfurt. de/ifawzl/baums/ Arbeitspapiere. html 
463 Gesetzentwurf der Bundesregierung Entwurf eines 
Gesetzes zur weiteren Fortentwicklung des Finanzplatzes Deutschland (Viertes 
Finanzmarktförderungsgesetz)" 2002 to download at http: //dip. bundestag. de/btd/14/080/1408017. pdf at p. 89 
464 Vogel, Hans-fiert Finanzierung von 
Übernahmeangeboten - Testat und Haftung des Wertpapierdienstleistungsunternehmens nach § 13 WpÜG" to 
download at http: //www. jura. uni-frankfurt. de/ifawzl/baurns/Arbeitspapiere. 
htrnl Paper No. 97,2002 at p. 3 
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able to provide the funds necessary to fulfil the offer. It is important to mention that it is 
possible to agree to an exclusion of liability in the internal relationship465. 
6.6.3.2.3. Ad Hoc Announcements § 15 WpHG 
During the hausse at the end of the 1990s and the beginning of the year 2000, ad hoc 
announcements were used excessively by Neuer Markt companies to market 
themselves. Often the "breaking news" was more of a hoax than anything else. In order 
to protect investors, the legislator considerably enhanced requirements for ad hoc 
announcements with the 4. Finanzmarktforderungsgesetz in 2002466 and lowered the 
liability threshold for an offence against the norms in § 15 s. 1 to 3 WpHG. However, to 
underline the fact that this norm is not a protective law (and hence, open to claims in 
conjunction with § 823 s. 2 BGB), and serves only to secure the functioning of the capital 
markets, a claim should only be possible via §§ 37b and 37c WpHG467. In addition to 
that, sanctions provided by the public law are possible if this norm is culpably 
infringed468. 
6.6.3.2.4. Prospectus Liability according to § 45 BörsG 
Reformed in 1998 by the 3. Finanzmarktförderungsgesetz, § 45 BörsG regulates the 
liability for false or incomplete prospectuses. The term prospectus relates only to 
presentations necessary to authorise the securities for trading at a stock exchange. 
Research reports, ad hoc announcements, advertising measures, etc. do not fall under 
this provision469. 
The party opposing a claim is, therefore, the one who took responsibility of the 
prospectus or the one who issued the prospectus470 (§ 45 s. 1 s. 1 No. 1 and 2). It is 
necessary to mention in this respect that exculpation is possible471. 
Increasing globalisation has lead not only to greater complexity but also to enhanced 
competition of financial markets472. In any case the investors will carefully scrutinise the 
different requirement. It will be interesting to observe if a "race to the top" will attract 
more capital in the competing regimes as shareholders will certainly benefit from these 
improved requirements. 
465 Vogel, Hans-Gert Finanzierung von 
Übernahmeangeboten - Testat und Haftung des Wertpapierdienstleistungsunternehmens nach § 13 WpUG" to 
download at http: //www. jura. uni-frankfurt. de/ifawzl/baums/Arbeitspapiere. html Paper No. 97,2002 at p. 17 
466 § 15 s. 1 s2 to 4 WpHG 
467 Gesetzentwurf der Bundesregierung Entwurf eines 
Gesetzes zur weiteren Fortentwicklung des Finanzplatzes Deutschland (Viertes 
Finanzmarktförderungsgesetz)" 2002 to download at http: //dip. bundestag. de/btd/14/080/1408017. pdf; Regierungsentwurf eines 
Vierten 
Finanzmarktförderungsgesetzes" Zeitschrift für Bankpolitik und Bankpraxis (ZBB)- Dokumentation 6/2001 at p. 513 
468 Assmann, Heinz-Dieter / Schneider, Uwe H. , Wertpapierhandelsgesetz" 
2nd Edition Cologne 1999 at § 15 No. 165 
469 Groß, Wolfgang Kapitalmarktrecht - 
Kommentar zum Börsengesetz, zur Börsenzulassungs-Verordnung, zum Verkaufsprospektgesetz und zur 
Verkaufsprospektverordnung" 2nd Edition Munich 2002 at §§ 45,46 BörsG No. 10 ff 
470 Groß, Wolfgang Kapitalmarktrecht - 
Kommentar zum Börsengesetz, zur Börsenzulassungs-Verordnung, zum Verkaufsprospektgesetz und zur 
Verkaufsprospektverordnung" 2nd Edition Munich 2002 at §§ 45,46 BörsG No. 20: This could include anybody who had an interest in the Issue. For example: 
major shareholders, who try to sell their share, parent companies or members of the supervisory 
board. 
471 § 46 s. 1 BörsG 
472 Groß, Wolfgang Kapitalmarktrecht - 
Kommentar zum Börsengesetz, zur Börsenzulassungs-Verordnung, zum Verkaufsprospektgesetz und zur 
Verkaufsprospektverordnung" 2nd Edition Munich 2002 at §§ 45,46 BörsG No. 3 
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It is also important to mention that §§ 45 ff BörsG are special norms in contrast to 
§§ 71 ff and 57 AktG. Therefore the latter are subsidiary473. This derives not at least from 
the fact that in this case an internal exclusion of the liability is within the law474. 
6.6.3.2.5. Prospectus Liability according to § 13 VerkProspG 
Supplementary to § 45 BörsG is § 13 VerkProspG, which regulates the question of 
liability for sales prospectuses. Regarding the basis of claim, it refers to 
§§ 45 to 48 BörsG. This indicates that the rules of these norms, with certain exceptions, 
also apply for § 13 VerkProspG. Here it is important that the exclusion deadline starts 
with the first public offer. Hence, the order has to be made during this period of time 
and must be based on the faulty prospectus. 
6.6.3.2.6. Further Basis of Claims 
Compensation according to § 826 BGB may also be possible. This provision provides a 
basis for claims, in the case of wilful immoral damage by the responsible group (e. g. 
management, shareholder, or creditor), who, for example, pushed investors for 
hopeless rescue payments475. 
6.6.4. Master Action 
In November 2005 the KapMuG476 - Kapitalanleger-Musterverfahrensgesetz (Act for 
Master Actions by Investors) became effective. In February 2007 the Oberlandesgericht 
Stuttgart judged in a Master Action against DaimlerChrsler in favour of the 
defendant477. 
The main reason for the introduction of this act was the (in April 2007 at the 
Oberlandesgericht Frankfurt still) pending suit against Telekom. About 15.000 plaintiffs 
filed a suit against the Deutsche Telekom AG and pleaded that the assessment of the 
real estates of the company in the year 2000 were wrong, which resulted in a wrong 
Bourse prospectus. Consequently, it was feared that the lawsuit would take several 
years. A decision by the Bundesverfassungsgericht, which mentioned that a master 
action would be more suitable, put the legislator under pressure to make a move478. 
473 Gesetzentwurf der Bundesregierung Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur weiteren Fortentwicklung des Finanzplatzes Deutschland 
(Drittes 
Finanzmarktförderungsgesetz)" 1998 (BT-Drucksache 13/8933) to download at http: //dip. bundestag. 
de/btd/13/089/1308933. asc at p. 54,78 
474 Groß, Wolfgang Kapitalmarktrecht - 
Kommentar zum Börsengesetz, zur Börsenzulassungs-Verordnung, zum Verkaufsprospektgesetz und zur 
Verkaufsprospektverordnung" 2nd Edition Munich 2002 at §§ 45,46 BörsG No. 8ff 
475 Schmidt, Karsten Gesellschaftsrecht" 
4th Edition, Cologne, Berlin, Bonn, Munich 2002 at p. 900 
476Gesetz über Musterverfahren in kapitalmarktrechtlichen Streitigkeiten (Kapitalanleger-Musterverfahrensgesetz - 
KapMuG)" 
2005 to download at http: //www. bafin. de/gesetze/kapmug. 
htm 
477 OLG Stuttgart, 901 Kap 1/06 (15.2.2007) 
478 Möllers, Thomas M. J. /Weichert, Timan "Das Kapitalanleger-Musterverfahrensgesetz" 
in Neue juristische Wochenschrift (NJW), No. 38,2005, p. 2737-2741 at 
ý737 p... 
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By bundling capital market-related legal disputes, a master action should be created, 
which will improve the collective enforcement of shareholder claims. Not only will this 
new master action ease the workload of the civil courts, but it will also help to avoid 
complex and similar evidence-taking in a number of proceedings. Additionally, the 
KapMuG will strengthen the supervisory authority; foster legal security as diverging 
decisions will be avoided, and most importantly will improve the enforcement 
possibilities of the individual investor through proportionate distribution of costs. The 
KapMuG's range of application concerns faulty information, which for instance 
includes incorrect prospectus or incorrect ad-hoc announcements, at the capital 
market479. 
It is essential to point out that a bundling only takes place with regard to the master 
action. Consequently, it is still necessary that every shareholder needs to file his claim 
individually480. Aim of the master action is to come to a decision in advance over single 
facts of the case, conditions or legal questions481. 
The application for a master action could be made by the plaintiff or the defendant. To 
do so, the applicant needs to state that the findings of a master action will have 
implications for other similar lawsuits482. In order to make other shareholders who have 
been harmed aware of the master action, it will be published in the Bundesanzeiger483. 
Important to add is that the court of competent jurisdiction will name a master plaintiff 
according to its own consideration. Thereby the court will consider the significance of 
the plaintiff's claim and the acceptance of the other plaintiffs484. This procedure was 
introduced to avoid a "race to the courtroom" as it frequently happens in connection 
with security class actions in the U. S. 485. The decision in the master action develops a 
commitment effect. 
Attention should be drawn to Article 9 KapMuG, which states that the act is effective 
for five years. This indicates that it was introduced in order to collect experiences first 
before turning it into a permanent act. The introduction of the KapMuG should 
improve the protection of the shareholder. Whether it is a successful tool remains to be 
seen. 
479 Gesetzentwurf der Bundesregierung Entwurf eines 
Gesetzes zur Einführung von Kapitalanleger-Musterverfahren" 2004 to download at 
http: //www. bmj. de/media/archive/798. pdf at p. 1 
480 Mtillers, Thomas M. J. /Weichert, Timan "Das Kapitalanleger-Musterverfahrensgesetz" in Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (NJW), No. 38,2005, p. 2737-2741 at 
p. 2738 
481 Reuschle, Fabian "Das Kapitalanleger-Musterverfahrensgesetz" in Neue Zeitschrift für Gesellschaftsrecht (NZG), No. 13,2004, p. 590-593 at p. 591 
482 §1s. 2 s. 3 KapMuG 
483 §2s. 1 KapMuG 
484 Möllers, Thomas M. J. /Weichert, Timan "Das Kapitalanleger-Mustererfahrensgesetz" in Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (NJW), No. 
38,2005, p. 2737-2741 at 
p. 2739 
485 Reuschle, Fabian "Das Kapitalanleger-Mustererfahrensgesetz" in 
Neue Zeitschrift für Gesellschaftsrecht (NZG), No. 13,2004, p. 590-593 at p. 592 
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Having explained the new German master action, attention should be drawn to the 
possibility of shareholders joining a class or similar action abroad. Unfortunately, 
German institutional investors have an aversion against these options. Although the 
institutional investors are entitled to it, they are reluctant to recover losses on behalf of 
their clients. Certainly economical factors will make filing a claim unattractive in some 
cases. However, in the US compensation payments became enormous486. Although 
there is no legal obligation to join a Security Class Action it is the fiduciary 
responsibility of Kapitalanlagegesellschaften to maximise the contributions to their 
clients. Consequently, the latter should insist that a respective clause is stated in the 
contracts. 
6.6.5. Investors via Kapitalanlagegesellschaften 
Fund investors are also protected with the ability to claim for damages where a causal 
and culpable infringement of administrative care and due diligence by the fund 
management has occurred487. 
Such cases may be as straightforward as culpable infringement of a contract of 
agency488. More complex situations can arise where fund management has infringed an 
individual protecting statute according to § 823 s. 2 BGB489. 
Damages claims may also be based on prospect liability490, provided that the investor 
has bought shares based on incorrect specifications in a prospect or brochure. The 
legislator has tightened this direction to damage claims by demanding that the 
wrongful specifications had to be essential for the valuation of the shares. Nevertheless, 
it should be questioned whether the statement that the fund manager will fulfil his 
"fiduciary duties" or "is responsible" is essential for valuation. Although these concepts 
are certainly phrased very gently, they are of importance from the angle of corporate 
governance, but from the angle of valuation, the importance is questionable. An 
investor who buys units in a fund certainly gets a positive impression through the 
fulfilment of fiduciary duties491. Additionally, investment in a responsible fund is more 
probable than investment in a fund that abstains from its fiduciary responsibilities. 
However, should a fund promoting the compliance of fiduciary duties to increase its 
market share while knowing that it never intends to address its national/ international 
voting rights, be targeted by prospect liability? Again the question of the appraisability 
486 Settlements in the Pipeline in October 2005: >13 Billion US$ - Source: Institutional Shareholder Services 
487 Brinkhaus, Josef/Scherer, Peter Gesetz über 
Kapitalanlagegesellschaften - Auslandinvestment-Gesetz", Munich 2003 at § 10 1 No. 26 (Schödermeier/Baltzer) 
488 §§ 675,611 in conjunction with §§ 280 ff BGB 
489 For example § 278 BGB (agent who is subjected to 
directions), §§ 276,31 BGB (infringement of contract) or § 831 BGB (agent). 
490 § 127 s. 1 s. 1 InvG 
491 Brinkhaus, Josef/Scherer, Peter Gesetz über 
Kapitalanlagegesellschaften - Auslandinvestment-Gesetz", Munich 2003 at § 20 II No. 7 (Schöderrneier/Baltzer) 
146 
(Bewertbarkeit) of voting rights arises and, unfortunately, it is doubtful whether courts 
will acknowledge this appraisability. 
The pursuit of fiduciary responsibilities incurs costs492 that are passed on to the 
investor. Investors in such firms demonstrate that they are willing to pay extra for a 
responsibly managed fund. Valuation of his investment is also determined by this 
factor, with the result that responsible investment is essential. To what extent courts 
will follow such an argument remains open. The reasoning will probably follow 
arguments of economic reason493. 
Finally, the claims have to be asserted, either by the custodian bank on behalf of the 
shareholders, or by the shareholders themselves. 
6.6.6. Legal Costs 
The cost of litigation must also be considered. Where a stock corporation is defeated in 
an appeal against a resolution or in a nullity action, it is according to § 91 ZPO 
(Zivilprozessordnung - Civil Process Rule) and § 247 AktG, obliged to cover the 
plaintiff's expenses. This payment only extends to reimbursing the investor's cost to 
initiate the proceeding against the firm, while additional costs, such as those for legal 
advice, investigations, and time involved to prepare the case, are not covered494. 
However, if the plaintiff does not succeed he has to carry the costs of the litigation. In 
contrast, the management will pass on the costs to the company in the case of a defeat. 
The grand total that may be claimed by the applicants following a ruling in their favour 
is a decisive factor for an investor to initiate a judgement procedure495. This is because, 
in contrast to the appeal against a resolution or the nullity action, the legal costs have to 
be covered by the opposing party. This should ensure that a procedure is possible for 
any shareholder. However, liability of the appealing shareholder is possible on the 
grounds of equitable principles (abuse of law). 
For the sake of completeness it should be mentioned that costs for a private shareholder 
filing a lawsuit, which could be ascribed to capital market law496, may be covered by 
appropriate insurance. 
Having explained the legal basis for shareholder engagement, the following chapter 
will provide a comprehensive insight and discuss the issue of selling the shares. In 
contrast to the forms of engagement mentioned so far, I will argue that this activity does 
492 E. g. Physical representation by a German Custodian in an AGM on behalf of an institutional investor: 100 ¬/hour. 
493 E. g. Brinkhaus, Josef/Scherer, Peter Gesetz über 
Kapitalanlagegesellschaften - Auslandinvestment-Gesetz", Munich 2003 at § 10 II No. 10 
(Schödermeier/ Baltzer) 
494 Baums, Theodor Die 
Anfechtung von Hauptversammlungsbeschlüssen" Working Paper No. 85,2000 - to download at http: //www. jura. uni- 
frankfurt. de/ifawzl/baums/Arbeitspapiere. html at p. 32 
495 § 15 SpruchG 
496 BGH IV ZR 327/02 
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not really agree with the idea of corporate governance. Selling the shares, or "exit" can 
only be treated as a last resort when all forms of engagement have failed. 
6.7. Selling the Shares and Shareholder Engagement 
Selling the shares has also been referred to as "voting with the feet", or as "exit" in 
contrast to the use of shareholder "voice". In this respect Arnswald, in citing 
Hirschman, points out that "exit belongs to the realm of economics, voice belongs to the 
realm of politics"497. 
Although Figure 17 indicates that institutional investors increasingly use the voting 
right and contact the company directly to communicate issues, the selling of the shares 
remains a popular tool to avoid negative consequences. 
The shareholder could actively control the corporation, but he also has the option of 
expressing his discontentment with management by selling his shares, and in the case 
of struggling companies, may avoid heavy losses by doing so. Not only is this an easy 
course of action, but it also has a side effect. Through selling the shares pressure is put 
on management to increase the company's performance. Indeed, this "side effect" is 
arguably all the more significant precisely in markets where long term or relational 
shareholding is practised. In such countries, for instance Continental Europe (in 
contrast to Anglo-American regimes) selling the shares could be seen as active 
governance because the ending of a long-term relationship puts a higher strain on the 
board. According to Hirschman "... it is very likely that the very process of decline 
activates certain counterforces"498. Whether this statement corresponds to the facts will 
be discussed in detail below. 
While some authors see the possibility of exiting the business as contradicting the 
exercise of governance499, other writers deny to mention this option5oo. However, both 
groups view the determining factor as the liquidity of the secondary market (stock 
exchange), although they see different conditions for their conclusions. Therefore a 
closer look is necessary. 
497 Arnswald, Ulrich "Hirschman's Theory of Exit, Voice, and Loyalty Reconsidered", European Institute for International Affairs Heidelberg 1997 at p. 11 
498 Hirschman, Albert Exit, 
Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organisations and States " Harvard University Press, Cambridge 1970 at p. 15 
499 All authors take liquidity thoughts as a basis - Coffee, John Liquidity versus 
Control: The Institutional Investor as Monitor" in Columbia Law Review, Vol. 91 
No. 6,1991 p. 1277-1368; Bolton, Patrik/von Thadden, Ernst-Ludwig "Blocks, Liquidity and Corporate 
Control" in the Journal of Finance, Vol. 53, No. 1,1998 at p. 1- 
25; Bhide, Amar "The Hidden Costs of Stock Market Liquidity" in Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 89,1993 at p. 31-51; Admati, Anat/Pfleiderer, Paul/Zechner, 
Josef "Large Shareholder Activism, Risk Sharing and Financial Market Equilibrium" in Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 102, No. 6 1994 at p. 1097-1130 
500 All authors assume the existence of asymmetric distribution of 
information (characteristic of the Principal-Agent-Theory) - Holström, Bengt/Tirole, jean 
Market 
Liquidity and Performance Monitoring" in Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 101, No. 4,1993 at p. 249-259; Kahn, Charles/ Winton, Andrew Ownership 
Structure, Speculation and Shareholder Intervention" in Journal of Finance, Vol. 53, No. 1,1998 at p. 99-129; Maug, Ernst Large Shareholders as Monitors: Is there a 
Trade-Off between Liquidity and Control? " in Journal of Finance, Vol. 53, No. 1,1998, at p. 65-98 
148 
6.7.1. Denying the Correlation between Selling the Shares and Corporate Governance 
Representatives of this opinion do not deny that selling shares is a form of corporate 
governance, but from their point of view selling the shares does not correlate with 
corporate governance. For them the driving force of active governance is the 
performance of the stock market. 
Deriving from the hypothesis that an asymmetric distribution of information will lower 
the equity prices at the secondary market, Steiger expresses the opinion that this bear 
market will lead to enhanced control of the corporation501. The grade of information 
undoubtedly influences the behaviour of the investor502, while the source of the 
information, whether it is of public or inside origin503, does not matter. Followers of this 
opinion argue that the possibility of higher rates at the secondary market will increase 
efforts of institutional investors to sell shares, as the expected gains will more than 
compensate for the governance costs. Hence, the Free Rider Problem does not exist 
within these theories504. 
For a number of good reasons, however, it seems that the metaphor does not work. 
These include the facts that the capital presence in general meetings is very low, even 
though the custodian banks already provide a considerable number of votes; that 
institutional investors are not interested in blocking shares; and that there is divergence 
between the activism of pension funds and investment funds. 
The assumptions of this hypothesis are certainly not baseless, especially as the exit 
(depending on the size of the investor) could place considerable strain on the secondary 
market, which cannot be in anybody's interest. However, the weakness of the theory 
mentioned above could be the insufficient differentiation of the groups of investors 
(Hedge funds which aim on a short term profit maximisation on the one side and long 
term orientated pension funds on the other side) and the missing time frame for the 
observations. 
6.7.2. Selling the Shares as an Alternative to Corporate Governance 
Providing that the secondary market for the issued share is endowed with sufficient 
liquidity, selling appears a desirable option, as it is easy to buy and sell without fear of a 
negative market impact505. However, the question remains if it is an alternative to 
corporate governance. As mentioned above, a number of authors answer this in the 
501 Steiger, Max Institutionelle 
Investoren im Spannungsfeld zwischen Aktienmarktliquidität und Corporate Governance" Baden-Baden 2000 at p. 104 
502 Erlei, Matthias/Schmidt-Mohr, Udo in "Gabler Wirtschaftslexikon" 15th Edition Wiesbaden 2000 at p. 2481 
503 Eatwell, John/Milgate, Murray/Newman, Peter "The New Palgrave -A Dictionary of Economics" London and Basingstoke 1987 at Volume 3 p. 677-679 
"trading on information in financial markets" 
504 Steiger, Max Institutionelle 
Investoren im Spannungsfeld zwischen Aktienmarktliquidität und Corporate Governance" Baden-Baden 2000 at p. 138 
505 Strenger, Christian Corporate 
Governance - The Viewpoint of a Large Institutional Investor" in Schwalbach, Joachim Corporate Governance - Essays in 
Honor of Horst Albach" Berlin, Heidelberg 2001p. 163-172 at p. 169 
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affirmative. Not only do they come to this conclusion because of the passivity of a large 
number of institutional investors (with the exception of some pension funds like 
Ca1PERS, TIAA-CREF or Hermes) but also because of the dispersal of their shares. This 
feature suggests that a trade-off between liquidity and governance exists. Depending on 
the investment policy the interest an institutional investor usually holds in a company 
could be relatively small. This generates a readiness to sell the shares in a short time 
frame, although this can have negative effects on the stock price. 
Primary investment in shares to provide a moderate amount of liquidity (compared to 
the size of the fund) and the readiness to hold them over a short time, underline the 
assumption that institutional investors prefer to sell rather than become involved in 
corporate policy. An additional reason might also be the governance costs, which are 
considerable, while the effect of corporate governance on the stock price is positive, but 
not determinable. 
However, the studies on this issue mentioned above do not differentiate between the 
groups of shareholders. Like the empirical investigations506 these research papers only 
confirm the investment policy of the institutional investors instead of analysing if exit is 
a desirable tool to pursue corporate governance and hence their significance is limited. 
This theory is also disproved by increased involvement of institutional investors in 
corporate governance, even though it might only be used as a promotional tool. 
Additionally, selling the shares provides no guarantee that the new owner of the shares 
will take measures to correct the original problem. This means from the perspective of a 
market regulator and the economy as a whole that use of exit as an exclusive remedy 
could increase the number of avoidable corporate failures and reduce market 
efficiency507. Such a result is not desirable. 
Having explained that selling the shares is no alternative to corporate governance, it 
could be deduced that it might serve as an additional tool in the concept of corporate 
governance. 
6.7.3. Is Exit a Completion of Corporate Governance? 
An association can be drawn between shareholder engagement as an active form of 
corporate governance, and selling shares as a passive form. This assumes shareholder 
engagement is only practised when effort and costs come at least close to the declared 
target, whether this is monetary or social. Therefore if this is not the case, a reasonable 
investor would sell his shares, rather than engaging with management. 
506 Steiger, Max Institutionelle 
Investoren im Spannungsfeld zwischen Aktienmarktliquidität und Corporate Governance" Baden-Baden 2000 at p. 218-261 
507 Donald, C. David "Shareholder Voice and its Oponents" Institute 
for Law and Finance - Johann Wofgang Goethe Universität; Working Paper Series No. 40; 
06/2005 at p. 3 
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Hence, when the profit on the stock price is higher than the governance costs the 
investor would become active, if not he would prefer to sell. Since the profit achieved 
by active corporate governance is rarely determinable, either the governance costs for 
the investor have to be very small (as is certainly the case in a free rider situation), or 
the expected profit has to be considerable for governance policies to be worthwhile. 
Given this, will the trade off influence the behaviour of the management? 
Providing the liquidity of shares is limited, exit of a group of investors will increase 
pressure on the remaining shareholders rather than raising pressure on management, 
although the danger of a takeover is also increased. The management could even 
become counterproductive by presenting the company in a better light than it really is 
(Enron, Worldcom and Parmalat are good examples of this) to avoid the exit of 
investors. As Driver and Thompson point out, the management is more likely to 
promote a healthy business instead of introducing unpopular measures, which will 
adversely affect the employees508 or themselves. Therefore the danger is that stabilising 
the share price is a more important item on the agenda than introducing measures to 
emphasise necessary reforms. 
Taking these points of view into account the consequence must be that selling the 
shares is not the completion of corporate governance. Too many bad examples in 
corporate history have shown that, in certain cases, it is counterproductive and could 
even have negative effects on the economy. 
6.7.4. Increased Influence of Active Shareholders 
When a group of shareholders decides to sell their shares, the remaining investors are 
under more pressure to take an active role in governing the company and force 
management to increase its efforts. If they are not prepared to make losses by trading 
off their shares, they are left with the choices of either waiting until the crisis has 
passed, or seeking means to be corporately active. To opt for the latter has advantages 
for the stakeholder. Such advantages are that their share is enhanced because of the 
increased selling activity; other shareholders are now more prepared to support the 
trailblazer; and the influence and power of the board is diminished. Taking this into 
account the position of the remaining shareholders is increased. Hence, becoming active 
508 Driver, Ciaran /Thompson, Grahame "Corporate Governance and Democracy: The Stakeholder Debate Revisited" 2001 to download at 
http: //www. open. ac. uk/socialsciences/staff/gthompson/Corporate%20Govemance%20and%2ODemocracy. pdf - 
The authors provide a number of arguments, 
which favour the role of stakeholders rather than shareholders. They conclude that in creating systems of countervailing power, 
it is necessary to move beyond the 
level of the corporation. Hence, confining stake holding to the 
firm involves a bias against broader interests - including customers, suppliers, the environment and 
even those not working or small entrepreneurs. However, their study 
does not cover the case of a struggling company, where the shareholders has the choice 
between exit or voice. 
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is an attractive possibility for them. To give an example, in 2002 the Deutsche Telekom 
share price dropped to less than ten per cent of its highest fixture, while the 
remuneration of the board members rose by 90% in one year. Incumbent CEO Ron 
Sommer started a campaign to show that the company's situation was far better than 
the share price reflected. This was not successful and the supervisory board forced him 
to step down. This followed by a demand from the federal government, as the major 
investor with a share of 43%, to change corporate policy and the composition of the 
board. 
Increased influence is part of the reason why some fund managers (e. g. Hermes) 
explicitly search for weak stock, which they then buy cheaply. Installing governance- 
related structure helps to regain the firm's lost ground before they sell their shares, 
often with considerable gain. 
6.7.5. Conclusion 
The option of selling the shares is Janus-faced with regard to the impact on corporate 
governance. On one side a management under pressure is likely to protect its own 
stakes and present the company to be more attractive than it actually is, on the other 
side remaining shareholders become more influential, and get more active. Having 
highlighted this inconsistency, it needs to be concluded that selling shares does not 
support corporate governance. Although the exit could have positive side effects such 
as the increased opportunity for shareholder engagement, the risk of negative effects is 
also present. 
In any case shares are sold to avoid or minimise risks. Therefore the statement that 
selling shares equals "voting with the feet" is misleading. It is not related to the forms 
of shareholder engagement mentioned already. The "exit" can only be seen as a last 
resort when all other forms of engagement have failed. 
6.8. Completion of Shareholder Rights: Asset Protection and Dividend Claim 
Although asset protection and dividend claim do not belong to the hierarchy of 
shareholder engagement, they are also shareholder rights. Along with the request 
for 
information, speaking at the general meeting, the use of the voting right and the 
possibility to take legal action this claim completes the list of shareholder rights. 
Therefore in order to provide a comprehensive view of shareholder engagement and 
rights, asset protection and dividend claim should be explained 
briefly at this point. 
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Probably the most important property right is the claim of a dividend, if the corporation 
has settled a declaration of dividends in accordance with §§ 60 s. 1,58 s. 4,174 AktG509. 
In contrast to the habit of US-American companies, in Germany the dividend is paid 
only once a year510, but the dividend does not necessarily need to be paid monetarily. It 
could also be a payment in kind if it is stated in the articles of association. A humorous 
example of such a payment was the case of the Walder Bräu AG (former Brauerei 
Hanle) in Königseggwald. In 2003 this brewery paid its shareholders a dividend of five 
boxes of beer. 
Often ignored with respect to dividend payments is the issue of withholding tax. On 
dividends paid by issuers listed abroad, tax is normally charged by the respective 
national government. However, no distinction is made between national and foreign 
investors - both shareholder types pay the same tax. Although the paid tax could be 
claimed back when double taxation occurs, investors usually do not make very much 
use of this right511. It should be emphasised that this should be a fiduciary responsibility 
of any institutional investor providing that the cost justifies the expected returns. 
Necessary to mention is also § 271 s. 1 AktG. According to this regulation the 
shareholder has the right to claim the distribution of any assets of the bankrupted 
company, which remain after the fulfilment of all liabilities. The leading opinion, stated 
in the comments of Huffer and Hoffmann-Becking, endorses a restrictive clause in the 
articles of association512. This is certainly right. However, the norm has the purpose of 
protecting the assets of the investor. 
The shareholder is also entitled to claim an allocation of new shares according to his 
interest in the capital stock (i. e. he has a "right of pre-emption")513. If possible, the type 
of shares corresponds to the stakeholders' present shares. Only the person who presents 
the dividend coupon (also termed pledged proprietor) is entitled to the new stocks514. 
Finally, with regard to shareholder engagement it is important to mention that the 
shareholder is also entitled to dispose of the shares in his ownership as he wishes (e. g. 
sale, donation, transfer of ownership by way of security, pledge). Therefore the voting 
right is generally attached to the share - an issue, which frequently comes up with share 
509 Eisenhardt, Ulrich "Gesellschaftsrecht" 10th Edition Munich 2002 at No. 622 
510 § 174 sl s. 1 AktG 
511 According to Goal (www. goalgroup. com) six Billion US-Dollars of withholding tax remains unclaimed each year. 
512 Huffer, Uwe "Aktiengesetz" 6th Edition Munich 2004 at § 271 no 2 and Hoffmann-Becking, 
Michael "Münchner Handbuch des Gesellschaftsrecht - Band 4 
Aktiengesellschaft" 2nd Edition Munich 1999 § 66 No. 16 (Hoffmann-Becking) 
513 § 186 s. 1 s. 1 AktG 
514 Huffer, Uwe "Aktiengesetz" 6th Edition Munich 2004 at 
§ 186 No. 13 and Hoffmann-Becking, Michael "Münchner Handbuch des Gesellschaftsrecht - Band 4 
Aktiengesellschaft" 2nd Edition Munich 1999 
§ 56 No. 57ff (Krieger) 
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lending. To give an example, in the case of a usufruct the usufructuary is entitled to 
vote (§ 22 s. 1 No. 4 WpHG). The International Corporate Governance Network (ICGN) 
addressed this concern and formulated a Code of Best Practise515 also to improve the 
use of the voting right. 
Chapter 6 provided the hierarchy of shareholder engagement according to Company 
Law by giving an in-depth idea of the rights which the investor could pursue. As 
proved, the engagement could be quite comprehensive. Therefore it is important to 
point out that shareholder engagement has its limits, and the investor must take this 
into account when performing his activity. The following Chapter will explain the limit 
imposed by the duty of loyalty in detail. 
515 International Corporate Governance 
Network "ICGN Stock Lending Code of Best Practice" 2005, to download at 
http: //,, ww. icgn. org/organisation/documents/slc/code_final. 
pdf 
154 
7. Chapter: The Shareholders' Duty of Loyalty 
With respect to the hierarchy of shareholder engagement the duty of loyalty applies to 
the usage of the voting right. Although it also serves to limit the right to file an action, 
courts have not sanctioned shareholders yet when they did not comply with this rule. 
The other forms of engagement are not limited by the duty of loyalty. However, in 
general Hirschman acknowledges that " .... the likelihood of voice increases with the 
degree of loyalty"516. Consequently, in reverse it is possible to say that the duty of 
loyalty enhances shareholder engagement. 
In Germany the right of disposal, including the exercise of shareholder rights, is limited 
by Article 14 s. 2 s. 1 Grundgesetz. Here it is stated that property comes with obligations. 
Consequently, the existence of the duty of loyalty is not only legally accepted in 
German law but also has a constitutional basis. As it is also almost undisputed in 
modern publications, this construct provides the legal limits of share ownership and 
consequently, the exercise of shareholder rights according to the claimed hierarchy. 
The Duty of Loyalty obliges the investor to exercise his membership rights, especially 
his co-administration and control rights, with respect to the corporate interest of the 
other investors517. Therefore, the scope of this duty is wider than the prohibition of 
illegal behaviour. In the individual case it could impose duties on the shareholder to set 
aside his individual interests in favour of those of the corporation or other 
shareholders518. 
The basics for the limitation of the membership and engagement rights derive from 
§ 242 and 705 BGB - elements of confidence protection and the obligation to promote 
shareholding on the one side, and legal restriction on the other519. The consequence of a 
violation of this norm could be compensation payments according to § 826 BGB. 
To simplify matters, the duty of loyalty can be divided into four categories520: 
1. Duties of conduct in the market (e. g. insider trading (§ 38 WpHG), and offers for take- 
overs. 
2. Asset protection of shareholders (e. g. hidden dividend payouts, excessive 
compensations in subsidiary companies). 
3. Loyal behaviour in conjunction with voting (e. g. blocking essential resolutions, 
evasion of voting restrictions). 
516 Hirschman, AlbertExit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline 
in Firms, Organisations and States " Harvard University Press, Cambridge 1970 at p. 77 
517 Schmidt, Karsten Gesellschaftsrecht" 
4th Edition Cologne, Berlin, Bonn, Munich 2002 at p. 592 
518 Obermüller, Werner, Winden Die 
Hauptversammlung der Aktiengesellschaft" revised by Butzke, Volker 4th Edition Stuttgart 
2001 at p. 183 
519 Obermüller, Werner, Winden Die 
Hauptversammlung der Aktiengesellschaft" revised by Butzke, Volker 4th Edition Stuttgart 2001 at p. 183 
520 Timm, Wolfram Treuepflichten 
im Aktienrecht" in Wertpapiermitteilungen 1991 p. 481-494 at p. 483 
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4. Loyal behaviour in conjunction with the right of action (e. g. abuse of the appeal 
against general meeting resolutions) 
Having named these, it should be emphasised that the consequence of infringements 
varies. Points one and two, which are less relevant for shareholder engagement, oblige 
the offender to pay compensation. Disloyal behaviour in conjunction with voting makes 
the resolution contestable or the offender receives a fine. Finally, the abuse of the right 
of action does not provide a sanction at all. 
Almost unanimous consensus exists in the literature when it comes to the duty of 
loyalty for the majority shareholder with respect to the minority being protected. There 
is, however, disagreement whether the duty of loyalty exists between minority 
shareholders inter-se521. While some authors522 promote an effect-related duty of 
loyalty, others object this approach. They claim that a shareholder ignoring the 
necessary consideration of company concerns and the interests of fellow shareholders 
breaches a duty of loyalty. This latter opinion has to be preferred as Bungeroth523 
explains adequately: It is not a matter of loyalty but one of causality as to whether the 
investor's behaviour results in damage (e. g. accidental majority) or not. This means that 
the latter opinion pledges for a stronger assessment of the cause (negligence, gross 
negligence or intent) instead of the damage. 
In practice, the behaviour of large shareholders is naturally subject to higher standards 
and scrutinised more carefully than the behaviour of small investors. Nevertheless, 
crucial for an offence against the duty of loyalty is not only the extent of the interest 
infringement but also if the shareholder acts as an entrepreneur or a simple investor524, 
and the size of the company. It could also be assumed that greater standards for share 
ownership and engagement apply to smaller, non-listed corporations as the number of 
investors is usually kept within manageable limits compared to public companies. 
At this point it should be remembered that the nature and extent of the duty of loyalty 
is relatively unclear. This is undesirable, given the importance of transparency and 
clarity in Company Law. In order to avoid abuse and excessive application of the 
duty 
of loyalty it is therefore essential that the limits are clearly pointed out525. 
In the "Linotype" decision by the Federal High Court526 the jurisdiction stated for the 
first time the limits of shareholder engagement by acknowledging a duty of loyalty 
by 
the investor, not only towards the company but also towards other shareholders. 
521 Nodoushani, Andreas Die 
Treuepflicht der Aktionäre und ihrer Stimmrechtsvertreter" Baden-Baden 1997 
from p. 51ff 
522 Wolfgang Zöllner in Kölner 
Kommentar zum Aktiengesetz" Einleitungsband st Edition No. 169 
523 Kropff, Bruno/Semler, Johannes Münchner 
Kommentar zum Aktiengesetz" Volume 2 §§ 53a-75,2nd Edition Munich 
2003 at Vor § 53a No. 21 (Bungeroth) 
524 Schmidt, Karsten Gesellschaftsrecht" 
4th Edition Cologne, Berlin, Bonn, Munich 2002 at p. 592 
525 Kropff, Bruno/Semler, Johannes Münchner 
Kommentar zum Aktiengesetz" Volume 2 §§ 53a-75,2nd Edition Munich 
2003 at Vor § 53a No. 25 (Bungeroth) 
526 Federal High Court - Amtliche 
Sammlung der Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofs - BGHZ Volume 103 at p. 184 
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In this case the majority shareholder, who had held 96% of the shares and thus the 
votes, decided to liquidate the company in order to buy essential parts of it cheaply in 
the progress of the winding up. Due to already existing arrangements between the 
management and the majority shareholder it was not possible for the minority 
shareholder to acquire parts of the company. The BGH did not see an infringement of 
the duty of loyalty in the liquidation decision itself, but saw it in the accompanying 
circumstances. 
Until this decision was made, it was seen as neither necessary nor justifiable to define a 
comprehensive corporate legal duty of loyalty reaching beyond the general legal 
principles of §§ 226,242,826 BGB. This assumption was additionally justified by the 
law. This derives from the fact that the shareholder is mostly independent. 
Additionally, the by-laws527 sometimes can only be amended under strict rules and 
conditions (e. g. § 26 s. 5 AktG states that fixings regarding the capital structure can only 
be altered 30 years after the company was registered and when the legal relationships, 
on which the fixings are based, have been wound up for at least five years). Moreover, 
the organisational structure of the company (Management board, supervisory board, 
general meeting) and numerous protective rules existing in Company Law also serve to 
avoid the abuse of power528. 
It has been shown that in Germany the introduction of a duty of loyalty, especially in 
the light of shareholder engagement, is essential for corporate Germany and does not 
contradict the right of free property disposal. 
This is in contrast to what is accepted in the United Kingdom for example. Although 
there are exceptional legal areas where the law accepts some limit on the shareholder's 
freedom to vote as she pleases. In general shareholders are not subject to any duties 
towards their fellow shareholders or the management. It is argued that shares are the 
personal property of the shareholder. For example in North-West Transportation v Beatty 
it was ruled: "In general, the right of a shareholder to vote is regarded as a right of 
property, which he is entitled to cast in his own interests"529. He is not bound to cast his 
vote in the company's interests530. However, the court will intervene if, for instance, a 
resolution to alter the articles deprives the minority shareholders of their share of the 
company's assets531. Therefore the tests (laid down in Allen v Gold Reefs of West Africa 
Ltd and Greenhalgh v Arderne Cinemas Ltd)532 are that the resolution must be passed bona 
fide for the benefit of the company as a whole. The effect of the resolution must not be 
527 § 26 s. 5 AktG 
528 §§ 117,243 s. 2, §§ 300 ff, 309,311 ff AktG - Kropff, Bruno/Semler, Johannes Münchner 
Kommentar zum Aktiengesetz" Volume 2 §§ 53a-75,2nd Edition 
Munich 2003 at Vor § 53a No. 17 (Bungeroth) 
529 North-West Transportation Co Ltd v Beatty (1887) 12 App Cas 589 (PC), at p. 593 
530 The Law Commission "Shareholder Remedies" (1996) at p. 20 to download at www. lawcom. gov. uk/files/cp142. pdf 
531 Buckley, On the Companies Acts (1981) 14 th Edition Vol 1 p. 971 
532 Allen v. Gold Reefs of West Africa Ltd. [1900] 1 Ch. 656; Greenhalgh v 
Ardeme Cinemas Ltd [19511 Ch 286 
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to discriminate between the majority and minority shareholders. The former should not 
get an advantage of which the latter is deprived533. 
Attention should also be drawn to clause 216 of the Company Reform BiJ1534. This 
section proposes that in future, ratification of a director's breach of duty will be 
effective only if pursued by members without "personal interest" in the ratification. 
Although the legislation in the UK explicitly acknowledges the right of shareholder 
property, it imposes some limits to the disposal of such property, which at least 
indicates the existence of fundamental principles of the duty of loyalty. 
Having mentioned UK law above, the existence of a duty of loyalty is also known in US 
law (e. g. Illinois: Hagshenas v. Gaylord (1990)535) and in certain circumstances even 
imposed on minority shareholders536. Moreover, the duties and responsibilities of 
corporate directors and controlling persons (including shareholders) were already 
comprehensive537 and have even been increased by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002). 
Donald538 explains that under Delaware Law, and the laws of most U. S. jurisdictions, 
currently a shareholder owes a fiduciary duty to the corporation and any minority 
shareholder if he either owns a majority in, or exercises control over, the business affairs 
of the corporation539. He adds that this rule is also imposed on minority shareholders if 
it can be verified that they dominate and control corporate conduct540. 
An exemplary conflict between the duty of loyalty and the right of free property 
disposal could be seen in the pursuit of an investment philosophy like SRI. In the case 
of the latter, Rounds points out that 
"Social investing is a precarious investment philosophy that cannot help but reflect the personal, 
financial, social, and/or political predilections of the investor. Human nature being what it is, 
trustees will always be tempted to practice social investing in derogation of their fiduciary duty of 
undivided loyalty. " 
533 Greenhalgh v Ardeme Cinemas Ltd [1951] Ch 286,291 
534 Clause 216, Company Law Reform Bill to download at http: //www. publications. parliament. uk/pa/ld200506/ldbills/034/06034.97-103. 
htm1#ratif 
535 Hagshenas v. Gaylord, 557 N. E. 2d 316,323 (111. App. 1990), appeal 
denied, 561 N. E. 2d 691 (1990) 
536 United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; No. 94-2529, REXFORD 
RAND CORPORATION v. GREGORY ANCEL, Appeal from the United States 
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. No. 93 C 7386 
(1995) 
537 Listed and Explained in GIL, Andres V. "Legal Duties and 
Responsibilities of Corporate Directors and Controlling Persons of U. S. Publicly-Owned 
Companies", 1995, to download at http: //www. natlaw. com/pubs/usmxlaw/usmjnml. 
htm 
538 Donald, C. David "Shareholder Voice and its Oponents" Institute 
for Law and Finance - Johann Wofgang Goethe Universität; 
Working Paper Series No. 40; 
06/2005 
539 Donald, C. David "Shareholder Voice and its 
Oponents" Institute for Law and Finance - Johann Wofgang Goethe Universität; 
Working Paper Series \o. 40; 
06/2005 at p. 16 
540 Citon v. Fairchild Camera & 
Instrument Corp., 569 A. 2d 53,70 (Del. 1989) 
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He further argues that "such nonfinancial considerations necessarily divide fiduciaries' loyalty to 
the financial interests of their beneficiaries. The financial performance of SRI is "legally irrelevant" 
as the loyalty line has already been crossed"M1. 
Although this opinion raises a critical issue, it does not question the duty of loyalty 
itself. Instead, it emphasises its importance as an essential basis for the stakeholders. 
For the sake of completeness it needs to be mentioned that in Germany, the duty of 
loyalty is not only imposed on shareholders but also on the company with respect to 
their shareholders. The company has the duty of enabling every shareholder to pursue 
his shareholder rights appropriately and without hindrance. Additionally, it has to 
refrain from any measure which could encroach on these rights542. This must be in the 
interest of the company anyway, as an infringement might pave the way for an action. 
Drawing a conclusion, it makes sense that the duty of loyalty applies to the voting right. 
The right to file a suit is regulated by existing laws and other forms of shareholder 
engagement do not provide a sufficiently deep possibility to encroach corporate affairs. 
In contrast to that he voting right in the hands of a majority shareholder could provide 
a powerful tool, which has to be executed in the interest of all shareholders, while 
protecting the minority. 
The points mentioned above also clarify that the duty of loyalty does not support the 
possibility of forming alliances or sustain common approaches to issues like class 
actions, negotiations or overcoming the free-rider problem. At this point in time the 
duty of loyalty is only imposed on majority shareholders and only when there is a case 
of a severe infringement of loyalty towards fellow investors. Therefore shareholders 
who do not fall into this category have the right to dispose freely on their investment. 
This means that the duty of loyalty cannot impose a positive duty to vote, to participate 
in an action or in negotiations. Equally, the free-rider problem cannot be solved by the 
duty of loyalty - agency costs of active shareholders cannot be balanced this way 
(an 
alternative solution to this latter issue will be provided later in this thesis (Chapter 
10.2. ). 
Part B described the realisation of shareholder engagement in corporate Germany. It 
examined how the hierarchy of shareholder engagement could be employed. 
541 Baue, William "Fiduciary Duty, Undivided Loyalty, and Socially Responsible Investment 
Performance", 2004 to download at 
http: //www. socialfunds. com/news/article. cgi/articlel530. 
htm1; ROUNDS, Charles "Public Pension Funds, Charitable Funds, and the Social Security Trust Fund: 
When the State Gets into the Investment Business, Social Investing 
is Inevitable and there is Little the Law Can Do about it", 2004 at p. 1 to download at 
www. aei. org/docLib/20040604-Rounds. pdf 
542 Kropff, Bruno/Semler, Johannes Münchner 
Kommentar zum Aktiengesetz" Volume 2 §§ 53a-75,2nd Edition Munich 2003 at Vor § 53a No. 24 (Bungeroth) 
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Part C will now explain reforms introduced by the legislator as well as theories 
(including own theories) on further improvement of the shareholder engagement 
regime in Germany. 
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Part C- Reform 
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8. Chapter: A more Detailed Analysis of Recent Legislative Reforms 
With a number of initiatives in recent years, the legislator has shown a remarkable 
activity to reform the Company Law not only in order to keep pace with other financial 
markets but also to improve the environment for shareholder engagement. Important 
laws in this area include the Finanzmarktforderungsgesetze (especially the 3rd in 1998 
and the 4th in 2002), the KonTraG of 1998, the NaStraG of 2001, the TransPuG of 2002 
and the UMAG of 2005 as well as other acts, which only touched on the Company Law 
in less significant areas. Unfortunately, these acts represent more a "reform in 
permanence", as Noack543 describes it and not a fundamental modification of the 
Company Law. The legislator often does not pass crucial amendments, because the 
lobby of issuers, Kapitalanlagegesellschaften or custodians oppose these amendments 
successfully. 
Although there are still a lot of legal deficits which have not been removed yet, it can be 
stated that the German capital market slowly shows the necessary development and 
strengthens the position of the shareholder. 
8.1. The KontraG - Gesetz zur Kontrolle und Transparenz im Unter- 
nehmensbereich 1998 (Corporation Control and Transparency Act) 
On the 1st of May 1998, the German Government introduced a first wave of reforms 
towards a more competitive Stock Corporation Act. The new KonTraG can be seen as a 
first step towards a number of changes made by the legislative body. Other important 
changes with an impact on corporate governance were made in the "Unternehmens- 
und Kapitalmarktrecht" (company- and capital market law), the "Gesetz für kleine 
Aktiengesellschaften" (Act Governing Small Non-listed Stock Corporations) and the 
"Gesetz zur Deregulierung des Aktienrechts" (Act to Deregulate the Company Law). 
The KonTraG544primarily focused on the legal requirements of the supervisory board, 
enhancement of transparency and strengthening of the shareholder meeting. 
It provides for management boards of stock corporations being obliged to concern 
themselves with adequate risk-management and internal revision. Moreover, the duty 
to inform the supervisory board about future company policy is strengthened. 
The number of mandates a member of the supervisory board could have were reduced 
to ten (by the Corporate Governance Code to five and now the recommendation is 
543 Noack, Ulrich Neuerungen 
im Recht der Hauptversammlung durch das Transparenz- und Publizitätsgesetz und den Deutschen Corporate Governance 
Kodex" in Der Betrieb (DB) 12th Issue 2002 p. 620-626 at p. 626 
544 Shearman, John "Germany - Controlling Directors the German Way" in the 
Company Lawyer Vol. 18 No. 4 (1997) p. 123-125 at p. 123 
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scrutinised to reduce it to three! ), while the chairman's mandate counts double, and the 
mandates have to be published. Additionally, annual meetings have to be held at least 
four times a year. Furthermore, the commission of the final auditor is no longer carried 
out by the management board, but by the supervisory board. Therefore it is only a 
logical consequence that it is the duty of the final auditor to be present at the balance 
meeting of the shareholder representatives' board. He has to present his report to all 
members of the board. All in all this should provide a greater distance between the 
auditors and the management. In its report to the general meeting, the supervisory 
board has to declare how often it has met and how many panels it has formed. 
Moreover, it has become easier to call the members of the management board or the 
supervisory board to account for serious misconduct. 
In the KonTraG, reforms concerning the shareholder rights have also been introduced. 
Shareholders now have better access to information concerning the financial situation of 
the company. Additionally, the practice of proxy voting by banks is more closely 
related to the interest of the shareholders. Moreover, banks must no longer exercise 
proxy votes when they own more than 5% of the firm's equity themselves, unless they 
receive specific voting instructions. However, the practical consequences of the latter 
will be marginal, since this requirement primarily changes the layout of the forms used 
to solicit proxy votes545 
Worth mentioning is also that multiple votes (Mehrstimmrechte)546 are not possible 
anymore. The highest voting right (Höchststimmrecht) is only possible in unlisted 
companies. The cumulating of influence resulting from share ownership and proxy 
votes of the custodian banks is weakened as § 128 s. 2 s. 2 AktG now states that the bank 
has to follow the interest of the represented shareholder and not its own. 
To draw a conclusion of the KonTraG, with this Act in 1998 the German Government 
has started to take care of necessary reforms. Whether these reforms provide a better 
control over company policy remains unclear. However, the fact that the legislation has 
recognised the necessity to improve the two-tier system shows that the problems and 
scandals in the mid-nineties have not been taken as a matter of fact. 
545 Boehmer, Ekkehart "Transparency of Ownership and 
Control in Germany" 1998 at http: //w, %-,. wi; A-i. hu-berlin. de/-boehmer/papers/gennany2. pdf at p. 
23 
546 See Chapter 6.2.5.1. Voting Restrictions 
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8.2. The NaStraG - Gesetz zur Namensaktie und zur Erleichterung der 
Stimmrechtsausübung 2001 (Law on Registered Shares and Simplified 
Rules for the Exercise of Voting Rights) 
Of course, the wave of new reforms in German Company Law could easily be attached 
to the demands of an increasingly global economy. However, not only has the legislator 
become active but also a number of renowned issuers. In order to become more 
attractive they changed their bearer-share equity into registered shares. 
These changes on the German capital market also required consideration by the 
legislator. Therefore on the 25th of January 2001 the legislator introduced the "Gesetz 
zur Namensaktie und zur Erleichterung der Stimmrechtsausübung" - Law on 
Registered Shares and Simplified Rules for the Exercise of Voting Rights (NaStraG) 547. 
The intention of accepting new communication forms through the legislator was to 
allow for the fact that the number of shares and shareholders have increased and have 
became more global. Although these changes were substantial for the Stock 
Corporation Act, the formal requirements and the technical proceedings were not 
reformed548. In contrast to the KonTraG, the NaStraG primarily focused on improving 
the good practice of German companies and therefore did not concentrate on changing 
the legal environment but instead on improving the possibilities for stock corporations, 
giving them more organisational independence. 
The reforms of the NaStraG have a considerable impact on Company Law as it enables 
listed German companies to: 
-Simplify the exchange of anonymous bearer-share equity into registered shares 
-Establish electronic proxy voting to general meetings 
-Establish electronic notices of general meetings 
-Establish electronic tabulation of vote counts at shareholders' meetings 
In addition to that, it includes some alterations in the area of the post formation law 
(Nachgründungsrecht) and announcements in the commercial register. 
The changes of this act met with unanimous approval among the renowned 
German 
stock corporations, as it was seen as a tool to encounter the ongoing 
decrease of capital 
presence at general meetings in Germany. Maybe there was even 
hope that NaStraG 
created the possibility of a higher turn-out at meetings. 
Unfortunately, the development 
547 Gesetzentwurf der Bundesregierung Entwurf eines 
Gesetzes zur Namensaktie und zur Erleichterung der Stimmrechtsausübung 
(Namensaktiengesetz - 
NaStraG)" (BT-Drucksache 14/4051) 2000 to 
download at http: //dip. bundestag. de/btd/14/040/1404051, pdf 
548 Gesetzentwurf der Bundesregierung Entwurf eines 
Gesetzes zur Namensaktie und zur Erleichterung 
der Stimmrechtsausübung (Namensaktiengesetz - 
NaStraG)" (BT-Drucksache 14/4051) 
2000 to download at http: //dip. bundestag. de/btd/14/040/1404051. pdf 
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was slower than expected. Although the capital presence started improving as a result 
of this reform, it was not yet able to cushion the retreat of the custodian banks. 
8.3. The TransPuG - Transparenz- und Publizitätsgesetz 2002 (Transparency 
and Publicity Act) 
First of all, the TransPuG introduced deregulations in the areas of finance, general 
meeting and information of the shareholders, as well as other thematic focal points like 
the supervisory board and its supply with information-149. The TransPuG primarily 
aimed at broadening the rights of shareholders by introducing good-practice-provisions 
for German stock corporations. Legally binding reforms were less of the target of this 
act. 
With regard to shareholder engagement, a number of considerable suggestions towards 
the revaluation of the general meeting, the use of new media, access and quality of 
corporate information and the jurisdiction were made. 
The TransPuG primarily implemented the findings of the Commission "Corporate 
Governance - Corporate Conduct - Corporate Control - Modernisation of the Stock 
Corporation Act" and the subsequent Cromme Commission, which created the 
standards of the German Corporate Governance Code into Company Law. 
To point out the significance of the panel's work in formulating the Corporate 
Governance Code, nearly 150 recommendations for amendments or changes to existing 
provisions of German law were made. Furthermore, the panel evaluated all proposals 
on how the German corporate governance system should be further developed in order 
to maintain a normative framework that is suitable and attractive not only for 
companies but also for domestic and foreign investors550. 
In the foreword of the German Corporate Governance Code it is stated that551: the 
drawn up Code presents essential statutory regulations for the management and 
supervision (governance) of German listed companies and contains internationally and 
nationally recognised standards for good and responsible governance. The Code aims 
at making the German corporate governance system transparent and understandable. 
Its purpose is to promote the trust of international and national investors, customers, 
549 Gesetzentwurf der Bundesregierung Entwurf eines 
Gesetzes zur weiteren Reform des Aktien- und Bilanzrechts, zu Transparenz und 
Publizität (Transparenz- 
und Publizitätsgesetz)" 2002 to download at 
http: //www. bmj. bund. de/media/archive/301. pdf at p17 
550 Report of the Panel on Corporate Governance to 
download on http: //wivw. ovs. de/corporate_govemance. htrn (English conclusion available) or press rccp rt 
304/01 
551 German Corporate Governance 
Code to download at www. corporate-governance-code, de/eng/dow-nload/DCG_K_E200-105. pdf at 
1. Foreword 
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employees and the general public in the management and supervision of listed German 
stock corporations. 
The Code was established in § 161 AktG and rules that listed German stock 
corporations have to explain annually whether they comply with the provisions of the 
German Corporate Governance Code or not. If they chose not to comply, the 
corporations have to justify their refusal in the Bundesanzeiger. 
With regard to shareholder engagement only those recommendations having an effect 
on it should be highlighted. 
First of all, the introduction of the Bundesanzeiger in an electronic format needs to be 
pointed out. In contrast to the printed form, the new electronic Bundesanzeiger can 
provide far more information to the shareholder. In future it is even a possibility to 
create an uninterrupted information chain to the securities account held online552. 
It is also recommended that the announcement of a general meeting is published on the 
stock corporation's webpage (Clause 3.2.1 Deutscher Corporate Governance - Kodex). 
Noack points out that an obligatory publication of general meeting resolutions on the 
webpage is threatened by nullity action (§ 241 S. 1 AktG) while in contrast to that a 
voluntary publication has no consequences553. 
Furthermore, the German Corporate Governance Code enhanced the duty of the issuer 
to inform their investors. Now the stock corporation should also send the notice of the 
general meeting to all domestic and foreign financial services, shareholders and 
shareholder associations. In general this is also provided by law 
(§ 125 s. 1, s. 2 no. 1, s. 2 no. 3, s. 5 AktG). 
According to the code, additional information such as the annual report should also be 
provided on the webpage (Clause 2.3.1 Deutscher Corporate Governance - Kodex). 
The reform of §126 s. 1 AktG certainly aims in the right direction. According to this 
paragraph, the stock corporation only needs to make counter-proposals to items on the 
agenda accessible. This means that publishing them on the webpage is legally sufficient. 
However, this is attached to less of a legal but more of a technical problem. When 
making counter-proposals accessible on its webpage, the company faces the problem 
that they become public knowledge. In order to prevent this from occurring, an access 
code needs to be introduced. Another idea is to inform only the known proxies, 
associations and custodians about counter-proposals and to make interested 
shareholders aware of the fact that they could have a look at those when contacting 
these institutions. For an active investor this is certainly cumbersome but reasonable. 
552 Noack, Ulrich Neuerungen 
im Recht der Hauptversammlung durch das Transparenz- und Publizitätsgesetz und den Deutschen Corporate Governance 
Kodex" in Der Betrieb (DB) 12th Issue 2002 p. 620-626 at p. 620 
553 Noack, Ulrich Neuerungen 
im Recht der Hauptversammlung durch das Transparenz- und Publizitätsgesetz und den Deutschen Corporate Governance 
Kodex" in Der Betrieb (DB) 12th Issue 2002 p. 620-626 at p. 621 
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Alternatively, the issuer could also ask the author of the counter-proposal if he objects 
to a publication of his motion. This matter does occur with issuers of registered shares. 
However, an improvement regarding shareholder rights is also given by the fact that 
the time for counter-proposals is extended to one week before the day of the general 
meeting (so far it has been only one week in total). 
A relief for members of the supervisory board is provided in § 118 s. 2 AktG. As per this 
paragraph they could participate via image and sound (e. g. Video screen). 
It is also encouraging that the company can include the broadcast of the general 
meeting in image and sound (§ 118 s. 3 AktG) in their articles of association. 
Kapitalanlagegesellschaften are now enabled to pass on their votes durably to a proxy. 
This is certainly a relief as it makes the voting process considerably easier. 
Unfortunately, the legislator did not follow the first draft of the bill where the 
introduction of a record date was planned. With a delay, this provision was taken up by 
the UMAG and should, therefore, be mentioned again below. 
Moreover, the possibility for the shareholder to vote directly online without the 
requirement of physical presence or the involvement of a proxy was neglected. 
To draw a conclusion, the TransPuG is more of a mini-reform than a real improvement 
of the Stock Corporation Act. Courageous amendments were omitted. Only the most 
necessary reforms to keep up the pace with other financial markets were realised and a 
good opportunity was lost. Hopefully the legislator will be more progressive in future 
reforms. 
8.4. The UMAG - Gesetz zur Unternehmensintegrität und Modernisierung 
des Anfechtungsrechts 2005 (Act for Enterprise Integrity and the 
Modernisation of the Right to Appeal)5M 
The latest legal activity, which will take effect probably in the second half of 2005, 
targets primarily three areas: reform of the right to appeal, the revision of the directors 
and officers (D&O) liability and the law of the special audit, and the preparation and 
realisation of AGMs. In this context the UMAG is, because of the legal requirements, 
comparable to the KonTraG. The essential rules are binding and do not rely on the good 
practice of the market participants. 
Seibert/Schütz555 emphasises accurately that the UMAG strengthens the conditions of 
the right to appeal. It enhances the possibility to 
block important resolutions with a 
554Bundesjustizministerium "Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur 
Unternehmensintegrität und Modernisierung des Anfechtungsrechts (UNIAG)" 200-1 to download at 
http: / / %ýw%%,. bmj. bund. de/ media/ archive/701. pdf 
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single share, while the liability of the corporation has been improved in favour of the 
shareholder. Here the improvement of the law is significant as financial requirements 
for shareholders to file a suit have been reduced to 1% of the capital stock or the market 
value of the shares exceeding 100,000 Euro. This means that now almost any 
institutional shareholder and a considerable number of private shareholders will be 
entitled to file a suit. 
With respect to the admission of a suit, the enhancement for a second or third filing is 
remarkable. The course of law in these cases will only be open if the plaintiff provides 
new information, which is not subject of the first suit. However, with regard to 
shareholder rights it has to be pointed out that in cases where the rules mentioned 
above are applied, the company has the right claim and not the shareholder. 
A small revolution are the changes provided in § 123 ss. 2-4 AktG. Here the legislator 
recognised the changing shareholder environment towards an increase of global 
holdings and an enhanced demand for electronic communication, and therefore 
introduced a record date. This means that the requirement of depositing the shares 
prior to a general meeting became obsolete. Now the relevant factor is the registration 
to the general meeting. In the case of bearer shares a certificate by the custodian bank is 
necessary. 
The potential of this reform are expressed by Noack556: 
"It is expected that this regulation makes voting for foreign institutional shareholders easier, and 
that it will fit into the future efforts by the EU with respect to cross border voting. " 
With the introduction of § 127a AktG, the legislator improves shareholder 
communication in order to give them the opportunity to organise themselves whenever 
the law requires value or quorum thresholds. The Bundesanzeiger will provide a 
"Shareholder Forum' where an investor can file his request, for which he needs a 
certain stock value or quorum. 
In addition to that, the rights of the chairman in the general meeting have been 
extended (§ 131 s. 3, s. 6 AktG). With the intention of increasing the efficiency of the 
shareholder assembly, it is now possible to limit the time for shareholders to hold their 
speech or ask their questions. Moreover, the company can offer to accept written 
questions, which it will answer during the meeting. Although this provision guarantees 
the company flexibility557, the danger is that floodgates potentially producing contrary 
effects will be opened, as it is naturally easier to formulate a question in a written 
form 
than posing it in front of some hundred shareholders. 
555 Seibert, Ulrich/Schütz, CarstenDer Referentenentwurf eines Gesetzes zur Unternehmensintegrität und 
Modernisierung des Anfechtungsrechts - L'\IAG" in 
Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht (ZIP) 2004 p. 252-258 at p. 252 
556 Noack, Ulrich Erleichterung grenzüberschreitender 
Stimmrechtsausübung - Bericht über eine Initiative 
der niederländischen Regierung und der 
Euroäischen Union" in Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht (ZIP) 2002 p. 1215-1216 at p. 
1215 
557 Seibert, Ulrich/Schütz, Carsten Der 
Referentenentwurf eines Gesetzes zur Unternehmensintegrität und Modernisierung 
des Anfechtungsrechts - UMHAG" in 
Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht (ZIP) 2004 p. 252-258 at p. 
256 
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Finally, the UMAG also modernised the right to appeal in the new § 243 s. 4 s. 1 AktG by 
following the ruling of the BGH558 (Federal High Court). This paragraph demands that 
it is now decisive, if a shareholder judging objectively made his actions dependent on 
the content of the inquiry. Additionally, § 243 s. 4 s. 2 AktG limited the possibility of an 
appeal against a resolution when the information duty has been violated. 
The introduction of a release procedure for certain structure-changing resolutions 
(§ 246a AktG for the appeal against a resolution and § 249 s. 1 s. 1 AktG in connection 
with § 246a AktG for the nullity action) has also to be assessed as a positive reform. This 
measure disarms shareholders who simply want to block a resolution with the aim of a 
lucrative settlement, and enables the corporation to move forward with necessary 
resolutions, which are in its interest. In other words, although a nullity action or an 
appeal against the resolution has been successful, the registered resolution cannot be 
declared invalid by the judgement of the court. However, § 246a s. 8 AktG provides 
compensation for the successfully appealing shareholder. 
With regard to shareholder engagement, the UMAG provides a number of positive 
reforms, which will certainly enhance the ability of investors to become active. In 
addition to that, the necessary respect and understanding is drawn to the further 
development of corporate governance. 
Nevertheless, it has been critically stated above and should be mentioned here again, 
that the UMAG is another indicator that the legislator prefers a Company Law reform 
"in permanence". 
8.5. Further Anticipated Legal Reforms 
Shareholders could expect a number of legal initiatives in future. This does not only 
derive from the legal activity of the Securities and Exchange Commission in the last two 
years and the impact of new regulations by the European Union, but also from the 
increased importance of the capital market for the pension scheme. 
Currently, the legislator plans to scrutinise the liability for false capital market 
announcements. This initiative is primarily the consequence of the abuse of ad 
hoc 
news and other information during the soaring of the Neuer Markt. 
Unfortunately, the 
introduction of this act has been postponed until the European Union 
has clarified its 
approach to this issue. 
558 Amtliche Sammlung der Entscheidungen 
des Bundesgerichtshofs - BGHZ Volume 122, p211 
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Quite important is the European Commission's Action Plan on modernising Company 
Law and enhancing corporate governance in the EU559. The Commission found that the 
necessary framework should be developed in a Directive since an effectively exercising 
these rights requires a number of legal difficulties yet to be solved560. This already 
indicates that the impact of this Directive will be considerable. 
Also on a European level, the implementation of the regulations of the Societas Europea 
into national law could be expected. However, the conversion into respective acts will 
mostly only affect corporations with European cross-border holdings561. 
Finally, the work of the OECD's Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering also 
needs to be mentioned. To avoid the criminal activities of money laundering and 
financing of terrorist activities, it is being contemplated to abandon the bearer share, or 
at least to develop this system so that the beneficial owner is made visible. 
8.6. Conclusion 
There is certainly some truth in the statement that whatever the SEC decides today will 
become law in Germany five years later. Nevertheless, the German legislator does not 
only show considerable activity in the regulation or deregulation of the financial market 
in Germany, but also a sensitive approach in improving the environment for 
shareholder engagement in order to make it a stronger governor of the company. 
This has to be embraced, not only against the background of the corporate scandals but 
also because of the increasing impact of globalisation on the domestic financial markets 
and the growing importance of the stock markets for the old-age insurance. 
Future legal initiatives will certainly be driven by impacts of the international financial 
markets instead of national requirements. 
559 European Commission - Directorate General Internal 
Market Fostering an 
Appropriate Regime for Shareholders'Rights" 2004 to download at 
http: //europa. eu. int/comm/intemal_market/company/shareholders/ consultation_en. pdf 
560 European Commission - Directorate General 
Internal Market,, Fostering an Appropriate Regime for Shareholders'Rights" 2004 to download at 
http: //europa. eu. int/comm/intemal_market/company/shareholders/ consultation_en. pdf at p. 
5 
561 Heidel, Thomas "Aktienrecht - Aktiengesetz, Gesellschaftsrecht, 
Kapitalmarktrecht, Steuerrecht, Europarecht" Bonn 20(13 at p. 2712 
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9. Chapter: Theories on the Reform of the System 
There are a number of theories on reform of the shareholder engagement system. Some 
just aim at marginal alterations in the appropriate acts. Others question the system as a 
whole. Unfortunately, some of these theories are not well thought through, 
inappropriate for the German legal system, or legal development (e. g. the NaStraG or 
the TransPuG) has made them superfluous. 
With respect to shareholder engagement in Germany, the majority of proposals for 
reforms aim at the role of custodian banks. Although the criticism of some authors of 
the current German system is often logical and understandable, they lack a global 
dimension in a world of Enrons, Worldcoms and Parmalats. Moreover, the introduction 
of proxy agents provided by stock corporations through § 134 s. 3 s. 3 AktG forced some 
custodian banks to pull out of the proxy voting business. Additionally, the losses they 
produced annually in this area, the bad reputation of this business, and the 
concentration on the original scopes of business probably made it considerably easy for 
them to accept it, and even to accelerate this development. Hence, institutional 
investors will have to conduct their voting independently from the custodian banks in 
future. This statement is emphasised by the introduction of § 32 s. 1 s. 4 InvG, which 
provides that a Kapitalanlagegesellschaft is authorised to appoint somebody to function 
as a proxy agent only for isolated cases. This means that it is impossible to pass on 
permanent power of attorney and full discretionary power -a single instruction for 
each point on the agenda is required. In contrast to the simple representative, an 
independent proxy voting service could be authorised durably and without instructions 
(§ 32 I S. 5 InvG). 
Having emphasised the actual role of the custodian banks in Germany, fundamental 
theories that go beyond this issue rarely exist (or have already been discussed in this 
thesis) and thus should not be taken into account in this connection. In the following 
some theories on the reform of the system are provided. Thereby it needs to be pointed 
out that although some reforms were developed for an anglo-american legel system 
they are, at least to a certain extent, also applipicable in Germany. 
9.1. Geldmacher 
A modern system of proxy voting is promoted by Geldmacher562. The intention of his 
concept is to intensify the contest for the power of disposition on enterprise-tied 
resources through a separate "trade of votes"563. Hence, he favours a market-controlled 
562 Geldmacher, Detlef "Marktorientierte Managerkontrolle: Stimmrechte als 
Kontrollinstrument" 1st Edition, Wiesbaden 2000 
563 Geldmacher, Detlef "Marktorientierte Managerkontrolle: Stimmrechte als 
Kontro11instrument" 1st Edition, Niesbaden 2000 at p. 248 
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coordination of proxy votes. He bases his theory on the relationship between vote and 
share price. The shareholder should be enabled to trade his vote according to a self- 
determined price. The acquirer will obtain the power of disposition and executes the 
vote on his behalf, which should have a positive effect on shareholder value. 
Undoubtedly, the advantage of this concept is that the cast votes will be used most 
efficiently. The collector will try to achieve the necessary majority of votes. Thus the 
danger of accidental majorities no longer exists. 
Furthermore, the market of votes could serve as an indicator as to whether a suffering 
share price is the result of a weakening economy or bad management564. Hence, 
management will be put under pressure when a gap appears between the two rates. 
A number of hedge funds already make use of this tool565. Black and Hu explain that 
"certain equity derivatives and other capital market developments now allow shareholders to 
readily decouple voting rights from economic ownership of shares. This decoupling (the new vote 
buying) is largely undisclosed and unregulated"566. 
Regrettably, Geldmacher's theory and the new capital market developments provide a 
number of weaknesses and dangers: 
Through the introduction of a market for votes, the free-rider problem would be 
aggravated rather than defused. Firstly, an acquirer would have to carry the governing 
costs, like those for research or consulting. Secondly, he would be faced with the 
expenses to gather and cast the necessary votes. Thirdly, the spending for 
administration should not be underestimated (e. g. contacting the custodians, creating 
the ballots, etc. ). 
Furthermore, this opinion does not sufficiently consider the problem that the market for 
votes would probably become the focus of the shareholders' attention instead of 
governance issues. Large investors could try to initiate a proxy contest, which they 
would probably win; not because they have the better arguments, but because they are 
willing to spend more than the opponent. A good example for this point is a takeover 
battle. 
Finally, a market for votes could infringe the existing 
1aw567. In 
§ 405 s. 3 No. 2 and No. 3 AktG it is stated that somebody acts against the regulations 
when he uses somebody else's shares, which he received 
by granting or the promise of 
special advantages in a general meeting. 
Although this theory provides an interesting approach, it does not provide satisfactory 
arguments for the discussion of reforming the system. 
564 Geldmacher, Detlef "Marktorientierte Managerkontrolle: Stimmrechte als 
Kontrollinstrument" 1st Edition, b'iesbaden 2000 at p. 279 
565 Black, Bernard/Hu, Henry, Hedge Funds, Insiders, and 
Empty Voting: Decoupling of Economic and Voting Ownership in Public Companies" March 
2006, 
ECGI - Law Working 
Paper No. 56/2006, to download at http: //ssm. com/abstract=874098 
566 Black, Bernard/Hu, Henry, "Hedge Funds, Insiders, and 
Empty Voting: Decoupling of Economic and Voting Ownership in Public Companies" March 
2006, 
ECGI - Law Working 
Paper No. 56/2006, to download at http: //ssm. com/abstract=874098 at 
Abstract 
567 Fraune, Christian "Der Einfluss institutioneller 
Anleger in der Hauptversammlung" Cologne, Berlin, Bonn, Munich 1996 at p. 47 
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9.2. Latham 
An interesting theory was developed by Mark Latham568. He suggested the 
implementation of a "Corporate Monitoring Firm", which does not require a particular 
board or legal system and hence, is restricted by national circumstances. 
According to his view, the shareholders should vote and choose an independent agency 
for nominating director candidates. This will make directors responsive to owners 
rather than to management, while avoiding the free-rider569 problem that limits the 
effectiveness of other solutions. Furthermore, he suggests that the nominating entity 
will need to monitor director performance in order to decide whether to select a given 
candidate again, for the board of the same or another firm. Also it could perform 
further monitoring functions if requested by a majority of shareholders570. 
Latham highlights that such a "Corporate Monitoring Firm" has the advantage over the 
system that is existing so far that the intermediate would be paid by each corporation 
about which they give advise, in accordance with shareholder votes so as to preclude 
management influence571. This payment system is analogous to a citywide tax572. In 
other words, the benefit of this system is undoubtedly the coverage of governance costs 
by the stock corporations. Through this equilibrium, investors will be afforded an 
effective pursuit of corporate governance issues. 
Latham then continues with a prevailing argument. According to Latham, most 
important is that the "Corporate Monitoring Firm" would be independent. This would 
allow the shareholder to make powerful monitoring decisions as several monitoring 
companies will strive to build a reputation for sound business judgement and 
independence from the managers of the corporation they monitor. Compared to an 
individual director, such a firm would provide services to many more client companies 
over many more years, permitting a far more accurate assessment of its capability573. 
Thus, the alignment of the monitoring firm with the investors will promote more 
effective governance. In addition to that, directors are chosen by their competence 
instead of their influence of the electing body. Hence the influence of shareholders will 
increase, as they can dismiss the monitors annually, and the monitors can dismiss the 
board574 
568 Latham, Mark The 
Corporate Monitoring Firm" in Corporate Governance - An International Review January 1999 (Volume 7 No. 1) and at 
www. corpmon. com/CorpMonFirm. htm 
569 The Free Rider Problem occurs when one investor gets active and carries the costs for his engagement, while shareholders who prefer to stay passive get the 
benefits of the activity without carrying any expanses. 
570 Latham, Mark The 
Corporate Monitoring Firm" in Corporate Governance - An International Review January 1999 (Volume 7 No. 1) and at 
www. corpmon. com/CorpMonFir, m. htm at -2. Solution: A Monitoring Intermediary- 
571 Latham, Mark "The Road to Shareowner Power" May 1999 at www. corpmon. com/Road. htm at -Abstract- 
572 Latham, Mark "The Road to Shareowner Power" May 1999 at www. corpmon. com/Road. htm at -2. The Free-Rider Problem and Its Solution- 
573 Latham, Mark , 
The Corporate Monitoring Firm" in Corporate Governance - An International Review January 1999 (Volume 7 No. 1) and at 
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574 Latham, Mark The 
Corporate Monitoring Firm" in Corporate Governance - An International Review January 1999 (Volume 7 No. 1) and at 
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htm at -3. Potential Benefits of Monitoring Intermediaries- 
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A third point favouring this system is the up-valuation of information. In order to 
provide the shareholders with accurate information, the monitor should go beyond 
publicly available information, to the point where they would be legally considered 
insiders. Investors must avoid this possibility or risk having to restrict their trading 
activity575. 
Finally, he argues that 
"effective shareholder representation at the bargaining table will bring the compensation of top 
executives closer to the market value of each manager's contribution to the value of the company. 
Oversight of the process of training and promoting middle managers can prevent a clique from 
monopolising the knowledge of how to best run the firm576. " 
An assessment of Latham's suggestions is not easy. On the one hand they are well 
thought through and provide a number of interesting improvements to the proxy 
system; on the other hand it is questionable whether there is a possibility that this 
theory could ever become a part of the German Company Law. Latham's proposals are 
probably more applicable to "outsider systems" of governance with more dispersed 
share ownership (e. g. the US or the UK). 
With regard to Germany one point of criticism would be that the tasks of the 
monitoring firm are too closely related to those of the supervisory board. In a regime 
with corporate monitoring firms and supervisory boards, issues regarding the 
competence and the spheres of responsibility would be pre-programmed. Hence, it 
would be easier and make more sense to reform the system of the supervisory board 
than implementing a competing institution operating at the same level. This would 
most probably invoke the question of power and additionally, the administrative 
machinery would become inflated and costly. 
9.3. Monks 
In using a historical method, Bob Monks577 pleads that true balance of power 
equilibrium is essential to both the political legitimacy and the economic 
competitiveness of large corporations. 
According to Monks, the development of corporate governance started with the 
recognition and the consequent separation of ownership and control. This era was 
followed by what he calls shareholder resolutions and boardroom discussions, meaning 
the slow emancipation of institutional shareholders. However, he suggests that a new 
575 Latham, Mark The 
Corporate Monitoring Firm" in Corporate Governance - An International Review January 1999 (Volume 
7 No. 1) and at 
www. corpmon. com/CorpMonFirm. htm at -3. 
Potential Benefits of Monitoring Intermediaries- 
576 Latham, Mark The Corporate Monitoring Firm" in Corporate Governance - 
An International Review January 1999 (Volume 7 No. 1) and at 
"www. corpmon. com/CorpMonFirm. 
htm at -3. Potential Benefits of Monitoring 
Intermediaries- 
577 Monks, Robert A. G. "Relationship Investing" Paper Columbia 
University, 1993 to download at http: //www. lens-Iibrarv. com/info/colum. html 
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level called "relationship investing" has to follow these historic developments. This 
becomes necessary as the existing tools show considerable inefficiencies. Therefore a 
shift must be made to the extent that the regulatory agencies must take the initiative to 
enforce the fiduciary obligation of trustees to their beneficiaries. Once a fiduciary 
standard is created, there is momentum to extending the same duty to other categories 
like mutual funds, banks and insurance companies. 
The Economist sums up what the new models should be able to accomplish: 
"So everything now depends on financial institutions pressing even harder for reforms to make 
boards of directors behave more like overseers, and less like the chief executives' collection of 
puppets [... ] Financial institutions must also fight to restore their rights as shareholders, lobbying 
for the dismantling of state takeover restrictions which have provided no protection to workers, 
only to top managers. Institutions should also demand that shareholder democracy be allowed to 
operate [... ]. But there is more to be done. In the age of the computer, access to shareholder lists 
should be cheap and simple, not jealously guarded by the boss; that would make it easier to solicit 
support from other shareholders. Institutions would then be able to use their clout in big firms to 
elect directors, who would be obliged to represent only their collective interest as owners. Chief 
executives would still run their firms; but, like any other employee, they would also have a boss. 
And when they failed at their jobs, they would face the sack"578. 
Getting to the point, he introduces two new structures, which can be designed to bridge 
the gap between the level of activism that is optimal for individual shareholders (even 
large ones) and that is ideal for maximum corporate performance. 
The first structure involves the corporations adopting by-laws which enable long-term 
shareholders to monitor the overall direction of the enterprise, "rational involvement" 
instead of "rational ignorance. " This should be achieved by enhanced information 
passed on to investors (no disproportionate cost or risk) and by their ability to propose 
solutions to value-inhibiting problems. These so called "long-term shareholders" (who 
could be defined as those holding a minimum level -- $5 million -- of common shares 
for a minimum holding period -- three years), in contrast to short term speculators, 
should be empowered to nominate candidates for a special committee, for approval by 
all shareholders. Vested with certain powers, the committee should monitor the board 
of directors and should have access to the company proxy statement for a brief 
statement of its findings and recommendations. The objective is to allow ownership to 
be effectively exercised when it is necessary and not to create a "new bureaucracy"579. 
The second structure involves the creation of an investment vehicle specifically created 
for the sole purpose of monitoring "focus companies. " Because owners profit from the 
578 The Economist "Getting Rid of the Boss" 06.02.1993 
579 Monks, Robert A. G. "Relationship Investing" Paper Columbia University, 1993 to 
download at http: //w,., «-%%,. Iens-librarv. com/info/colum. html at p. 25f 
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existence of an effective governance system, they should be motivated as a class to take 
appropriate steps to assure that such a system, in fact, is in place580. 
He concludes his findings by the statement: 
"It is increasingly clear that large and regulated institutional investors may be best able to enhance 
governance through the creation and funding of new entities specially created as effective 
monitors. Over the last fifteen years since the creation of "index funds, " the mode of equity 
investment by large institutional investors has increasingly become "passive. " Instead of buying 
stock in companies that they think is going to go up and selling stock in companies that they think 
is going to go down, investors simply buy into a portfolio that replicates the market as a whole, 
knowing that the likelihood is that the market as a whole will go up (and reflecting empirical data 
that "active" management has seldom outperformed the market, over time). Indexation has become 
so popular that it has changed both the way that the market responds to new developments and 
the way in which trustees view their ownership responsibilities. If a trustee has given up the 
opportunity to make money (or to send a message to management) by selling the shares, exercising 
ownership rights is the last chance he has left. He can do nothing and watch an underperforming 
company sink lower and lower in the index, or he can do something to try to make it do better"581. 
Unfortunately, the suggestions of Monks are only justified from an American angle. 
Moreover, they are not really topical and show a considerable vagueness, as indicated 
by an approach which is more of a philosophical nature than of direct reform. 
Nevertheless, his thoughts are certainly a good basis for improving shareholder-driven 
corporate governance in Germany. Especially his request for a fiduciary standard is 
well worth considering as it could certainly serve the effectiveness of the German 
financial market. 
9.4. Mülbert 
In his expert's opinion to the 61st Lawyers conference in 1996 Mülbert582 investigated a 
number of suggestions. Recognising that the proxy system of the custodians only has a 
considerably limited abuse potential, he believes that the current situation does not give 
rise to question the practice as a whole583. Nevertheless, Mülbert takes up different 
proposals to reform the Stock Corporation Act and to scrutinise their perspective. 
First, Mülbert discusses the possibilities involving the quantitative restrictions of the 
interest held by banks584. According to his opinion, a reform targeting regulation of the 
580 Monks, Robert A. G. "Relationship Investing" Paper Columbia University, 1993 to download at http: //www. lens-library. com/info/colum. html at p. 26 
581 Monks, Robert A. G. "Relationship Investing" Paper Columbia University, 1993 to download at http: //www. lens-library. com/info/colum. html at p. 26f 
582 Mülbert, Peter Empfehlen sich gesetzliche 
Regelungen zur Einschränkung des Einflusses der Kreditinstitute auf Aktiengesellschaften? " Gutachten E für den 
61. Deutschen Juristentag" Munich 1996 
583 Mülbert, Peter Empfehlen sich gesetzliche 
Regelungen zur Einschränkung des Einflusses der Kreditinstitute auf Aktiengesellschaften? " Gutachten E für den 
61. Deutschen Juristentag" Munich 1996 at p. E 75 
584 Mülbert, Peter Empfehlen sich gesetzliche 
Regelungen zur Einschränkung des Einflusses der Kreditinstitute auf Aktiengesellschaften? " Gutachten E für den 
61. Deutschen Juristentag" Munich 1996 from p. E 83 
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interest of banks in stock corporations would be useless. He argues that this does not 
create an economic difficulty requiring reforms. Mülbert also states that a regulation of 
the interest would in any case infringe the Equality Principle in Art. 3 Grundgesetz. 
Hence, regulation of the interest is not an option. Nevertheless, the crossholdings by big 
insurance companies and banks are on trial at present, as a number of restructuring 
initiatives indicate (e. g. Deutsche Bank selling off Daimler Chrysler shares). 
Additionally, Mülbert investigates the proxy voting practice and possible reforms of the 
system. Fortunately, his major point of concern with the proxy voting practice of the 
custodians, § 128 s. 2 s. 2 AktG, was altered by Art. 1 No. 10 a NaStraG in 2000. Therefore 
his arguments became diluted. 
9.5. Bill by the Social Democrats and Suggestions by Baums/von Randow 
During the Nineties, the Social Democratic Party585 presented two concepts. The first 
one was based on proposals by Baums and von Randow586. The second concept was 
more advanced and resulted in a bill. Both suggestions to reform the system were based 
on the same approach. Therefore it is advisable to scrutinise the theories in cumulo. 
Both hypotheses provide that custodian banks are only entitled to function as proxies if 
single instructions by the shareholder are given. Here the role of custodian banks is 
taken over by five shareholder representatives, who should be elected for five years 
(SPD), as well as two to three voting administrators elected for three years (Baums). 
From today's point of view it is incomprehensible that those agents should be provided 
by the auditors as a conflict of interest would be programmed. 
The elected representatives should compete against each other for the shareholders' 
ballots. This contest should guarantee a qualitative selection. 
There is a difference regarding the scope of the voting rights. While the bill of the Social 
Democrats provides that the shareholder representative is only entitled to vote for the 
delegated proxies, the voting administrator should represent those shareholders who 
were not interested in voting. The agents should be compensated (by the company) 
according to the number of shares they represent. 
585 Gesetzesantrag des Landes Rheinland-Pfalz Entwurf eines 
Gesetzes zur Steigerung der Effizienz von Aufsichtsräten und zur Begrenzung der 
Machtkonzentration bei Kreditinstituten infolge von Unternehmensbeteiligungen" 
1997 (BR-Drucksache 561/97) to download at 
http: //www. parlamentsspiegel. de/WWW/Webmaster/GB_I/I. 4/Dokumentenarchiv/dokument. php? k=BBD561/97, a critical comment to these alterations 
compared to his own suggestions could 
be found in Baums, Theodor Vollmachtsstimmrecht der Banken - Ja oder Nein? " Universität Osnabrück, Institut für 
Handels- und Wirtschaftsrecht, Paper No. 29,1995 to download at www. jura. uni-osnabrueck. de/institut/hwr/papers. htm at p. 25 ff 
586 Baums, Theodor/von Randow, Philipp Der Markt 
für Stimmrechtsvertreter" in Die Aktiengesellschaft Volume 40,1995 p. 145-163 
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Criticism587 is certainly appropriate regarding the representatives. It is not advisable to 
choose auditors, not only due to the experience made with Enron and Worldcom. Their 
conflicts of interest are omnipresent. Moreover, the requirement of a single instruction 
would most probably lead to a further decrease of the capital presence. 
Furthermore, the "politicising"of the general meeting towards a "shareholder 
parliament" might be a good idea at first glance, but problems are undoubtedly 
inherent. The creation of such a system would probably lead to an unwanted 
polarisation in the general meeting, populist representatives and over-regulation. 
In addition to that, the compensation model is not able to guarantee quality (good 
corporate governance). The payment by the company will again lead to a conflict of 
interest of the agents. 
To draw a conclusion, it has to be acknowledged that the legal development has 
superseded these theories. Now, not only possibilities exist like voting via the internet 
or handing over the completed ballots to company representatives, but also obligations, 
which state for instance that investment trusts should vote for their funds by 
themselves, or can use an independent proxy. 
9.6. Enhancing the Role of Shareholder Associations 
It is well worth having a look at the shareholder associations588; especially as their role 
is mentioned in § 135 s. 9 no. 1 AktG. But the question arises if they are really capable of 
playing an alternative role to custodian banks. It should be possible to say that they are 
free from any conflict of interest as they are financed by contributions of their members. 
Their role began to be questioned because of the suspicion of insider trading and 
financing by stock corporations in some recent crisis589. Moreover, their influence is 
limited as they rarely represent more than one percent of the votes in the meetings. 
Therefore the shift towards shareholder associations has to be enormous. As a 
consequence it has to be doubted whether they are prepared and determined to take on 
such an organisational challenge. 
Additionally, their structure as an association will complicate efforts of opening them 
up to other shareholder groups. Financing needs to come from earnings of offered 
services and other products instead of membership fees. Furthermore, the articles of 
association would require a reform away from non-profit orientation towards a profit 
orientated organisation. 
587 In detail Tuerks, Robin Depotstimmrechtspraxis versus U. S. -proxy-system: 
der Beitrag von Finanzintermediären zur Optimierung der 
Unternehmenskontrolle" Munich 2000 at p. 44 ff or Mülbert, Peter in Empfehlen sich gesetzliche Regelungen zur Einschränkung 
des Einflusses der Kreditinstitute 
auf Aktiengesellschaften? " Gutachten E für den 61. Deutschen Juristentag" Munich 1996 at p. E92 ff 
588 The two most popular in Germany are the Deutsche Schutzvereinigung für Wertpapierbesitz (www. dsw-info. de) and the Schutzgemeinschaft der 
Kapitalanleger (www. sdk. org). 
589 Jakobs, Georg/Schmitt, Jörg Etikettenschwindel" in Manager Magazin 10/02 p. 206ff 
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However, a big obstacle will also be their reputation as activists. This flaw, whether it is 
justified or not, will repel a number of investors (especially institutional investors). 
On the other hand it has to be mentioned that their influence will certainly increase 
with the retreat of the custodian banks. In order to avoid an unwanted cooperation with 
another bank or asset management (fear of disclosure), a solution might be sought, 
which might include voting via the associations. 
9.7. Limited Voting Right 
Tuerks590 remarks that the limitation of the voting right, as §3s. 5 s. 1 VW- 
Privatisierungsgesetz provides for the Volkswagen AG, might be an approach to reduce 
the influence of custodian banks. However, limiting the voting rights would certainly 
result in a low capital presence591, which would be far below the current turn-out. 
Therefore this suggestion cannot be acceptable. Reforms should result in an increase or 
at least a stabilisation of the capital presence and avoid the creation of accidental 
majorities. 
9.8. Requirement of Single Instructions 
The "Bankenstrukturkommission592" (Commission on the Structure of Banks), 
appointed by the Ministry of Finance to solve fundamental questions of the credit 
service sector, suggested to demand single instructions for decisions requiring a 
qualified majority and for the election and the discharge of members of the supervisory 
board employed by a custodian bank. 
Logic predicts decreasing turn-out at meetings. Voting would simply become too 
complicated and expensive. In addition to that, the already existing enormous 
administration with proxy voting would be further inflated. 
9.9. The Bank Employed Proxy Agent 
A questionable reform is the suggestion to introduce bank-employed proxy agents593 to 
vote free of instructions and independently. It is suggested that they should function as 
the "bad conscience" of the custodian bank. In addition to that, this reform should 
enhance transparency. 
590 Tuerks, Robin Depotstimmrechtspraxis versus 
U. S. -proxy-system: der Beitrag von Finanzintermediären zur Optimierung der Unternehmenskontrolle" 
Munich 2000 
591 Presence number in the general meeting of the Volkswagen AG 2004: 37,21 % 
592 Bericht der Studienkommission (Bankenstrukturkommission) Grundsatzfragen 
der Kreditwirtschaft", Bonn 1979 at p. 993f. 
593 Sabine Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger Im Kräftefeld der Interessen: Das Vollmachtsstimmrecht der Banken" in Der Betrieb (DB) 1995 at p. 2355 
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In general, this approach could be able to take the proxy voting process away from the 
banks at least to some extent. Nevertheless, it is more than doubtful that a proxy agent 
paid by the bank will be independent from it. To push the criticism further, a bank- 
employed proxy agent would probably not be more than a puppet. Even if the bank 
will not influence him the agent is not safe from trying to act in the interest of his 
employer594. Hence, this reform is not acceptable as it pretends independence where 
there is none. 
9.10. "Voting Mandatory" 
A reform suggested by the Bundesrat aimed at the introduction of a "Voting 
Mandatory595". The idea of "mandatory" was the logic conclusion from a restriction of 
the voting right of the custodian banks596. The Bundesrat saw an increasing demand for 
independent proxy agents as an alternative to the custodian banks. As the "mandatory" 
was seen as a new profession, with a very responsible assignment, the Bundesrat 
suggested to require personal qualifications supervised by the Bundesaufsichtsamt für 
Wertpapierhandel (today BAFIN - Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht). 
It cannot be denied that this bill by the Bundesrat included some advanced innovations. 
From today's point of view it was certainly sensible to agree on introducing a new 
group of proxies (Just referring to the proxy committee of the stock corporation in 
§ 134 s. 3 s. 3 AktG). In addition to that the required personal qualifications will most 
probably come up again in conjunction with § 32 s. 1 s. 4 InvG597. 
However, criticism of this bill is certainly unavoidable. The main problem attached to 
this initiative is the accompanying overregulation598. It is more than questionable if an 
overloaded supervisory authority would be able to cope with the control of the 
suggested amendments and to cover the increasing costs. Furthermore, it has to be 
expected that the restrictions of the voting right of the custodian banks will result in 
further decreasing capital presence. This could partly be seen as a result of increased 
regulation (Which proxy does represent my interests best? ) and the missed opportunity 
594 Same criticism: Baums, Theodor Vollmachtsstimmrecht 
der Banken - Ja oder Nein? " Universität Osnabrück, Institut für Handels- und Wirtschaftsrecht, 
Paper No. 29,1995 to download at www. jura. uni-osnabrueck. de/institut/hwr/papers. htm at p. 19,20 
595 Gesetzesantrag des Landes Rheinland-Pfalz Entwurf eines 
Gesetzes zur Steigerung der Effizienz von Aufsichtsräten und zur Begrenzung der 
Machtkonzentration bei Kreditinstituten infolge von Untemehmensbeteiligungen" 1997 (BR-Drucksache 561/97) to download at 
http: / / www. parlamentsspiegel. de/ WW W/Webmaster/ GB_I/ I. 4/ Dokumentenarchiv/ dokument. php? k=BBD561/97 
- Alteration regarding 
§ 135 s. 9 s. 3 AktG 
596 Alteration regarding § 135 s. 1 AktG - the Bundesrat suggested to couple the voting right with its role as a creditor within the stock corporation and to avoid 
the accumulation of own voting rights and proxies. 
597 It would be surprising, if the BAFIN (Bundesaufsichtsamt für das Finanzwesen - German supervisory authority) would refrain from regulating and defining 
the role of "someone". 
598 Tuerks, Robin in Depotstimmrechtspraxis versus 
U. S. -proxy-system: der Beitrag von Finanzintermediären zur Optimierung der Unternehmenskontrolle" 
Munich 2000 at p. 52 
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to make the voting process easier. The question of the agency costs also remains 
unsolved. Regarding the institutional investors it could be assumed that they will be 
prepared to pay for this proxy service. However, this cannot be expected from private 
investors. Most probably they will not be ready to take over the administration costs. 
In drawing a conclusion to this bill, it should be stated that it appears promising. 
Installing an authority as an alternative to the custodian banks is certainly the right 
approach. However, the legislator should promote the idea of the "mandatory" and 
provide incentives for using one rather than producing another law producing 
additional administration. 
9.11. Bonus for Exercising the Vote 
The suggestion that shareholders who executed their voting right should receive the 
incentive of a higher dividend (10-20%)599 to increase the turn-out at annual general 
meetings can be supported. Nevertheless, this idea should not become a legal 
requirement and should be left dispositive to the statutes of the company600. This 
solution would provide far more flexibility as the companies could decide by 
themselves whether this tool is necessary and under which conditions it should 
operate601. By introducing a bonus for exercising the vote, the company will not only 
give an incentive to those shareholders using their voting right and thus lower the 
danger of accidental majorities, but it will also pay the governing costs and 
consequently, foster shareholder engagement. It is recommendable that the bonus 
should be paid to the shareholder who is eligible to vote at the general meeting (day of 
the record date) and not to the shareholder who acquired the shares after the record 
date but before the general meeting602. 
The question of hidden representation, that is only the proxy is known and not the 
shareholder (e. g. in the case of bearer shares), could turn into a problem. As such a 
verification process is complex and could be costly603, the economical feasibility comes 
into focus. Doubts on the idea of the bonus also arise regarding the amount of the 
599 Davis, Stephen, "Voting Pays" in Global Proxy Watch; Vol. IX No. 35; 7. Oct. 2005,599; Klühs, Hannes Präsenzboni 
für die Teilnahme an der 
Hauptversammlung - Ein Vorschlag zur Steigerung der Hauptversammlungspräsenz bei Aktiengesellschaften" 2005; Paper No. 124 to download at 
http: // publikationen. ub. uni-frankfurt. de/ volltexte/ 2005/2335/ pdf/ 124Aufsatz_pm. pdf 
600 Deutsche Schutzvereinigung für Wertpapierbesitz Hauptversammlungssaison 2005" to download at http: //www. dsw- 
info. de/Hauptversammlungssaison-2005.566. O. html 
601 Klühs, Hannes Präsenzboni 
für die Teilnahme an der Hauptversammlung - Ein Vorschlag zur Steigerung der Hauptversammlungspräsenz bei 
Aktiengesellschaften" 2005; Paper No. 124 to 
download at http: //publikationen. ub. uni-frankfurt. de/volltexte/2005/2335/pdf/124Aufsatz_pm. pdf at p. 5 
602 Klühs, Hannes Präsenzboni 
für die Teilnahme an der Hauptversanunlung - Ein Vorschlag zur Steigerung der Hauptversammlungspräsenz bei 
Aktiengesellschaften" 2005; 
Paper No. 124 to download at http: //publikationen. ub. uni-frankfurt. de/volltexte/2005/2335/pdf/l24Aufsatz_pm. pdf at p. 9 
603 Davis, Stephen, "Voting 
Pays" in Global Proxy Watch; Vol. IX No. 35; 7. Oct. 2005 
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premium to be paid. Although a 100% capital presence can not be expected it needs to 
be taken into consideration. This also provides an element of uncertainty. However, a 
solution to this latter problem might be to expect 100% capital presence and to define a 
fixed bonus which will be paid out. This premium could then be distributed among 
those who are actually physically present. To give an example: The company announces 
a5 Cent bonus for exercising the voting right. When only 50% of shareholders make use 
of their right, then their premium will raise to 10 Cent. 
The success of this suggestion depends on a calculation of the expenses. However, the 
suggestion of a bonus for exercising the vote is supported by the Spanish financial 
market where payments for the execution of the vote of two to ten Cents per share on 
the dividend lead to increased capital presence (E. g. Endesa rose from 37% to 66%)604. 
I shall argue that the "educational" approach is certainly problematic. The investor 
should cast his vote because he is convinced that governance matters, which will in 
exchange foster shareholder value, and not because he is paid for it. Stock picking in 
order to claim the dividend bonus will certainly increase the capital presence but does 
not automatically serve good governance and does not avoid corporate scandals. 
To draw a conclusion, a bonus payment for shareholders casting their vote is a 
proactive and elegant suggestion to overcome the constant decrease of turn-out 
numbers at general meetings and to improve the engagement of investors. If this 
approach could have enough economical substance will be shown by the interest of the 
financial market. 
9.12. Further Suggestions 
Because of the renunciation of some of the custodian banks, a number of further 
suggestions became almost superfluous. Worth mentioning in this respect are 
transparency and publication rulings as well as renunciations with respect to decisions 
where a conflict of interest might arise605. Moreover, fundamental demands like the 
abolition of the custodian voting right606, as Wenger suggests, or the sale of preference 
shares solely to small private shareholders607, according to Müller-Erbach are once and 
for all off the agenda. Instead of an additional reduction of the voting right of custodian 
604 Klühs, Hannes Präsenzboni 
für die Teilnahme an der Hauptversammlung - Ein Vorschlag zur Steigerung der Hauptversammlungspräsenz bei 
Aktiengesellschaften" 2005; Paper No. 124 to download at http: //publikationen. ub. uni-frankfurt. de/volltexte/2005/2335/pdf/l24Aufsatz_pm. pdf at p. 4 
605 Mülbert, Peter Empfehlen sich gesetzliche 
Regelungen zur Einschränkung des Einflusses der Kreditinstitute auf Aktiengesellschaften? " Gutachten E für den 
61. Deutschen Juristentag" Munich 1996 from p. E 100 
606 Wenger, Ekkehard Stellungnahme zur 
Aktienrechtsreform" Die Aktiengesellschaft - Sonderheft, August 1997 from p. 57 
607 Müller-Erzbach, Rudolf Umgestaltung 
der Aktiengesellschaft zur Kerngesellschaft verantwortungs- 
voller Großaktionäre" 
Berlin 1929 at p. 20ff 
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banks it should be more desirable to maintain at least some influence by custodian 
banks. With regard to the current situation and some of the suggestions mentioned 
above, it has to be acknowledged that the custodians might be the only institution 
which is prepared to offer reasonable proxy voting to private investors. Moreover, it 
has to be kept in mind that the custodians also function as an opinion-forming body in 
corporate policy. 
9.13. Notions on the Further Development 
The landscape of Company Law has changed considerably over the last years. A huge 
wave of reforms has created a completely different scenery. Today the discussion on 
how to deal with custodian votes has been almost eliminated. Less fundamental issues 
like the development of proxy voting, the driving back of the co-determination in the 
supervisory board or the purification of the annual general meeting, are now in the 
limelight of reforms. As the presentation of the UMAG already suggests in this "post- 
custodian period", ground-breaking reforms cannot be expected. Company Law will 
probably be reformed permanently instead. This means that small steps will be taken to 
enhance shareholder engagement. Yet it cannot be expected that the activity of the 
legislator will slow down. The still existing shortcomings in the law and the changing 
environment of shareholder engagement will guarantee a further development of 
reforms. 
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10. Chapter: Conclusions: Three Proposals for the Improvement of 
Shareholder Engagement 
Shareholder engagement is a load-bearing pillar in the German corporate governance 
system. Not only does it support transparency and control of stock corporations but it 
also serves as a value-enhancing factor, as demonstrated in previous chapters. The 
environment for the investor to become active has changed considerably over the last 
couple of years. Reason for this development was an increased sensibility towards 
shareholder issues not only by the legislator but also by the companies. Now the 
investors are not longer regarded as simple sponsors of the company. They have 
become emancipated. 
Nevertheless, although considerable progress has been made, there is still considerable 
room for improvement. Therefore, I will point out three areas of shareholder 
engagement where I think that a reform approach will have a positive effect on the 
German corporate governance regime. 
10.1. Path Dependency as a Condition 
Condition for a sound reform of Company Law is that the alterations are "path 
dependent". In explaining this approach Cheffins has argued that ""law matters" in the 
sense that laws, which allow investors to feel confident about owning a tiny percentage 
of shares, constitutes the crucial "bedrock"" 608. Therefore, legal reforms should follow 
the existing legal path and consider the legal status of the shareholder. Although his 
inquiry was mainly based on economies dominated by widely held public companies, 
his findings are even more valid with regard to regimes where ownership is primarily 
concentrated. The assumption that dispersed share ownership can only arise if a 
country's legal system provides strong shareholder protection for minority 
shareholders has important normative implications609. In other words, the various 
market-orientated factors offering protection to investors in fact proved highly effective 
in mobilising capital and assuaging perceptions of risk610. Legal reforms of moderation, 
which do not only take the existing legal and financial but also the social environment 
into account, could foster share ownership and the financial market as a whole in 
Germany. Especially with regard to the struggling pension system and an economic 
608 CHEFFINS, Brian R. Law as Bedrock: The Foundations of an Economy Dominated by Widely Held Public Companies", in Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 
Vol. 23, No. 1 (2003) p. 1-23 
609 CHEFFINS, Brian R. Law as 
Bedrock: The Foundations of an Economy Dominated by Widely Held Public Companies", in Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 
Vol. 23, No. 1 (2003) p. 1-23 at p. 7 
61() CHEFFINS, Brian R. Law as 
Bedrock: The Foundations of an Economy Dominated by Widely Held Public Companies", in Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 
Vol. 23, No. 1 (2003) p. 1-23 at p. 12 
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stability path dependency for the future, development of shareholder engagement is 
crucial. 
Having pointed out the importance of the "law matters" theory, the shortcomings 
hindering a sound development of the shareholder engagement hierarchy need to be 
pointed out. Primarily three unsolved issues have to be mentioned in this respect: The 
question of financing shareholder engagement, the unawareness and reluctance of 
investors, and shortcomings in the Company Law. 
10.2. First Proposal: Financing Shareholder Engagement 
As long as investors have to cover the costs for engagement they are reluctant to pursue 
their rights listed in the hierarchy of shareholder engagement. Even provisions in the 
law (just mentioning § 32 s. 1 s. 3 InvG, which states that Kapitalanlagegesellschaften 
should vote their national stock) do not provide the necessary basis to become active. 
Having said this it should be mentioned that shareholder engagement is quite costly, 
considering the fees for hiring a proxy voting service or lawyer, sending a 
representative to the general meetings, proxy fights, administration, inquiries or 
analysing the company, etc.. 
Mostly institutional investors intending to become active, be it at the general meeting or 
through shareholder negotiations with management, have to carry the accompanying 
costs. Other investors profit from their engagement not only as they do not need to 
become corporately active themselves, but also because they could benefit from the 
improved performance. Consequently, this issue is called the free-rider problem. 
The active Kapitalanlagegesellschaft can use the performance to promote its fiduciary 
responsibility. Deutsche Bank investment subsidiary DWS and Union Investment are good 
examples, which often attract attention at general meetings and hence the media, by 
criticising or praising deeds of management. The same is true for shareholder 
associations like the Deutsche Schutzvereinigung für Wertpapierbesitz (DSW) or the 
Schutzvereinigung für Kapitalanleger (SDK). However, the costs involved in executing 
good corporate governance could be extraordinary for an investor. It certainly has to be 
admitted that due to the custodian banking system in Germany the problem of agency 
costs was not a primary concern611, as corporate governance was pursued and financed 
by banks. However, the situation has changed. It has to be acknowledged that since the 
custodians have pulled out of the proxy voting business, or at least have reduced their 
611 Jürgens, Ulrich/Rupp, Joachim/Vitols, Katrin/Jäschke-Werthmann, Bärbel "Corporate Governance und Shareholder Value in Deutschland" - 
Veröffentlichungsreihe der Abteilung Regulierung von Arbeit des Forschungsschwerpunkts Technik-Arbeit-Umwelt des Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für 
Sozialforschung FS 11 00-202,2000 to download at http: //bibliothek. wz-berlin. de/pdf/2000/ii00-202. pdf at p. 7 
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services in this area, capital presence at general meetings has decreased and the free- 
rider problem has become more of an issue. This is illustrated by the fact that some 
institutional investors, like dit/ADAM, CSAM or Invesco Asset Management and others, 
have out-sourced their voting to a proxy voting service, while other firms try to 
maintain voting via the custodians, or simply prefer not to vote at all. Private 
shareholders now prefer to renounce their vote instead of paying fees for its execution, 
or going to the trouble of finding other ways to vote (e. g. custodians that are still active, 
shareholder associations, investment clubs, proxy committees etc. ). Equally, global 
shareholders face difficulties and high costs when they try to pursue informed voting 
abroad. Hence, they prefer not to cast their vote. 
Following the hierarchy of shareholder engagement, I only see voting to have a serious 
possibility to be financed by the company and not by the shareholder. The other forms 
of engagement are already financed by the company (information material, shareholder 
proposal (§ 122 s. 4 AktG), calling a meeting (§ 122 s. 4 AktG)), do not carry considerable 
costs (speaking at the meeting) or are not sufficiently transparent (shareholder 
negotiations). Moreover, the shareholder who intends to file a suit could ask for legal 
aid (§ 247 s. 2 AktG). 
To solve this free-rider problem, the following proposals can be taken into 
consideration for reforms to the financing of corporate governance existing so far. 
10.2.1. Duty of Loyalty 
One way of avoiding the free-rider problem might be through the shareholder's duty of 
loyalty. This might be so if such a duty had a horizontal effect. Having said that, the 
shareholder could engage when there is an under-performance of the company with the 
result that a compensation of his costs might be possible via joint liability. However, the 
duty of loyalty is only applicable in cases of unacceptable conduct in the market, 
endangering shareholder assets and disloyal behaviour at elections by a company. 
When the under-performance is related to these cases, then compensation for 
shareholder engagement via this construct is possible. Not justifiable for an expense 
allowance via the duty of loyalty is the mere under-performance in contrast to 
comparable companies. 
10.2.2. Making Voting a Legal Obligation 
Currently, Kapitalanlagegesellschaften are only supposed and do not have to vote 
(§ 32 s. 1 s. 3 InvG). This situation is quite unsatisfactory as, on the one hand 
Kapitalanlagegesellschaften do not feel obliged to vote, while on the other hand the 
supervisory authority cannot sanction this 
failure to comply and hence, cannot see the 
n -ý :, sß; 4-, ity to act. Reforming this act and exchanging this "should vote" provision with a 
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"must vote" provision will improve the awareness and certainly the voting 
engagement. With reference to (still) a number of custodians, the proxy committees or 
intermediaries, who function as proxies, the institutional investor has sufficient tools to 
pursue a responsible voting policy. Whatever solution the shareholder chooses he will 
incur the selected agency's costs. However, while Kapitalanlagegesellschaften carry the 
cost for executing the votes; private, corporate and other shareholders will not be 
involved in this financing issue. Where voting has been made compulsory for funds, 
like in the US or Spain, this legal obligation has at least been able to weaken the free - 
rider problem. Unfortunately, § 32 s. 1 s. 4 InvG has recently been changed by the 4. 
Finanzmarktförderungsgesetz. Hence, it is debatable whether the legislator will review 
the document with respect to an alteration of § 32 s. 1 s. 3 InvG in the near future. 
However, it needs to be pointed out that the Bundesanstalt für 
Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (BAFIN - supervisory authority) was given means to 
supervise the performance of the Kapitalanlagegesellschaften. An infringement of the 
"should vote" provision could be sanctioned. But as this formulation is pretty vague 
and the BAFIN does not see voting as an important issue on their agenda and prefers a 
solution by the market612, it cannot be expected that a change will come from this side. 
10.2.3. The Intermediate 
Another option is to promote the use of an intermediate offering proxy voting as well as 
corporate governance analysis of companies. Certain authors613 have developed 
different theories regarding the concept of intermediates. These authors concluded that 
establishing the use of intermediates would have the capacity to reduce agency costs 
that emerge from shareholder engagement. 
10.2.3.1. The Corporate Monitoring Firm 
The theory of Mark Latham on the corporate monitoring firm has already been 
explained in the previous chapter. This theory provides a solution to avoid the free- 
rider problem. The issue is that the corporate monitoring firm is too closely related to 
the supervisory board. Hence, with regard to the question of financing corporate 
governance, it has to be questioned if shareholders would be prepared to cover the costs 
for the corporate monitoring firm. 
612 Statement of the Chairman of the BAFIN, Jochen Sanio, at a speech held at the American Chamber of 
Commerce in Stuttgart (5th of April 2006) 
613 E. g. Latham, Mark The 
Corporate Monitoring Firm" in Corporate Governance - An International Review January 1999 (Volume 7 No. 1) and at 
www. corpmon. com/CorpMonFinn. 
htm and Baums, Theodor Vollmachtsstimmrecht der Banken - Ja oder Nein? " Universität Osnabrück, Institut 
für Handels- 
und Wirtschaftsrecht, 
Paper No. 29,1995 to download at www. jura. uni-osnabrueck. de/institut/hwr/papers. htm at p. 25 ff 
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10.2.3.2. Baums 
A similar view was stated by Theodor Baums in 1995614. He pleads for the involvement 
of professional proxy agents, as they require only one payment for all services. This is 
an economically sensible solution since the proxy agent has considerable specialisation 
and dimensional advantages with regard to procurement and evaluation of enterprise- 
relevant information. However, to guarantee a qualitatively convincing service, proxy 
agents have to meet some requirements615: 
-independence between the proxy agent and the stock corporation 
-guarantees that the proxy agent does not pursue extraneous aims 
-the pricing model of the proxy agent has to avoid the free-rider effect 
-the proxies have to guarantee effective control at the general meeting 
One important consequence is that certain qualitative and quantitative standards must 
be maintained. Therefore, Bauens supports the view that shareholders who are unable 
to be present at the general meeting should be represented by a qualified "proxy 
administrator" elected by the general meeting. However, it has to be recognised that 
this opinion was accompanied by the omnipotent role of the banks at that time (1995) 
and was aimed at reforming the custodian system. This problem is currently not as 
relevant and therefore should be put into perspective. Nonetheless, this opinion 
provides an approach as to how the agency costs could be divided among a number of 
shareholders with the result that the free -rider problem is somewhat diminished. 
10.2.3.3. Agency without Authority 
In contrast to the Anglo-American legal system, in the German and probably also in the 
Roman and Middle-European one, it is possible to dissolve the free-rider problem via 
the construct of an agency without authority according to § 677,683s. 1 BGB. Not only is 
this solution elegant but also simple, as no reform of the existing Company Law is 
necessary. 
Conditional for Germany in this respect is that the votes are not distributed via the 
custodian but by a proxy voting service directly. The Decree on the indemnification on 
custodian expenses (Verordnung über den Ersatz von Aufwendungen der 
Kreditinstitute 2003) is closing, which means that custodians cannot ask for an 
additional indemnification (e. g. voting) than for sending out AGM materials on behalf 
of the custodian. 
614 Baums, Theodor/von 
Randow, Philipp Der Markt für Stimmrechtsvertreter" Working Paper No. 22 1/1995 to download at www. jura. uni- 
osnabrueck. 
de/institut/hwr/papers. htm 
615 Baums, Theodor/von 
Randow, Philipp Der Markt für Stinunrechtsvertreter" Working Paper No. 22,1/1995 to download at www. jura. uni- 
osnabrunk"de/Institut/hwr/papers. 
htm at p. 21 ff 
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The concept is based on a triangle between an intermediary, the institutional investor 
and the company. This avoids a conflict of interest because there is no contractual basis 
between the intermediary and the company. The intermediary is paid for his services by 
the investor, who has the legal tool to claim back these payments from the company. 
Figure 27: Agency without Authority Triangle 
Investor Contract of Service § 611 ff BGB Intermediate 
Contract of Manufacture § 631 ff BGB* 
Compen: 
for Analy 
683 s. 1 E 
is or 
9 *x 
*A contract of service according to § 611 ff BGB, a contract of manufacture according to § 631 ff BGB, or a 
combination of both (as might occur in a consulting contract, when the drawing up of a written expert's 
opinion likewise is a determining element of performance616) needs to be closed. 
**There is no contractual relationship between the intermediary and the company. This is necessary to 
avoid conflicts of interest. 
***Basis of claim for the compensation of the costs, which arise from the contract between the investor 
and the intermediary, is an agency without authority according to § 677,683 s. 1 BGB. 
The condition for an agency without authority according to § 677,683s. 1 BGB and 
hence, for a compensation of the agency costs is (1) a conduct of business, which the (2) 
outside executive conducts, (3) with the will to manage another one's business, (4) 
without being authorised or entitled. Additionally, (5) the conduct of business has to be 
in the interest of the principal. 
(1) Taking the diagram above as the solution scheme, the contract between investor and 
intermediary has to be a conduct of business. This condition is met when the activity is 
of legal or real nature. The conduct of business is also covered when the executive 
chooses a third party to conduct the business617. The contract which is made between 
616j. von Staudingers Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch" 13th Edition Berlin 1995 at § 675 C117 (Martinek) 
617 Dörner, Heinrich 
/Ebert, Ina/Eckert, Jörn/Hoeren, Thomas/Kemper, Reiner/Schulze, Reiner/Staudinger, Ansgar Bürgerliches 
Gesetzbuch" Baden-Baden 
2001 it § 677 No. 2 (Schulze) 
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investor and intermediary/ proxy voting provider is a conduct of business and thus 
fulfils the required condition. 
(2) Moreover, the business has to be conducted by an outside executive. Providing that 
the intermediary does not have any contractual relations with the investor, he is an 
outside executive. 
(3) A further requirement is that the outside executive has the intention to manage the 
business of a third party. Two reasons for the formation of the contract between the 
investor and the intermediary can be determined. Firstly, contracting between the 
intermediary and the company might lead to conflicting interests and is therefore 
inappropriate. Secondly, the custodians gradually abandon the proxy voting business 
and are often unable to provide a global proxy distribution. Issuers do not and 
strategically cannot offer a suitable replacement providing sufficient coverage. 
Therefore the outside executive has the intention to manage the business of a third 
party. 
(4) The investor does not need to be authorised or entitled by the company. Providing 
the company's articles of association state otherwise, the shareholders are generally not 
entitled or authorised, by the company to hire an outside service. This is also valid with 
regard to voting via an authorised proxy. 
(5)Finally, the conduct of the business has to be in the interest of the company. In 
general, companies want to avoid accidental majorities, see their investors selling the 
shares and maintain the shareholder rights granted by the Stock Corporation Act. These 
shareholder rights indicate that the investors should be comprehensively informed 
about the business of the company and have the right to get involved in the general 
meeting. The right to file an action needs to be excluded as it is for obvious reasons not 
in the interest of the company. 
Often enough the mentioned shareholder rights can only be executed with difficulties. 
Such difficulties arise for example for shareholders from abroad who might receive an 
agenda in a foreign language, or whose custodian charges enormous 
fees for executing 
the vote (e. g. Italy up to 600 Euro/meeting) if at all. Local investors might 
have 
difficulties executing their shareholder rights as well, considering that a number of 
German custodians have pulled out of the proxy voting business. 
Consequently, the company has an alleged interest that investors hire an intermediary 
to help overcoming these problems. 
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Important to mention is that the conduct of business does not need to be successful. 
§ 677 BGB only demands conscientious implementation of the business that has been 
taken over and not the realisation of success618. 
Following the approach of the agency without authority the free-rider problem seems to 
become obsolete. As the corporation pays compensation to the investor, all 
shareholders are under equal financial strain. A conflict of interest is avoided, as the 
intermediary is not dependent on the company, but is exclusively paid by, and only 
responsible to, the investor. This gives intermediaries additional possibilities in 
pursuing corporate governance. 
Finally, this construct does not require initiative from the legislator, since the 
possibilities of existing laws are exhausted, so lengthy discussion with a subsequent 
legislative procedure is superfluous. The shareholder could even seek compensation ex 
tunc (§ 95 BGB limitation 30 years). 
Having shown the possibility of circumventing the free-rider problem, it is interesting 
to see how the solution could be realised. The critical point is to create an interest by the 
company, which will consequently address the issue of finance. The following research 
path is conceivable: 
1. Consulting contract between the investor and the intermediary. 
2. The intermediary will seek dialogue with the company: 
a) Is the company prepared to accept such a foundation of a claim? 
b) What will be the scope of compensation? 
c) How can floodgates for other intermediaries be avoided? 
d) Will the corporation be open for dialogues if the intermediary provides suggestions 
for improvement? 
3. The results and suggestions will be presented to the investor. 
4. The intermediary will receive a mandate to outline the conditions with the company 
5. The investor will claim the charges he or she paid to the intermediary from the 
company 
Concluding, it is important to point out that if the market participants agree on the 
"agency without authority" construct then not only corporate governance in Germany 
could be improved, but also the relationship between the stock corporation and its 
investors. 
618, T von Staudingers 
Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch" Berlin 1995 13th Edition at § 677 No. 8 (Martinek) 
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10.3. Second Proposal: Overcoming the Lack of Awareness and Apathy of 
Shareholders 
It is quite unsatisfactory that the vast majority of investors do not sufficiently know 
their shareholder rights and how to adequately pursue them. Moreover, when looking 
at the capital presence at general meetings it could be concluded that there is even 
apathy towards the execution of shareholder rights. The fact that even institutional 
shareholders ignore their fiduciary duties is a serious issue. 
These shortcomings prevent sound shareholder engagement according to the claimed 
hierarchy and weaken corporate governance from the shareholders' side. 
While other forms of engagement are not sufficiently transparent (negotiations) or are 
less of an issue to allege a lack of awareness (e. g. information request, shareholder 
proposal or calling the meeting), the apathy and the lack of consciousness become quite 
obvious with regard to voting (especially cross-border). 
In contrast to that, the right to file a suit has been used excessively in the past619, which 
shows that shareholders are quite aware of this tool. 
To overcome these shortcomings German companies had improved "shareholder 
education" considerably in the last couple of years. However, to further enhance their 
relationship with investors they need to implement the new possibilities provided by 
Company Law rigorously, in particular with regard to improved usage of the Internet. 
Here especially the electronic distribution of reports, ballots and other material needs to 
be emphasised again. It is also necessary for companies to acknowledge the growing 
number of foreign shareholders. They should receive an annual report and an agenda of 
the general meeting in German and English. The fewer obstacles there are for an 
investor to participate in a general meeting and to inform himself, the more likely it is 
that he gets involved in corporate policy and thus in corporate governance. 
Regarding the "education" of institutional investors, the German Association of 
Investment and Asset Management (BVI), has not yet exhausted its possibilities. In any 
way it is important to point out that the BVI has recognised the importance of an 
informed voting. To encounter the reluctance of institutional shareholders the BVI 
offers its members a general meeting service which provides announcement and 
analysis of 220 German and European meetings. This service started in 2007. 
Although private shareholders cannot and should not be obliged to execute their vote, 
this is not necessarily the case for institutional investors, especially as they have a 
fiduciary responsibility towards their clients. The key section with regard to voting is 
§ 32 s. 1 s. 3 InvG. When the legislator changes the provision so that 
Kapitalanlagegesellschaften have to execute their votes (currently they should execute 
them), they are urged to take their fiduciary responsibilities more seriously with the 
619 Chapter 6.2.6 
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result that the safeguarding of shareholder rights would become a quantifiable value. 
Here it should be added that an active fund might also function as a positive example 
for enhanced engagement of private shareholders. Although a further legal obligation 
should be the last option for the legislator, the capital presence and the behaviour of the 
fund industry show that an alteration of § 32 s. 1 s. 3 InvG towards compulsory voting is 
almost unavoidable. 
The issue of voting could be quite complex. Therefore, it is necessary that investors use 
the services of intermediarys to overcome shortcomings in the pursuit of shareholder 
rights. This will not only save them administrative work, but will also enhance their 
sphere of action, while strengthening corporate governance in general. Equally 
important in this respect is the introduction of a voting policy by institutional 
shareholders as the voting process could be automated. The use of such a policy will 
reduce the workload in the proxy season and will be an indicator for the issuer when 
drawing up the general meeting agenda. 
10.4. Third Proposal: Correcting Shortcomings in Company Law 
The third area where shareholder engagement could be improved is Company Law. 
Although it has been considerably reformed by the legislator, a number of issues still 
need to be solved. 
To start with, the issue of transparency for better shareholder information needs to be 
addressed. The Security and Exchange Commission in the US requested "Disclosure, 
again disclosure and yet more disclosure"620. This statement is also valid for Germany. 
Although the legislator introduced the new VorstOG - Vorstandsvergütungs- 
Offenlegungsgesetz (Management Remuneration Disclosure Act) 2006621 to increase the 
disclosure requirements regarding the remuneration of the management for companies, 
it needs to be recognised that certain transparency provisions are still in need of further 
development. To mention in this respect are for instance accounting standards, an area 
in which some companies still have to catch up. 
Some reforms to improve shareholder engagement in the general meeting have been 
introduced by the UMAG. At this point, however, it is too early too assess if they are 
adequate means of enhancing issues like speaking at the general meeting or voting. 
The right to file a suit according to § 243 AktG is certainly still in need of reform. It has 
to be acknowledged that some improvements have been made by the UMAG in 2005. 
However, as it has been stated above, it is essential to recognise the entrepreneurial risk 
620 Noack, Ulrich Modern 
Communication Methods and Company Law" at B I, to download at http: //www. jura. urvi- 
cluesscý Iorf. 
de/, iozenten/noack/texte/noack/eblr. doc 
621 Gesetzentwurf 
der Bundesregierung Entwurf eines Gesetzes über die Offenlegung der Vorstandsvergütungen (Vorstandsvergütungs-Offenlegungsgesetz - 
VorstOG)" to download at 
http: //dip. bundestag. de/btd/15/055/1505577. pdf 
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for stock corporations. This could be endangered by law suits. It should be down to the 
management board, the supervisory board and the general meeting, for example, to 
decide on a takeover and not to the courts. I pointed out that strengthening the 
judgement procedure will not only benefit the company as its resolutions will not be 
blocked, but it will also improve the possibility of the shareholders to claim 
compensation and ease the workload of the courts. Only in cases of severe damage 
threatening the company the filing of an action should be made possible. 
Beyond the hierarchy of shareholder engagement, the structure of the supervisory 
board (codetermination of employee representatives, former CEO on the board) is in 
need to reform. It is not necessary to question the two-tier board system as a whole as 
the supporters of such a solution recommend, though the conversion of the Societas 
Europea into national law needs to be observed. From my point of view a complete 
reconstruction of the board system will lead to deterioration of corporate governance at 
least for the transitional period. It would be better to improve the standard of the 
supervisory board than to fundamental changes. It is certainly easier not to allow 
shareholder representatives who have more than five mandates or former members of 
the management board to be put on the list of candidates than to introduce a single 
board system. 
Having stated the request for an improved legislation, it is necessary to emphasise that 
activity by the legislator should aim at deregulation of Company Law instead of new 
acts and provisions. In this respect it is important to refer to the "law matters" approach 
again. In order to foster the development of the financial market, the legislator is well 
advised not to create too many legal obstacles. 
First the self-regulation of the market forces has to be supported, as it has been shown 
with the introduction of the German Corporate Governance Code for example. The 
VorstOG (Management Remuneration Disclosure Act) mentioned above might have 
been superfluous if the Code had been worded differently. The compliance with the 
German Corporate Governance Code needs to receive more attention. Especially 
smaller stock corporations do not comply sufficiently yet622. 
Additionally, entrepreneurial risk should be accepted as an essential component of the 
market and not as an economy-threatening evil. Of course, it is essential that 
shareholders need to be protected, but this needs to happen on a basis that also leaves 
enough room for the stock corporations to develop. 
622 Vol' Werder, Axel/Talaulicar, 
Till Umsetzung 
der Empfehlungen und Anregungen des Deutschen Corporate Governance Kodex" Berlin Center of Corporate 
Governance, March 
2006 to download at http: //www. corporate-govemance-code. de/ger/download/Kodex_Report_2006_Executive_Summaryl. pdf at p. 8 
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To draw a conclusion, it is important to point out positively that the legislator has 
tackled a number of necessary reforms in the last couple of years and therefore has 
improved Company Law and the environment for shareholder engagement. 
10.5. Conclusion 
It is essential that the mentioned solutions, financing shareholder engagement, 
overcoming the lack of awareness and apathy of shareholders and correcting 
shortcomings in Company Law will be redressed (at least to a certain extent). They are 
important components to make the investor an effective corporate governor. Moreover, 
shareholder value will also be improved, while the option of selling the shares will 
diminish. 
Solving the financing of shareholder engagement will helps not only to improve the 
relationship between the shareholder and the company, but will also upvalue the 
corporate governance which is exercised by the general meeting. 
Overcoming the lack of awareness and apathy of shareholders is needed to make them 
a functioning governor of the company and to avoid voting with the feet. 
Shortcomings in company law need to be corrected so that some means of shareholder 
engagement do not run dry and that the role of the investor is fully acknowledged. 
At this point it should be mentioned that corporations will not need to face an army of 
self-declared supervisors. The governance system existing so far should simply be put 
on a more effective basis and be directed into the right channels so that shareholder 
engagement receives the role it deserves. 
Finally, if shareholder engagement is directed into the right channels it could enhance 
the dialogue between the corporation and its investors for the benefit of both sides. 
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Definitions 
American Depository Receipt623 - American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) are one of the 
most popular methods by which US investors gain exposure to foreign securities (For 
ADRs to be within the US pricing levels, they may represent more than one share of a 
foreign Issuer or a fraction of one share of a foreign Issuer). In comparison to owning 
foreign securities directly, ADRs provide benefits to US investors who wish to own 
foreign securities, including easy transfer of shares, payment of dividends in US dollars, 
and facilitation of compliance with foreign investment restrictions and requirements. 
Similarly, ADRs and other forms of depositary receipts also are attractive vehicles for 
many non-US investors for investments in emerging markets. Non-US investors of 
ADRs appreciate the greater security and liquidity that these instruments offer over 
direct investment in certain markets. 
ADRs, which are negotiable certificates Issued by a US bank or trust company, 
represent ownership interests in shares of a foreign Issuer that have been deposited 
with a depositary. The deposited securities are usually held by a custodian in the 
country of the foreign Issuer. 
ADRs may be established either as "sponsored" or "unsponsored" programs. 
Unsponsored ADRs are typically private arrangements among investors, broker- 
dealers, and a depositary bank, without the participation of the Issuer. Sponsored 
ADRs are established jointly between an Issuer and a depositary under the terms of a 
depositary agreement that sets out the rights and responsibilities of the Issuer, 
depositary, and ADR holder. Because ADRs must be sponsored to be listed on a 
national exchange or on NASDAQ, this paper focuses on sponsored ADRs. 
Different Types of ADRs 
There generally are three different types of sponsored ADR programs - Level I, Level II, 
and Level III, each with its own set of legal and regulatory requirements. 1 Generally, 
the higher level ADRs indicate a higher level of Issuer involvement with the ADR 
program and a greater amount of information made available by the Issuer to the 
public. Both ADRs and the deposited securities must be registered under the Securities 
Act of 1933 (Securities Act) if there is a public offering of securities in ADR 
form. 1 
Deposited securities must be registered under the Securities Act of 1933 if a 
foreign 
Issuer or its affiliate is selling securities to the public in the United States. 
Registration 
of deposited securities, however, would not be required when neither the 
Issuer nor an 
affiliate is engaged in a public offering of the deposited securities. 
623 Definition by the International Corporate Governance Network at www. icgn. org 
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Level I ADRs are used when an Issuer does not wish to, or is not allowed to, list its 
securities on a national securities exchange; Level I ADRs are traded in the "pink 
sheets. " Level I ADRs must be registered with the SEC although most Level I Issuers 
seek exemption from SEC reporting requirements. 
Level II ADRs can be listed and traded on national securities exchanges and must 
comply with the full registration and reporting requirements of the Securities Act and 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act), which include initial registration on 
Form F-6, registration statements on Form 20-F, and annual reports and interim 
financial statements. Level II ADRs also require compliance with other selected 
securities laws, including Section 13 reporting of stock transactions. Because a Level II 
ADR does not involve a public offering in the United States of the shares underlying the 
ADRs, the underlying shares do not have to be registered under the Securities Act. 
Level III ADRs are the highest profile programs under which Issuers float a public 
offering of depositary receipts in the United States and list the receipts on a national 
securities exchange. Level III receipts are subject to the same registration and reporting 
requirements as Level II receipts with the additional requirement that a Form F-1 
registration statement for the securities underlying the ADRs also must be filed with the 
SEC. The Form F-1 includes a prospectus to inform potential investors about the 
company and the risks associated with the offering. 
Under SEC rules for Level II and III ADRs, the depositary bank must make copies of 
shareholder communications, proxies, and reports received from the Issuer available for 
inspection by the ADR holders. 1 In their initial registration, foreign Issuers are 
required to disclose the terms of the deposit, including corporate governance rights of 
Level II and III ADR holders. 1 For example, foreign Issuers must disclose provisions, if 
any, with respect to the procedure for voting the deposited securities and the 
transmission of notices, reports, and proxy soliciting materials. For Level II and III 
ADRs, foreign Issuers also are required to disclose in their SEC registration filings any 
provisions of foreign law or governing documents of the Issuer that would limit the 
rights of nonresident or foreign owners of ADRs to hold or vote the securities or to 
receive dividends, interest, and other payments. 
Antigreenmai1624 - Greenmail refers to the agreement 
between a large shareholder and 
a company in which the shareholder agrees to sell his stock back to the company, 
usually at a premium, in exchange for the promise not to seek control of the company 
for a specified period of time. Antigreenmail provisions prevent such arrangements 
unless the same repurchase offer is made to all shareholders or the transaction 
is 
approved by shareholders through a vote. They are thought to 
discourage 
624 All the following definitions are taken from GOMPERS, Paul A. /ISHII, Joy L. /METRICK, Andrew "Corporate Governance and 
Equity Prices" July 2001 at 
IIttp: //papers. ssm. com/sol3/papers. cfm? abstract_id=278920 p. 37-42 
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accumulation of large blocks of stock because one source of exit for the stake is closed, 
but the net effect on shareholder wealth is unclear (Shleifer and Vishny (1986a)). Five 
states have specific antigreenmail laws, and two other states have "recapture of profits" 
laws, which enable firms to recapture raiders' profits earned in the secondary market. 
We consider recapture of profits laws to be a version of antigreenmail laws (albeit a 
stronger one). The antigreenmail category includes both firms with the provision and 
those incorporated in states with either antigreenmail or recapture of profits laws. 
Blank check preferred stock - This is preferred stock over which the board of directors 
has broad authority to determine voting, dividend, conversion, and other rights. While 
it can be used to enable a company to meet changing financial needs, it can also be used 
to implement poison pills or to prevent takeover by placement of this stock with 
friendly investors. Companies who have this type of preferred stock but who have 
required shareholder approval before it can be used as a takeover defence are not coded 
as having this provision in our data. 
Business Combination laws - These laws impose a moratorium on certain kinds of 
transactions (e. g., asset sales, mergers) between a large shareholder and the firm for a 
period usually ranging between three and five years after the shareholder's stake passes 
a pre-specified (minority) threshold. 
Bylaw and Charter amendment limitations - These provisions limit shareholders' 
ability to amend the governing documents of the corporation. This might take the form 
of a supermajority vote requirement for charter or bylaw amendments, total elimination 
of the ability of shareholders to amend the bylaws, or the ability of directors beyond the 
provisions of state law to amend the bylaws without shareholder approval. 
Classified board -A classified board is one in which the directors are placed into 
different classes and serve overlapping terms. Since only part of the board can be 
replaced each year, an outsider who gains control of a corporation may have to wait a 
few years before being able to gain control of the board. This provision may also deter 
proxy contests, since fewer seats on the board are open each year. 
Compensation plans with changes in control provisions - These plans allow 
participants in incentive bonus plans to cash out options or accelerate the payout of 
bonuses should there be a change in control. The details may be a written part of the 
compensation agreement, or discretion may be given to the compensation committee. 
Director indemnification contracts - These are contracts between the company and 
particular officers and directors indemnifying them from certain legal expenses and 
judgments resulting from lawsuits pertaining to their conduct. Some firms have both 
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"indemnification" in their bylaw/charter and these additional indemnification 
"contracts" 
. 
Control-share cash-out laws enable shareholders to sell their stakes to a "controlling" 
shareholder at a price based on the highest price of recently acquired shares. This works 
something like fair-price provisions (see below) extended to non-takeover situations. 
Cumulative voting - Cumulative voting allows a shareholder to allocate his total votes 
in any manner desired, where the total number of votes is the product of the number of 
shares owned and the number of directors to be elected. By enabling them to 
concentrate their votes, this practice helps enable minority shareholders to elect 
favoured directors. Cumulative voting and secret ballot (see below), are the only two 
provisions whose presence is coded as an increase in shareholder rights, with an 
additional point to G if the provision is absent. 
Directors' duties allow directors to consider constituencies other than shareholders 
when considering a merger. These constituencies may include, for example, employees, 
host communities, or suppliers. This provision provides boards of directors with a legal 
basis for rejecting a takeover that would have been beneficial to shareholders. 31 states 
also have laws with language allowing an expansion of directors' duties, but in only 
two of these states (Indiana and Pennsylvania) are the laws explicit that the claims of 
shareholders should not be held above those of other stakeholders [Pinnell (2000)]. We 
treat firms in these two states as though they had an expanded directors' duty provision 
unless the firm has explicitly opted out of coverage under the law. 
Fair-Price Requirements - These provisions limit the range of prices a bidder can pay 
in 
two-tier offers. They typically require a bidder to pay to all shareholders the highest 
price paid to any during a specified period of time before the commencement of a 
tender offer and do not apply if the deal is approved by the board of directors or a 
supermajority of the target's shareholders. The goal of this provision is to prevent 
pressure on the target's shareholders to tender their shares in the front end of a two- 
tiered tender offer, and they have the result of making such an acquisition more 
expensive. This category includes both the firms with this provision and the 
firms 
incorporated in states with a fair price law. 
Golden parachutes - These are severance agreements which provide cash and non-cash 
compensation to senior executives upon a triggering event such as 
termination, 
demotion, or resignation following a change in control. They do not require shareholder 
approval. 
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Director indemnification - This provision uses the 
bylaws and/or charter to indemnify 
officers and directors from certain legal expenses and judgments resulting from 
lawsuits pertaining to their conduct. Some firms have both this "indemnification" in 
their bylaws/charter and additional indemnification "contracts". The cost of such 
protection can be used as a market measure of the quality of corporate governance 
[Core (2000)]. 
Limitations on director liability - These charter amendments limit directors' personal 
liability to the extent allowed by state law. They often eliminate personal liability for 
breaches of the duty of care, but not for breaches of the duty of loyalty or for acts of 
intentional misconduct or knowing violation of the law. 
Pension parachute - This provision prevents an acquirer from using surplus cash in the 
pension fund of the target in order to finance an acquisition. Surplus funds are required 
to remain the property of the pension fund and to be used for plan participants' 
benefits. 
Poison pills - These securities provide their holders with special rights in the case of a 
triggering event such as a hostile takeover bid. If a deal is approved by the board of 
directors, the poison pill can be revoked, but if the deal is not approved and the bidder 
proceeds, the pill is triggered. In this case, typical poison pills give the holders of the 
target's stock other than the bidder the right to purchase stock in the target or the 
bidder's company at a steep discount, making the target unattractive or diluting the 
acquirer's voting power. The early adopters of poison pills also called them 
"shareholder rights" plans, ostensibly since they give current shareholders the "rights" 
to buy additional shares, but more likely as an attempt to influence public perceptions. 
A raider-shareholder might disagree with this nomenclature. 
Secret ballot - Under secret ballot (also called confidential voting), either an 
independent third party or employees sworn to secrecy are used to count proxy votes, 
and the management usually agrees not to look at individual proxy cards. This can 
help 
eliminate potential conflicts of interest for fiduciaries voting shares on behalf of others, 
or can reduce pressure by management on shareholder-employees or shareholder- 
partners. Cumulative voting (see above) and secret ballot, are the only two provisions 
whose presence is coded as an increase in shareholder rights, with an additional point 
to 
G if the provision is absent. 
Executive severance agreements - These agreements assure 
high-level executives of 
their positions or some compensation and are not contingent upon a change 
in control 
(unlike Goldenor Silver parachutes). 
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Silver parachutes - These are similar to golden parachutes in that they provide 
severance payments upon a change in corporate control, but unlike golden parachutes, 
a large number of a firm's employees are eligible for these benefits. 
Special meeting requirements - These provisions either increase the level of 
shareholder support required to call a special meeting beyond that specified by state 
law or eliminate the ability to call one entirely. 
Supermajority requirements for approval of mergers - These charter provisions 
establish voting requirements for mergers or other business combinations that are 
higher than the threshold requirements of state law. They are typically 66.7,75, or 85 
percent, and often exceed attendance at the annual meeting. This category includes both 
the firms with this provision and the firms incorporated in states with a "control-share 
acquisition" law. These laws require a majority of disinterested shareholders to vote on 
whether a newly qualifying large shareholder has voting rights. In practice, such laws 
work much like supermajority requirements. 
Unequal voting rights - These provisions limit the voting rights of some shareholders 
and expand those of others. Under time-phased voting, shareholders who have held the 
stock for a given period of time are given more votes per share than recent purchasers. 
Another variety is the substantial-shareholder provision, which limits the voting power 
of shareholders who have exceeded a certain threshold of ownership. 
Limitations on action by written consent - These limitations can take the form of the 
establishment of majority thresholds beyond the level of state law, the requirement of 
unanimous consent, or the elimination of the right to take action by written consent. 
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List of Abbreviations 
Acts 
AktG - Aktiengesetz (Stock Corporation Act) 
HGB - Handelsgesetzbuch (Trading Act) 
BGB - Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (Civil Code) 
InvG - Investmentgesetz (Investment Act) 
WpÜG - Wertpapiererwerbs- und Übernahmegesetz (Security Acquisition and Takeover Act) 
KStG - Körperschaftssteuergesetz (Corporation Tax Act) 
WpHG - Wertpapierhandelsgesetz (Securities Trade Act) 
SpruchG - Spruchverfahrensgesetz (Judgement Procedure Act) 
KapMuG - Kapitalanleger-Musterverfahrensgesetz (Act for Master Actions by Investors) 
KontraG - Gesetz zur Kontrolle und Transparenz im Unternehmensbereich (Corporation Control and 
Transparency Act) 
NaStraG - Gesetz zur Namensaktie und zur Erleichterung der Stimrrechtsaustibung (Law on Registered 
Shares and Simplified Rules for the Exercise of Voting Rights) 
TransPuG - Transparenz- und Publizitätsgesetz (Transparency and Publicity Act) 
UMAG - Gesetz zur Unternehmensintegrität und Modernisierung des Anfechtungsrechts (Act for 
Enterprise Integrity and the Modernisation of the Right to Appeal) 
VorstOG - Vorstandsvergütungs-Offenlegungsgesetz (Management Remuneration Disclosure Act) 
Institutions 
BGH Bundesgerichtshof (Federal High Court) 
EU - European Union 
NIRI - American National Investor Relations Institute 
BVI - Bundesverband Investment und Asset Management (Association of German Institutional Investors) 
AFG - Association Francaise de la Gestion (Association of French Institutional Investors) 
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DSW Deutsche Schutzvereinigung fair Wertpapierbesitz (German Association to 
Protect Shareholding) 
OLG - Oberlandesgericht (Higher Regional Court) 
LG - Landgericht (District Court) 
Other 
CEO - Chief Executive Officer 
IPO - Initial Public Offering 
AGM - Annual General Meeting 
SRI - Social Responsible Investment 
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